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I. INTRODUCTION
Children, by definition dependent and without legal capacity,
are perceived as unable to make mature decisions 1 and as more
vulnerable than adults to harm that may be caused by immature
decisions.2 Children are treated as incapable of giving legal consent
because they are believed to be actually incapable of making fully
informed and responsible decisions for and by themselves.' Upon
becoming eighteen,4 all persons are presumed competent to decide
and to act for themselves. Before that magical birthday, 5 however,
someone must have legal capacity, authority, and responsibility to
take care of children and to make decisions for them; in most cases
that someone is a parent, the state by itself taking custody or by
delegating custody to a substitute parent as in adoption or foster
care placement, or some nonparent. 6
To choose one from among custodial alternatives is a difficult
kind of decision for ajudge to make and for a society to rationalize.7
*Associate Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law. B.A., Northwestern, 1955;
J.D., University of North Dakota School of Law, 1971; L.L.M., George Washington, 1980.
My thanks to Randy H. Lee and Bernard O'Kelly for their careful reading and helpful
comments; they are of course not responsible for any remaining oversights or obscurities.
1. States may limit the freedom of children to make choices with potentially serious
consequences because "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack
the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental
to them." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion).
2. In Bellotti, the United States Supreme Court stated: "Our cases show that although children
generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as
are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and
their needs for 'concern, . sympathy, and ... paternal attention."' Id.
3. In Parham v. J.R. the United States Supreme Court stated: "Most children, even in
adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions. Parham
v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
4. N.D.CENT. CODE § 14-10-02 (1981). Section 14-10-02 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides: "All persons eighteen years of age and over are adults." Id.
5. Joseph Goldstein has observed that "It]he rite of passage in secular law from childhood to
adulthood is simple, certain, and easy to establish. A person need only reach the magic statutory age
of majority to be 'independent' of parental control and protection and to be presumed competent by
the state to take care of himself-to make and to be responsible for his own acts and decisions."
Goldstein, On BeingAdult and Being an Adult in Secular Law, 105 DAEDALUS 69, 70 (1973).
6. In upholding preventive detention of juveniles accused of delinquent conduct, the United
States Supreme Court observed the following:
Juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody. . . . Children, by
definition are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are
assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the
state must play its part asparenspatriae.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
7. As the North Dakota Supreme Court has observed, "[u]nfortunately, thousands of years of
experience since Solomon's famous decision have not given judges any better way to determine what
is best for children, particularly when choosing between two loving and fit parents." Landsberger v.
Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918, 918 (N.D. 1985).
Jon Elster points out that "the knowledge that the decision will have momentous importance
for the parties directly involved and the recognition that it may not be possible to have a rational
preference for one parent over the other . . . conspire to create a psychological tension in decision
makers that many will be unable to tolerate." Elster, SolomonicJudgments: Against the Best Interest ofthe
Child, 54 U. CHI._L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
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The choice obviously and deeply affects the lives of children and of
those who seek to care for them but does not lend itself to
impersonal, institutional resolution. It is, nevertheless, frequently
litigated in three categories of cases: (1) when the state seeks
temporarily or permanently to remove a child from parental
custody; (2) when two parents live separately and each wants
primary custody; and (3) when a nonparent claims that his or her
qualitative relationship with a child should supersede a parental
claim.
This Article will discuss the significance of primary caretaking
in North Dakota custody contests between two fit parents of
children too young to express their own preference, children who
are therefore actually as well as legally unable to decide for
themselves. Primary caretaking in such disputes will be examined
against the background of custody doctrinal developments and by
comparison to custody claims by nonparents against parents.
The North Dakota Supreme Court observed in Gravning v.
Gravning that North Dakota has not yet given elevated or
presumptive weight to primary caretaking status in determining
which of two fit parents is to have custody of their child.8 Justice
Beryl Levine argued in dissent that the court should adopt the rule
that when two equally fit parents seek custody of children too young
to express a preference, and one of those parents has been the
primary caretaker of the children, custody should be awarded to the
primary caretaker. 9 The justifications outlined by Justice Levine
and developed in current case law and scholarship provide an
occasion to reconsider the North Dakota position that all relevant
factors are of equal significance in determining custody according
to the best interest of the child. This Article will argue that primary
caretaking should be weighed more heavily than other
considerations in deciding interparent custody disputes when the
children are too young to express a preference.
A parent is a primary caretaker when he or she has been more
substantially involved than the other parent in providing care to
8. 389 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D. 1986); see also Branson v. Branson, 411 N.W.2d 395, 396, 399
n.3 (N.D. 1987).
9. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W. 2d 621, 624-25 (N.D. 1986) (Levine, J., dissenting); see
also Branson, 411 N.W.2d at, 401-02 (Levine, J., dissenting). A standard that is directly applicable
only to young children has a wide impact because most divorces take place early in marriage, when
children are still young. The medium length of a marriage ending in divorce in 1981 was seven years;
65% of divorces were within nine years of marriage. Carbonneau, A Consideration of Alternatives to
Divorce Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1134, (1986). Such a standard has a wider indirect
impact becausejudges are reluctant to separate siblings by splitting custody. See, e.g., In reJones, 309
N.W.2d 457, 461 (Iowa 1981) (court ordinarily tries to keep siblings together although the rule is not
ironclad). In re GONZALES, 373 NW. 2d 152, 155 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (siblings are not to be
separated unless there are compelling reasons to do so). But see Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d
621 (N.D. 1986) (upholding split custody for two-year old and one-year old siblings.
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their children.10 The position that primary caretaking is the most
important Consideration in custody disputes is based upon the
premise that the intimate interaction between young children and
their primary caretakers creates a unique psychological bond
between them. Because of that bonding, primary caretakers are
usually the primary psychological parents of young children. 11
Although the significance of psychological continuity and the
trauma caused by the separation of children from persons to whom
they are psychologically bonded was recognized long before 1970, it
is widely associated with the work of Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, and Albert Solnit. Those authors' work on psychological
bonding was published in influential books in 1973,12 1979,13 and
1986.14 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit assert that it is crucial for
children to maintain a relationship with a psychological parent,
"one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's
psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical
needs.''15 It therefore follows for them that every child needs
continuity of care, to receive affection and nourishment from at
least. one adult and to feel that he or she is and continues to be
important to those who take care of him or her. 16 While Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit in their earliest work viewed custody disputes in
divorce as contests between two equally suitable psychological
10. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MicH. L. REV.
477, 527 (1984). Neither parent is identified as primary caretaker if there has been substantial
coparenting. See infra notes 189, 230-31.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 132-6.
12. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE.BEST INTERESTS OF THE.CHILD (1973)
[hereinafter BEYOND BEST INTERESTS]. Joseph Goldstein is a Yale law professor and research
psychoanalyst. Anna Freud was a psychoanalyst. AlbertJ. Solnit is a Yale professor of pediatrics and
psychiatry.
Although their work is primarily based on a psychoanalytic theory of child development, Joseph
Goldstein explained in a 1984 interview the following:
[O]ur ideas are more than just beliefs... they rest on a disciplined and organized
investigation of human experience and on a substantial clinical base. Now to say that
is not to tell the whole story because what we have learned through a variety of
disciplines, not just psychoanalysis, only confirms what we know from ordinary
common knowledge and common sense.
Indeed, the whole notion in common law of protecting the privacy of families
comes out of a recognition of the need of families to have privacy, to have a setting in
which children can grow up and learn and be nourished and be stimulated and be
protected. It isn't as ifour theory comes from nowhere or from some new discovery; it
is a confirmation of human experience.
Interview withJoseph Goldstein, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANcE 575, 583-84 (1984).
13. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE.BEST INTERESTS OF THE.CHILD (1979)
[hereinafter BEFORE BEST INTERESTS].
14. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN THE.BEST INTERESTS OF THE.CHILD
(1986) [hereinafter IN BEST INTERESTS].
15. BEYOND BEST INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 98.
16. Id.
484 [VOL. 63:481
PRIMARY CARETAKERS
parents, 17 in their last colloborative effort they endorsed a
preference in favor of a parent who had functioned as primary
caregiver during the marriage.18
This Article proposes an explicit directive that any analysis of
the best interest of young children begin with a weighed preference
in favor of a primary caretaking parent. It accepts as a premise
that, substantively, maintenance of primary psychological
relationships is more important than other considerations for
determining the best interest of children. 19 It proposes protecting
primary psychological relationships by a presumption that young
children should remain in the custody of their primary caretakers, a
presumption that in effect recognizes primary caretaking as prima
facie evidence of primary psychological bonding between the
caregiver and young children. 20 The proposal is modest: the
presumption would be rebutted if the nonprimary caretaker
established that he or she was nevertheless the primary
psychological parent, 21 and it might be overridden by other
circumstances. 22 The Article argues that such a presumption serves
the best interest of young children better than assignment of equal
weight to all relevant considerations because it reduces the risk of
undervaluation of the intimate interaction and vital psychological
bonding between children and their primary caretakers- and
therefore more effectively protects continuity of care for children. 23
The best interest of children is served instrumentally as well as
substantively by an explicit preference for primary caretakers
because that preference facilitates coherent decisionmaking by trial
courts24 and meaningful appellate review. 25 By contrast, the impact
on the decisionmaking process of unweighed considerations of all
relevant factors makes determination of the best interest of the child
a matter of unpredictable and virtually nonreviewable discretion at
the trial level. 26 Since it is this indeterminate decisionmaking
process that permits misuse of the custody issue to extort agreement
to unfair support and property allocations from primary caretakers
unable to risk loss of custody in unpredictable litigation, 27 an
17. Id. at 19.
18. IN BEST INTERESTS, supra note 14, at 66-67. Anna Freud died before publication of this last
collaborative effort.
19. See infra pages 511-14.
20. See infra pages 528-29.
21. See infra pages 535-36, 559-60.
22. See infra pages 555-59.
23. See infra pages 516-17.
24. See infra pages 524-30.
25. See infra pages 530-33.
26. See infra pages 500-04.
27. See infra pages 521-22.
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explicit preference for primary caretakers as custodians of young
children leaves parents and their counsel better able to resolve their
disputes fairly and without trial.28
II. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW CUSTODY
DOCTRINE
Early English law followed Roman law in giving fathers
unconditional power over their legitimate children. 29 The quality of
the child-parent relationship was wholly irrelevant, because the
paternal entitlement was a status-based property right.30
Identification of the person entitled to custody was therefore easy
and clear. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century,
however, fathers in a few English cases lost custody because of their
egregious immorality. 3' The rule thus became a presumptive
entitlement that could be rebutted by showing paternal unfitness.
The fitness qualification required occasional evaluation of paternal
conduct rather than mere identification of the fact of paternal
status. Although questions raised by the narrow qualification arose
only in exceptional cases, the possibility of such a question did
introduce an element of judicial discretion and so made results
slightly less predictable than application of an unqualified status-
based rule. The qualification did not recognize any interest in the
mother. 32 Nor did the qualification require or treat as relevant any
comparative evaluation of paternal and maternal parenting.
28. See infra 523-24.
29. J. ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE 222 (1986).
30. See Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. -L. REV. 177, 180 (1916).
Roscoe Pound explained that Roman law treated wives, children, and slaves as property interests of
the head of the household, "to be protected, transferred, and dealt with as other objects of
ownership." Id. In 1916, however, Pound quoted Professor Wigmore as authority for the
proposition that, in addition to economic interests in services received from a child, parents had
interests in "the social pleasure ministered by the child land] the chastity of a female child, as
ministering to the parent's sentiments of family self-respect and honor." Id. at 181. Historian
Michael Grossberg notes that Pre-Revolutionary Anglo-American custody law "held children to be
dependent, subordinate beings, assets of estates in which fathers had a vested right. Their services,
earnings, and the like became the property of their paternal masters in exchange for life and
maintenance." M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE. HEARTH: .LAW AND THE. FAMIi.Y IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 235 (1985); see also Klaff, The Tenders Years Doctrine, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335, 337
(1982) (parental rights were like other property rights acquired during marriage, vested exclusively
in the husband).
31. Foster and Freed suggest 1817 as the date when absolute paternal dominance ended,
although they acknowledge some earlier dicta by Lord Mansfield that might support a fitness
qualification. Foster& Freed, Life with Father, II FAM. L.Q. 321, 325 (1978). In 1817, the poet Percy
Bysshe Shelley "lost custody of his children after [their mother's] suicide because of his atheistic
beliefs and profligate conduct. Lord Eldon in effect held Ariel unfit as a parent, thus qualifying the
father's absolute right to custody." Id.
32. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453. According to Blackstone, mothers were
"entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect." Id.
[VOL. 63:481
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The English presumption in favor of paternal custody was a
part of the male-dominated property system identified with
feudalism. 33 It lost its force as family roles were transformed by
industrialism, 34 and in the face of pressures caused by resistance to
the hardships of loss of custody by mothers of young children. 35 A
presumption entitling mothers to the custody of children less than
seven years of age was codified by Parliament in 1839,36 and in
1873 a Parlamentary Act authorized a maternal right to custody of
children to the age of sixteen. 37 These nineteenth-century English
statutes provided the basis for the tender years doctrine, a
preference for fit mothers as custodians of young children. 38
Some nineteenth-century cases in America approved the older
English rule presuming custody for fit fathers39 but others
recognized a maternal preference by adopting a rule that children
of tender years should be in the custody of fit mothers. 40 The
maternal preference was status-based, but rather than being a
property incident the status depended upon assumptions about the
33. See Foster & Freed, supra note 31, at 321; see also Devine v..Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 688 (Ala.
981) (common law paternal preference was fostered, in part, by feudalistic notions concerning the
responsibilities of the husband to provide for the maintenance, education, and religious training of
his children). Mothers were entitled to custody of their children after failed marriages under
prefeudal Anglo-Saxon law. Foster & Freed, note 31, at 321. Under feudalism, however, "the wife
was not a legal person in the eyes of the law, and her role as mother merely entitled her to respect but
not to authority." Id. at 321-22. Sayre notes that under the feudal system a father could transfer
custody to a nonparent rather than to the mother by appointing another guardian in his will. Sayre,
Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI..L. REV. 672, 675 (1942).
34. L. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY HISTORY AND FAMILY LAW 8-10 (1986) (description of change from
homes as units of economic production in agrarian society to places of private refuge in industrial
society, with corresponding change from seventeenth century spousal partnership roles to sharp
nineteenth century role differentiations of husbands as workers in public domain and wives as child
nurturers); see also L. WEITZMAN, THE. DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE. UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 219 (1985) (women's maternal
instincts were "discovered" as fathers moved into wage labor in factories and offices).
35. See Klaff, supra note 30, at 339-40 (describing the campaign for reform by counsel for a
mother who had fled to the continent with her three young children after a court refused to deny
custody to the father).
36. Act to Amend the Law Relating to Custody of Infants, 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 54 (1839).
37. Act to Amend the Law Relating to Custody of Infants, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 12 (1873).
38. See Klaff, supra note 30, at 353. According to Klaff, the term "tender years" in English law
described children too young to use their own discretion in choosing a guardian and, in America, the
term refers vaguely to the time before adolescence. Id. Homer Clark concludes that it is not clear
what ages are tender but that the characterization certainly includes preschool children. See H.
CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 585 (1968).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15, 256) (fathers
have the right, although not an absolute right, to custody); cf. 23 D. STEWART, THE. LAW OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AS ESTABLISHED IN ENGLAND AND THE.UNITED STATES 383 (1884) (the father
of a child has the first right to custody if the father is the husband of the child's mother, but the father
may forfeit his right to custody by unfitness).
40. See W. BROWNE, A COMMENTARY ON THE. LAW OF DIVORCE AND ALIMONY 321 (1892).
William Hardcastle Browne stated in 1892 that "[wlhere the child is of tender years, and, therefore,
requires a woman's nursing and a woman's care, the Court is disposed to award its custody to its
mother." Id. (footnote ommitted) However, he noted that "[many State decisions recognize the
superior right of the father, where the child has reached an age, where it can without violence to
nature be withdrawn from maternal nursing, and where its transfer to him will not apparently work
inJury to the child." Id. at 319.
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nuturing quality of mother-child relationships and upon the child's
interest in that qualitative relationship. 4 1 As the New Jersey
Supreme Court explained the tender years doctrine in 1869, "it is
not the dry, technical right of the father, but the welfare of the child
which will form the substantial basis of judgment.' '42 The
rationale for the paternal preference, meanwhile, changed from a
property incident to an entitlement based upon the protective
quality of father-child relationships and upon the child's interest in
that qualitative relationship. 3
Once mothers as well as fathers could be entitled to custody
because of qualities associated with their parental status, it became
natural to formulate the common law doctrine in terms of a
paramount parental right. This right provided that parents were
presumptively entitled to custody as against any nonparent or the
state, regardless of the fact that one parent might be preferred over
the other in an interparent contest. The paramount parental right,
like the older paternal right that it extended, was limited by the
standard requiring that parents must be fit in order to retain their
entitlement. 44
American courts spoke generally in terms of the welfare and
best interest of the children whose custody was disputed. 45 Any
41. See M. GROSSBERG, supra note 30, at 238. Grossberg notes that "a growing concern with
child nurture and the acceptance of women as more legally distinct individuals, ones with a special
capacity for moral and religious leadership and for child rearing, undermined the primacy of
paternal custody rights." Id.
42. State v. Baird & Torrey, 21 N.J. Eq. 384, 388 (1869), quoted in M. GROSSBERG, supra note
30, at 248.
43. See M. GROSSRERG, supra note 30, at 236. Grossberg observes that, as the father's custodial
claim "evolved from a property right to a trust tied to his responsibilities as a guardian," the
entitlement became more transferable. Id.
JusticeJoseph Story wrote, in an unusual federal habeas corpus case, the following:
[There is no] absolute right of the father, but for the benefit of the infant, the law
presuming it to be for his interest to be under the nurture and care of his natural
protector, both for maintenance and education. When, therefore, the court is asked to
lend its aid to put the infant into the custody of the father, and to withdraw him from
other persons, it will look into all the circumstances, and ascertain whether it will be
for the real, permanent interests of the infant; and if the infant be of sufficient
discretion, it will also consult its personal wishes .... It is an entire mistake to suppose
the court is at all events bound to deliver over the infant to the father....
United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 31-32 (D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15, 256); see also Hibbette v. Baines,
78 Miss. 695, -, 29 So. 80, 81 (1900) (the father has the right to the custody of his children
because the law assumes that the father has a natural love for his children that will result in the
children's happiness and care).
44. See Sjol v. Sjol, 76 N.D. 336, 338, 35 N.W.2d 797, 798 (N.D. 1949) (statute provides
preference to a parent but custody may be awarded to third party when the morals or safety or
interests of the child demand it).
45. Sayre, supra note 33, at 677-78; see, e.g., Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624,
626 (1925). Finlay has been described as the first clear enunciation of the best interest test. See Note,
Birth-Defective Infants: A Standardfor Nontreatmnent Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599, 606 n.33 (1978).
North Dakota cases have long identified the welfare of the child as the controlling consideration
in interparent disputes. E.g., Rufer v. Rufer 67 N.D. 67, 70, 269 N.W. 741, 742 (1931) (trial courts
488
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more particular standard was understood to be a secondary
criterion for determining the best interest of the child. The
presumption that fit parents were entitled to custody was reconciled
with the standard that custody was to be decided in the best interest
of the child by implicit presumptions that fit parents are nurturing
and protective and that it serves the best interest of children to be in
the custody of fit parents. 46 The child's interest was recognized
generally by those reconciling presumptions and in particular by
the qualification that the parents must be fit, but the interest of the
parent remained substantial and the fitness qualification remained
a narrow exception to the status-based entitlement. If a parent was
shown to be unfit, he or she had in effect temporarily or
permanently forfeited the entitlement to be a parent. As the North
Dakota Supreme Court explained in 1919:
For even the legal dominion which the law gives to the
natural parent has its limitations. Such dominion is the
nature of a sacred trust which the law imposes upon the
parent for the benefit of the child. . . . As long as the
parent is true to such trust the right to the custody and
control of his or her child is paramount, but when the
parent fails to perform the duties which the trust imply,
the parent forfeits the legal dominion over the child as a
matter of absolute right; and such dominion will not be
enforced by the courts if the court deems it to be contrary
to the best interests of the child. 47
whole consideration was the welfare of the child); Schlak v..Schlak, 51 N.D.897, 900, 201 N.W. 832,
833 (1924) (welfare of children is paramount consideration); In re Sidle, 31, N.D. 405, 412-13, 154
N.W. 277, 280 (1915) (adoptive parents able to fulfill child's emotional and physical needs). All
states now decide interparent custody disputes according to a best interest of the child standard. J.
A-rKtNsoN, supra note 29, at 220.
46. See, e.g., Powers v. Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, -, 353 A.2d 641, 645 (1976)
(presumption that best interest of the child is usually served by parental custody). Michael Wald
points out that "our preference for parental autonomy is based on the assumption that children
develop best when raised by their biological parents. The ties of blood are thought to generate the
concern and commitment essential to childrearing." Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse
and Neglect of Children: A Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child, 78 MICH. L. REv. 645, 645 (1980);
see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (natural affection leads parents to act in the best
interests of their children); D. STEWART, supra note 39, at 384 (parents have the first right to the
custody of the child because parental instinct and natural affection are the surest guarantees of the
child's welfare).
47. Larson v. Dutton, 43 N.D. 21, 28, 172 N.W. 869, 871 (1919) (affirming refusal to return to
mother a child she gave up for adoption four years earlier to persons who acted as parents to but did
not formally adopt the child).
1987] 489
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III. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COMMON LAW
DOCTRINE
The common law doctrine that fit parents are entitled to
custody of their children was constitutionalized as a matter of
substantive due process in a series of cases beginning in the 1920s. 48
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized
that parental rights are liberty interests entitled to enhanced
constitutional protection in Stanley v. Illinois.4 9 In Stanley a state
statutory scheme recognized no parental claim by fathers of
illegitimate children, the result of which led to Peter Stanley's
children being declared wards of the state after their mother died.5 0
The Court invalidated the state statute as a violation of due process
and determined that the state could not terminate Stanley's
relationship with the children except by finding him unfit. 5' The
Court reasoned:
[T]he private interest here, that of a man in the children
he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protec-
tion. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or
her children "come[s] to this Court with a momentum
for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which
derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.5 2
While later Supreme Court cases made it clear that the
Stanley right exists only in cases of fathers who have established an
48. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 520 (1925) (state law requiring public school
education conflicts with liberty right of parents to choose private schools for the education of their
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 392-93 (1923) (state prohibition of foreign language
instruction to elementary school children unconstitutional intrusion into liberty interest of parents to
control the education of their children). Because parental rights are fundamental within the meaning
of due process doctrine, enhanced procedural and substantive protections are constitutionally
mandated. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982) (grounds for termination of
parental rights must be established by at least clear and convincing evidence); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (state cannot break up natural family without some showing of unfitness).
But see Rivera v. Minnich, 107 S. Ct. 3001, 3006 (1987) (judicial declaration of paternity can be
based on preponderance ofevidence).
49. 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
50. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
51. Id. at 657-58. In addition to its determination that when a mother dies, an unwed father is
entitled, pursuant to the due process clause, to a hearing as to his fitness before the children may be
removed from his custody, a plurality of the Court also determined that the father was entitled to a
hearing pursuant to the equal protection clause. Id. at 658. It noted that since all Illinois parents arc
constitutionally entitled to a fitness hearing, denying a hearing to unwed fathers is "inescapably
contrary to the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
52. Id. at 651; see also.Rivera, 107 S. Ct. at 3004 (liberty interest in providing the training,
nurture and loving protection is at the heart of the parental relationship protected by the
Constitution).
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actual relationship with their children either by marriage to the
children's mother or by assuming a responsible role in rearing and
supporting the children, 53 the status entitling a parent to protection
of a fundamental liberty interest within the meaning of the due
process clause remains definable by reference to objective facts that
are usually easily determined, rather than by subjective evaluation
of the quality of the parent-child relationship. 54
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the
constitutionalization of parental interests in 1976 in Kottsick v.
Carlson,55 when it refused to interpret literally a provision of the
Revised Uniform Adoption Act that provides the parental rights of
a noncustodial parent may be terminated if his or her consent to
adoption of a minor child is withheld contrary to the best interest of
the child. 56  In Kottsick the court recognized that a literal
interpretation of that language would raise serious constitutional
problems, because permitting adoption without the consent of the
noncustodial parent would be equivalent to termination of a
parental right without showing that the parent is unfit.5 7 The court
reasoned that since the Supreme Court of the United States in
Stanley held that an unwed father had a constitutional right to
have his relationship with his children left undisturbed by the state
absent a hearing at which his unfitness was established, certainly a
married father must have that right. 58
53. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256
(1978).
54. The fact of parental status is usually easily identified. Traditionally, the fact of maternity
was identified and defined biologically, by the circumstance of birth. The fact of paternity was
identified and defined legally, by the fact of marriage to the mother of the child or by legitimation.
Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 226, 234 (Summer 1975). Unmarried fathers who had not legitimated their children were not
considered to be parents in the sense of having a protected relational interest in the child. The finding
by the United States Supreme Court that the paternity of an unmarried father might be
constitutionally protected introduced some uncertainty as to what circumstances created the status of
parent in a constitutionally-protected sense. Nevertheless, the rule that parents are presumptively
entitled to the custody of their children continues to provide a criterion of decision by which the
resolution of a custody question can be determined in most cases by the presence of an easily
determined fact. The clarity of such a general rule limits official discretion. It also limits the need for
judicially-imposed resolutions of custody. If the resolution of a question can with some certainty be
predicted without official adjudication, ordinarily persons will voluntarily conform their behavior to
the resolution: ordinarily, neither the state nor a nonofficial person will challenge the right of parents
to the custody of their children.
55. 241 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1976).
56. Kottsick v. Carlson, 241 N.W.2d 842, 846 (N.D. 1976); see N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-15-19(3)
(c) (1981) (parent-child relationship may be terminated as to noncustodial parent if his or her consent
to adoption is unreasonably withheld contrary to best interests of children).
57. Kottsick, 241 N.W.2d at 846.
58. Id.;. see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (concluding that unwed father
entitled to a fitness hearing before his children may be removed from his custody). For-a discussion
of Stanley, see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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IV. PARENTS AS AGAINST THE STATE
The common law and constitutionalized presumption that fit
parents are entitled to custody of their children sets and controls the
framework for parent-state relationships. The state recognizes the
paramount right of parents and usually defers to and reinforces the
family as an autonomous unit within which parental custody and
decisionmaking are insulated from state interference or inquiry. 59
North Dakota Supreme Court opinions that consider possible
temporary or permanent removal of children from parental custody
recognize that the fundamental right of parents to the custody of
their child is of statutory as well as constitutional dimension. 60
Although that right is not absolute, the court has Stated clearly that
there must be a preliminary finding of some grave reason to justify
overriding parental entitlement to custody.6 1 Except in a singular
series of cases in which a primary caretaking nonparent has become
the psychological parent of a child whose custody he or she
contests, 62 that grave reason must be more than a matter of the best
interest of the child. 63
State power to override paramount parental rights reflects the
common law and constitutional condition that parents be fit.
59. Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584,602(1979).
60. See, e.g., In rej.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27, 29-30 (N.D. 1971) (stating that the North Dakota
Juvenile Court Act acknowledges the inherent right of parents to their child's custody by providing
that it will be interpreted to accomplish its purposes in a family environment whenever feasible and
noting that the fundamental right of a parent to the custody of his or her child has been recognized to
be of constitutional dimension).
61. See, e.g., In re V.J.R., 387 N.W.2d 499, 502 (N.D. 1986) (parental rights are not to be
lightly abrogated); Bjerke v. D.T., 248 N.W.2d 808, 811 (N.D. 1976) (same); see Myers v. Morris,
810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir. 1987) (liberty interest in familial relations limited by the compelling
governmental interest in protection of minor children).
62. See infra pages 549-54.
63. Mortenson v. Tangedahl, 317 N.W.2d 107, 110 (N.D. 1982). To justify temporary
interference with parental custody, deprivation must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. See, e.g., In reJ.K.S., 321 N.W.2d 491, 494 (N.D. 1982) (concluding that there was clear
and convincing evidence to support a finding of deprivation). Moreover, to justify termination of
parental rights because of deprivation, the state must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the child is deprived, that the deprivation is likely to continue, and that because of continuing
deprivation the child will probably suffer serious physical or psychological harm. N.D. CENT. CODE
527-20-44(l)(b) (1974); see, e.g., In reJ.S., 351 N.W.2d 440, 442 (N.D. 1984) (parent's instability
and nomadic lifestyle provided evidence supporting trial court's conclusion that termination of
parental rights wasjustified).
Once deprivation has been established, the parents' fundamental right to custody is subrogated
to the court's authority to determine custody in the best interest of the child. The best interest of the
child standard is not controlling, however, until the dispositional stage of the proceeding. In re
R.D.S., 259 N.W.2d 636, 638 (N.D. 1977) (prior to determining the "best interest of child" court
must determine: (1) that the child is a deprived child; (2) that the causes and conditions of the
deprivation are likely to continue; (3) that the deprivations will cause the child serious harm); In re
M.L., 239 N.W.2d 289, 295 (N.D. 1976) (same). But see In reJ.A., 283 N.W.2d 83, 92 n.5 (N.D.
1979) (although it is insufficient for courts to determine that the best interest of the child would be
better served by termination of parental rights and placement of the child in another home, it is
apparent that the best interest of the child must be considered in examining the three factors set forth
in S 27-20-44 (1)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code ).
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Parental entitlement is necessarily limited because children have a
right to minimally acceptable parenting.64 They do not, however,
have a right to the best available parenting. The state cannot
override the entitlement of custodial parents on the basis of a
comparative judgment that they are not the best parents or that
someone else would be a better parent. 65 As a North Dakota judge
in 1919 argued against an award of custody to a nonparent rather
than to a parent whom he did not understand to have been found
unfit:
If such be the rule, well might the bright, intelligent child
in the humblest home of poor, devoted parents be taken
and given to the home much better provided and with
much greater facilities existing, owing to the prominence
and wealth of the owners, but strangers to the child,
when, in the viewpoint of the chancellor, the best welfare
of the child, as a future citizen of this state, would be
subserved. 66
Such is emphatically not the rule. The state instead defers to
parental interest and authority, so long as that authority is
exercised in a minimally tolerable manner.
Parent-child relationships are complex, so important facts
about them may not be readily available. There is considerable
consensus, however, as to what constitutes societally intolerable,
unfit parenting: it is uncontroversial that custodial parents are unfit
if they cause or permit a child to be physically harmed or
endangered, 67 and there is substantial agreement that parents are
64. See, e.g., In reJ.K.S., 321 N.W.2d 491, 493 (N.D. 1982) (parent's conduct must satisfy
minimum standards of care in raising children); In re L.N., 319 N.W.2d 801, 802 (N.D. 1982)
(same); In re S.W., 290 N.W.2d 675, 677-78 (N.D. 1980) (same); see also Hafen, Children's Liberation
and the New Equalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights, " 1976 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 605, 625-26 (1976). Hafen explains:
The common law and constitutional developments concerning parental rights are
mutually reinforcing and arrive at the same basic posture- children should be subject
to the custody and control of their natural parents until the parents' conduct falls
below the minimum standards established in such areas as neglect and abandonment,
or until the parents propose to subject the child to some action that would interfere
with his or her health or safety. The pro-parent presumption is rebuttable. But its
rebuttal is not dependent upon the relative quality of parents' child-rearing practices,
at least not until that quality reaches some almost obvious extremes.
Id.
65. In re L.N., 319 N.W.2d 801, 804 (N.D. 1982); see, e.g., In re M.N., 294 N.W.2d 635, 640
(ND. 1980) (that parents had hopes for child beyond his abilities and did not publicly demonstrate
affection did not justify termination of parental rights).
66. Larson v. Dutton, 43 N.D. 21, 31, 172 N.W. 869, 873 (1919) (Bronson,J., dissenting).
67. BEFORE BEST INTEREST, supra note 13, at 73-74; Wald, supra note 46, at 688-90.
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unfit if they cause or permit a child to be psychologically harmed or
endangered. 68 The facts in cases in which parental unfitness is
alleged tend to be dramatic and accessible, altihough assessment of
the significance of those facts may be disputed. 69 The uncertainty
introduced by the fitness qualification of parental rights as against
the state is, then, limited by the relative accessibility of the facts to
be evaluated and by the substantial consensus as to criteria for
evaluation.
V. INTERPARENT CUSTODY DISPUTES
When fit parents who live separately disagree about the
custody of their children, custody must be decided on some basis
other than parental choice and authority. 70 The status-based
entitlement to custody of one parent in effect cancels the other's
and there is no rule of family autonomy to which a court may
conveniently defer. Since it cannot be presumed that custody in one
fit parent rather than in another fit parent is in the best interest of
the child because of parental status, either some other determinable
factor must identify which parent would better serve the child's best
interest, or the best interest of the child must be decided by
comparing both parents. If two fit parents are comparatively
evaluated, either all relevant considerations must be treated as
equally significant, or a particular status or other factor must be
preferred in the sense of being assigned special weight and
importance.
68. See Wald, supra note 46, at 673 (supporting intervention when there is emotional abuse); see,
e.g., Bjerke v. D.T., 248 N.W.2d 808, 812 (N.D. 1976) (when emotional well-being of the child is
threatened, the necessity of state intervention to protect the child may be just as strong as when the
child's physical well-being is threatened). But see BEFORE BEST INTEREST, supra note 13, at 75-77
(arguing that emotional neglect is too imprecise to ensure fair warning and adequate control).
69. Comment, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73
YALE L.J. 151, 153 (1963) (despite the ambiguity of terms such as unfitness, most courts using the
parental right doctrine consider the test relatively simple to apply to particular fact situations). While
critics argue that particular legal procedures make it too difficult for the state to protect children from
dangerous parents, it is generally recognized that grounds for intervention must be restrictive
because disruption of family relationships is in itself damaging to children. See, e.g., BEFORE BEST
INTEREST, supra note 13, at 23-25 (stating that children react to infringement of parental autonomy
with anxiety, diminishing trust, loosening of emotional ties, or an increasing tendency to be out of
control, and therefore no intrusion should be authorized unless sufficient cause is established to
justify action); Wald, supra note 46, at 660-62 (stating that children suffer anxiety and depression
from being separated from their parents, often resulting in emotional and developmental damage,
and therefore removal of the child should be limited to situations where benefits of removal outweigh
the harms).
70. More than two million children each year are involved in divorce. Weitzman reported in
1985 a projection that parents of more than half the children in the United States would experience
divorce before they reached the age of eighteen. Additionally, a significant number of children
(18.4% of 1980 births) are born to unmarried parents, many of whom will not live together
throughout their offspring's childhood. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 34, at 215.
[VOL. 63: 481
1987] PRIMARY CARETAKERS 495
A. BEST INTERESTS OF CHILD-TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE
By the end of the nineteenth century, following the period
during which American custody decisions were divided as to which
parent was preferred, the tender years doctrine dominated
American case law. 71 In marked contrast to the premise on which
the paternal preference was initially based, the preference for
mothers as custodians of young children was from its beginning
based upon assumptions-often expressed in excessively
sentimental terms72 -about the quality of mother-child rela-
tionships. Judicial opinions treated the bond between mothers
and young children as a self-evident and natural fact. The North
Dakota Supreme Court declared in 1918, for example, that "[it is
not for a court to rend the most sacred ties of nature which bind the
mother to her children, except in extreme cases." '7 3 The natural
law rationale was reinforced or replaced by psychological theories
about child development that emphasized the crucial importance of
infant-mother attachments 74 and by sociological observation. 75
71. M. GROSSBERG, supra note 30, at 253. Grossberg notes that "[bly the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, traditional paternal custody and guardianship rights had been superseded in
America; judicial decisions and complementary legislation had established a new orthodoxy,
maternal preference." Id. Klaff agrees that "the presumption that maternal custody is ordinarily
best for young children had been adopted in virtually all jurisdictions by the end of the nineteenth
century either by case law under the best interests principle or, particularly in the frontier states, by
statute." Klaff, supra note 30, at 341; see alsoJ. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 221 (maternal preference
was adopted by the end of the nineteenth century).
Nancy Polikoff points out, however, that the tender years doctrine did not have its most
significant impact until the 1920s because before then many courts did not require noncustodial
fathers to contribute to the support of their children. Polikoff, Gender and Child Cuitody Determinations:
Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLCIES: A FEMINIST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN
AND THE.STATE 183, 186 (I. Diamond ed. 1983). Until court-ordered child support became accepted
practice, only women able to provide for children by themselves or with the assistance of their
families were able to request custody. Id.; see 2 J. BisHoP, COMMENTARIES ON THE.LAW OF MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE 437 (4th ed. 1864) ("the child must ordinarily be put where its hand could reach the
food necessary to sustain it, and the clothes to warm it.").
72. See, e.g., Krieger v. Krieger, 81 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Idaho 1938) (the maternal preference
"needs no argument to support it because -it arises out of the very nature and instincts of
motherhood; nature has ordained it"); Tuter v. Tuter, 12Q S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. App. 1938)
("[there is but a twilight zone between a mother's love and the atmosphere of heaven .... ); see also
M. GROSSBERG, supra note 30, at 241. Grossberg quotes a Pennsylvania Supreme Court conclusion in
1840 that "every instinct of humanity unerringly proclaims that no substitute can supply the place of
her, whose watchfulness over the sleeping cradle or waking moments of her offspring is prompted by
deeper and holier feelings than the most liberal allowance of a nurse's wages could possibly
stimulate. "Id.
73. Random v. Random, 41 N.D. 163, 165, 170 N.W. 313, 314 (1918); see also Adams v.
Adams, 198 N.W. 2d 118, 122 (N.D. 1972) ("No doubt, as the father of the children, he does love
them as he claims. But the natural place for children of tender years is with their mother"); Horner
v. Horner, 66 N.D. 619, 620, 268 N.W. 428, 428 (1936) (the natural place for a girl of tender years is
with her mother).
74. See, e.g., J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss 29 (1969) (most important variable associated
with child's detached behavior is absence of familiar mother-figure); 2J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND
Loss 51 (1973) (young children are quick to notice mother's absence and commonly show anxiety
and distress); Watson, The Children ofArmageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L.
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Some states adopted a strong presumption that the
determinable factor of motherhood identified which fit parent
would be the better custodian: mothers, unless they were unfit,
were entitled to custody of young children. 76  Other states
recognized a weak presumption. The weak preference could be
overridden by establishing that paternal custody would better serve
the best interest of the child. 77 The distinction between a strong
presumption and a weak presumption is important because the
strong form of presumption makes only the fitness of the
presumptively-identified parent relevant, 78  whereas a weak
preference requires a comparative analysis of both parental
relationships but puts on the parent not presumptively identified
the burden of overcoming a prima facie preference for the other
parent. 19
REv. 55, 70 (1969) (psychologically sound for mother to be parent of first choice for children below
the age of adolescence).
75. See, e.g., Klaff, supra note 30, at 363 (biological and cultural factors will continue to prepare
women for infant rearing in a way that men simply are not); Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody
Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation after Divorce, 12
U.C. DAVis L. Rev. 473, 481 (1979) (maternal presumption supported by psychologists and child
development specialists who recognized the unique relationship between an infant and its mother).
76. See McGregor v. McGregor, 257 Ala. 232, -, 58 So. 2d 457, 459 (1952) (father must
present clear and convincing evidence of mother's unfitness in order to rebut maternal presumption);
see, e.g., Dalton v. Dalton, 214 Kan. 805, 807-08, 522 P.2d 378, 380-81 (1974) (mother unfit when
she had adulterous relationships with two minors, allowed her children to roam the streets
unsupervised, let her three-year old go outside in diapers when it was cold, and used vulgar and
profane language in front of the children; absent finding of unfitness amounting to more than
"possible shortcomings in her character or conduct," mother ordinarily entitled to custody of child
of tender years).
77. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 577 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (if the father would be a
better custodian of the child, the presumption for maternal custody is not only inapplicable, but the
father may be awarded custody even though the mother is not found to be unfit).
78. Although the premise of the maternal presumption was the nurturing quality of mother-
child relationships, disqualifying unfit mothers did not necessarily protect that relationship. The
most common unfitness was moral: adulterous women were rarely awarded custody. William
Hardcastle Browne outlined that tradition in an 1892 treatise:
THE MOTHER'S RIGHTS.
Child of Tender Years. Where the child is of tender years, and, therefore,
requires a woman's nursing and a woman's care, the Court is disposed to award its
custody to its mother.
Her Bad Character. If, however, her character be depraved or her habits
objectionable, presenting a bad example to the child, and thus rendering her unfit for
so sacred a charge, the Court will give the infant to the father or to a third party. So
essential to the babe, however, is the mother's nursing, that temporarily, at least, she
has occasionally been awarded its custody, not only in cases where a divorce has been
obtained for her fault, but even where she has been found guilty of adultery or of
drunkenness.
W. BROWNE, supra note 40, at 321 (1892). Robert Levy's review of files of Hennepin County,
Minnesota court-ordered custody investigations in 1970 supports a finding of continuing strong bias
against sexual misconduct by custodial mothers. See Levy, Custody Investigations and Divorce, 19
COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 485, 500 (1985). Levy reports "close to automatic disqualification"
when investigators found sexual misconduct by custodial mothers. Id. at 501. Although Levy's data
was fifteen years old, he argues that the model remained representative in 1985. Id.
79. See, e.g., Casale v. Casale, 549 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Ky. 1977) (evidence that both parents love
child and participated in his care but natural preference for the mother has not been overcome by the
testimony in this case).
496
PRIMARY CARETAKERS
North Dakota from 1877 to 1973 provided by statute that as
between parents claiming custody "other things being equal, if the
child be of tender years, it should be given to the mother."80 The
North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that the phrase "other
things being equal" left a great deal of judicial discretion.8 The
precondition that all other things be equal seemed to create a weak
presumption requiring a preliminary comparative analysis of
maternal and paternal parenting, but opinions in some cases in
which a father won custody of young children in spite of the
statutory maternal preference reflected disapproval of maternal
conduct rather than evidence of comparatively better parenting by
the father. For example, custody of a seven-year old and an eight-
year old was awarded to their father in a case involving the
following circumstances:
[T]he mother demonstrated her lack of concern for her
children by voluntarily, without necessity, leaving them
withbabysittersfrom 6:30 in the evening to as late as 2:00
in the morning on numerous occasions while she engaged
in bowling, drinking, dancing, and eating. Not only did
she deprive the children of her care while absent from
them, but of necessity she also reduced the quality of care
she could give them during the day while she rested and
recovered from her evenings of overindulgence. We have
no assurance that she will conduct herself any differently
in the future. 82
In some cases, however, there were comparative evaluations of
maternal and paternal pairenting. When custody of nine- and
twelve-year olds was awarded to their father in 1972, for example,
the North Dakota Supreme Court detailed the positive caretaking
and parenting by the father, in marked contrast to the trial court's
emphasis on negative qualities of the mother.8 3
80. CIVIL CODE S 127(2) (1877); REVISED CODE S 2817(2) (1895); REVISED CODE S 2817(2)
(1899); REVISED CODE S 4129(2) (1905); CIVIL CODE S 4461(2) (1913); REVISED CODE S 30-1006(2)
(1943); N. D. CENT. CODE § 13-10-06(2) (1944). North Dakota has no reported decisions prior to
1877 that reflect a paternal preference. Minnesota law before 1895 reflected a common law paternal
preference. Crippen & Hatling, Is There Gender Neutrality in Minnesota Custody Decisions?, 9 HAMLINE L.
REV. 411, 412 (1986).
81. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 202 N.W.2d 760, 764 (N.D. 1972); see also Gress v. Gress, 148
N.W. 2d 166, 179 (N.D. 1967).
82. Gress, 148 N.W.2d at 178-79. Shiela Okupaku observes critically that the Gress court
"abjured the task of weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the competing alternatives,
making a single passing comment on the nature of the child care arrangement proposed by the father
.... Okupaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1117, 1131
(1976).
83. See Ferguson, 202 N.W.2d at 765. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that after the
birth of the youngest child, the mother worked evenings and the father
1987]
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Increased cultural sensitivity to gender stereotypes84 and
enhanced scrutiny of gender-specific laws 5 led most states to reject
the tender years doctrine and to apply best interest standards with
no special weight favoring either parent because of his or her
gender.8 6 There remains some suspicion, however, that a maternal
had borne most of the household responsibilities, such as the cooking, cleaning, and
laundry, in addition to seeing that the children attended Sunday school and received
their breakfasts on Sunday mornings. It is also apparent that since the issuance of the
decree of separate maintenance in early 1970 the three children usually have been left
without adult supervision from 4:00 p.m. to midnight or later. The record further
reveals that Arnold, since the issuance of the separate maintenance decree, has
succeeded in establishing a good relationship with his children under the
circumstances.
Id. A 1985 annotation characterizes Ferguson as a case in which the court implicitly viewed the
primary caretaker role as a factor entitled to important consideration in awarding custody.
Annotation, Primary Caretaker Rule of Respective Parents as Factor in Awarding Custody of Child, 41 A.I.R.
4TH 1.129, 1138-39 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
The trial court, by contrast, had emphasized maternal fault. The district court judge wrote that
I cannot help but place a great deal of emphasis upon the fact that on the part of the
plaintiff (appellant) there is a mother and a wife who has elected to leave the home and
the sanctity of her marriage and to seek and keep company with a third party who has
no place in that home and with that wife at this time.
It is not happenstance or an occasional meeting, but the evidence would indicate a
continuous, almost an open and notorious association with this third party. It
included meetings in his apartment, in the home of the parties, at rendezvous in
secluded spots, at the business or employment places of the plaintiff, and on a host of
other circumstances, all of which this Court cannot sanction as the conduct of a
responsible and dutiful and morally suitable mother and wife.
On the other hand, the evidence indicates that on the part of the defendant and
father and certainly not a man who is perfect, for who is? But also a man who has
contributed to the best of his ability towards the support of his family, who has shown
no improper conduct, has not indicated any interest in any other outside unsuitable or
questionable activity except for his family and his children. It is a matter of this Court
deciding what is in the best interest of these children based upon two parents who have
demonstrated almost opposite attitudes and concerns and qualitites towards the moral
conduct that in this society is considered fit and proper.
Respondent's Brief at 15-16, Ferguson v. Ferguson, 202 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1972) (quoting trial
court).
84. Chambers, supra note 10, at 523 (1984). Two authors suggest:
Back when the world was a bit more innocent, the movies taught us that 'men were
men' and 'mothering' was something done by women. Hollywood reinforced these
sexual stereotypes with strong, stoic male breadwinners and conscientious female
caretakers who rarely worked outside the home. Divorce was rare, but when it
occurred, custody was not an issue; barring some monumental human flaw, the
mother always got custody.
Feiner & Terre, Entangled Relations: Therapist, Patient, Lawyer, 9 FAMILY ADVOCATE 1' 5 (1986).
85. Courts of three states have held that gender-based maternal preferences violated the federal
equal protection clause. See Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 695 (Ala. 1981); Watts v. Watts, 77
Misc. 2d 178, -, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290-91(N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117,
119-20 (Utah 1986). Several courts determined that the tender years doctrine violated state
constitutitional provisions. See, e.g., People ex rel. Irby v. Duboix, 41 111. App.3d 609, 612-13, 354
N.E.2d 562, 565-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (tender years doctrine violated constitutitional notion of
gender neutrality); Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, -, 368 A. 2d 635, 639-40 (1977) (same). But
see Patel v. Moody, 434 So. 2d 681, 684 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (based on human experiences, child
often does better with the mother).
86. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 19 FAM. L.Q. 331, 401 (1986); J.
ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 224-25.
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preference persists in fact if not in theory, as an inarticulated basis
for many judicial decisions,87 and as a general assumption of some
practicing attorneys. 88 Proponents of continued support for a
maternal preference argue that it appropriately recognizes the
primary role of mothers as nurturers of their children.8 9 However,
use of gender as a proxy for a role or quality generally associated
with women is now recognized as based upon and a perpetuation of
stereotypic thought patterns. Furthermore, it is unnecessary to use
female parentage as an indirect and imprecise means of identifying
the primary nurturer, for a gender-neutral preference can be
formulated directly in terms of the primary caretaker. Recognition
of the advantages of a primary caretaker preference is, however,
made more difficult because of suspicions that it is merely a device
for masking and continuing a maternal preference. 90 Ironically, the
core insight that was imperfectly served by the maternal preference
- the recognition that the intimate bonding between young
children and their primary caretakers is crucial to children's
development - may be rejected because a primary caretaker
preference is mistaken for a disguised maternal preference.
B. BEST INTEREST OF CHILD-UNWEIGHED CRITERIA
The North Dakota tender years provision was a part of the
state probate code repealed in 1973 when the state adopted the
87. See Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 75, at 504. Weitzman and Dixon report that 81% of
judges they interviewed in Los Angeles in 1977 said they thought there was still a presumption in
favor of maternal custody for preschool children. Id. A 1976 survey of Illinois judges showed they
assumed that mothers of young children would get custody. Id. New York and New Jersey studies of
gender bias in courts in the mid-1980s found that some judges had difficulty perceiving fathers as
being or wanting to be primary cartakers. Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts, 70
JUDICATURE 280, 288 (1978); see also L. WEITZMAN, supra note 34, at 235. Weitzman notes, however,
that the consensus disappears with regard to older children. Id. Atkinson suggests that some judges
presume fathers can do a betterjob of raising older boys. J. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 236.
88. See Weitzman & Dixon supra note 75, at 508. Weitzman and Dixon found that attorney
responses based on hypotheticals and their own experiences reflected belief that mothers would get
custody unless they were unfit rather than as a result of a comparative analysis of both parents. Id. at
508-13. Their data suggest that attorneys discourage fathers from requesting custody. Id. at 505-07.
Weitzman reports, however, that attorneys believed things were changing and it was easier now for
fathers to win custody. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 34, at 238.
89. Klaf's defense of a maternal preference is actually a defense of a preference for functional
mothering, "a policy presumption against separating a child from his primary caregiving parent
(that is, the parent who has mothered him) and a factual presumption that the primary caregiving
parent is the mother." Klaff, supra note 30, at 344. "Mother," for Klaff, is an "extremely accurate
proxy for 'primary caregiving parent.' Id. at 369. Klaff argues that the presumption should be
rebutted if the mother was not the primary caretaker because then the father could show that
paternal custody would better serve the child's developmental needs by maximizing continuity of
care. Id. at 349.
90. See infra pages 537-40.
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Uniform Probate Code. 91 Four years later, the North Dakota
Supreme Court observed in Odegard v. Odegard 92 that:
[O]f course, the repeal of the statute setting forth the
"tender years" doctrine does not alter the observed fact
that mothers of infants are most often better able to care
for them than the fathers are. But the fact is only one of
the many considerations to be weighed by the trial court
in making its finding as to the best interest of the
child.... 93
In 1979, the North Dakota Supreme Court explained that it had
not intended in Odegard to retain a maternal preference. Rather, it
suggested, "a mother's caring ability" was one of many relevant
considerations to be weighed in order to determine the best interest
of the child. 94 Also in 1979, the North Dakota Legislature
specifically provided that "[b]etween the mother and father,
whether natural or adoptive, there is no presumption as to who
will better promote the best interests and welfare of the child." 95
Comparative evaluation of two fit parents, with no greater
weight or preference assigned to a particular factor, confers
virtually unchallengable discretion on a trial court because the
court need show only that one of numerous available considerations
supports a particular decision. A best interest standard that treats
all relevant considerations as of equal weight and importance is
essentially indeterminate. In the absence of any ranking of qualities
relevant to evaluating parenting, there is no objective basis for
choosing between fit parents with different strengths and
weaknesses.
A 1979 North Dakota case dramatically illustrates how
unweighted reference to relevant considerations can lead to
opposite results supported by wholly different but equally plausible
rationales. In Porter v. Porter96 the custody of three children was
91. North Dakota Probate Code, ch. 257, 1973 N.D. Laws 627 (codified as amended at N.D.
CENT. CODE 5530.1-01-01 to 30.1-35-01 (1976 & Supp. 1987)).
92. 259 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 1977).
93. Odegard v. Odegard, 259 N.W. 2d 484, 486 (N.D. 1977).
94. Gross v. Gross, 287 N.W.2d 457, 461 (N.D. 1979).
95. Act of March 3, 1979, ch. 194, S 2, 1979 N.D. Laws 423 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE 5
14-09-06.1 (1981)).
96. 274 N.W.2d 235 (N.D. 1979). The children were two-, four-, and nine-years old at the time
of the divorce. See Porter v. Porter, No. 29446, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for
Judgment at 2 (N.E. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Nov. 1, 1977). The oldest child was born to Mrs. Porter
before her marriage and had been adopted by Captain Porter. Id.
Polikoff discusses Porter as an illustration of a court eliminating the importance of nurturance
and equating financial support with the provision of psychological and physical needs. Polikoff, supra
note 71, at 188.
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contested following a six-year marriage. 97 Their father was an Air
Force Captain. 98 During the marriage, their mother, who was not
employed outside the home, had clearly been the primary caretaker
of the children. 99 There was no evidence or claim that the father
had shared or significantly contributed to child care.100 The mother
had interim custody of the children for eleven months from the
commencement of the divorce until its completion and began
working part-time during that period. 10'
After a five-day trial, the trial court found both parents fit and
proper to have custody. 10 2 It awarded custody to the father, stating
as its reasons that because of their employment situations the father
would be better able to support and maintain the children and that,
unlike the mother, he would be able to spend evenings with the
children. 103 The North Dakota Supreme Court observed that:
The findings make it clear that the trial court
considered [the father] in a better position to care for the
support and maintenance of the parties' children and that
because of his present employment he is in a position to
lend more stability and guidance to nuturing [sic] the
development of the children during those periods of time
in which he Would not be actually pursuing his employ-
ment than is [the mother]. After reviewing the evidence
introduced at trial we cannot say the factors, or the
findings of fact supporting those factors used by the trial
court in reaching its decision, as to the general
determination of what was in the best interests of the
children were clearly erroneous.10 4
Given the same facts and record, the trial court might also
without error have emphasized the mother's nuturing qualities, as
demonstrated by her past primary caretaking and the emotional
bonding created by that caretaking. In a case like Porter, traditional
family role allocation during the marriage gives the primary
caretaking parent strong evidence of existing ties of love and
97. Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235, 237 (N.D. 1979).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 241-42.
100. See id. at 242.
101. Id. at 237-38. During this time the mother moved from the Grand Forks Air Force Base to
Grand Forks and began to work part-time as a waitress and as an apartment cleaner. Id. at 238-39.
102. Id. at 238.
103. Id. at 238, 241.
104. Id. at 241.
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affection and prospective psychological continuity, while the
noncaretaking wage earners are usually more secure economically,
better established in their work or profession, and consequently
better able to show present ability to give children material
advantages and to provide prospective environmental stability.
The best interest of a child standard, therefore, can support an
award of custody to either parent by wholly different rationales,
because what most strengthens one parent's claim with reference to
one consideration is the same circumstance that most weakens that
parent's claim with reference to another consideration.
If an appellate court must treat all relevant considerations as
equal, it must uphold trial court determinations of the best interest
of a child based on evidence that one parent is better in any relevant
way. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Porter showed its
discomfort with the indeterminacy that it acknowledged and
perceived as unavoidable:
We sympathize with the situation in which [the mother]
finds herself in this instance. She contends it was unfair
that because she decided to foresake a career or
employment opportunities in oider to remain home and
care for her family and household duties while her
husband advanced his career and earning capacity, such
decision has now become a factor in depriving her of the
custody of the children. We cannot say, however, that it
would be more fair to deprive [the father] of custody
because he did not remain home to care for his family and
household during the day but developed his career to
support his family. Both care and support are important
functions of any family situation and award of custody to
either parent in this case would have resulted in an
unfairness to the other. Fairness to the parents, however,
is not the test but rather what is in the best interests of the
children. 105
Robert Mnookin argues that the best interest standard makes
no substantive judgments about what factors are most important
for a child's well-being because there is no collective societal
agreement about content for such a standard. An indeterminate
judicial standard is inevitable, according to Mnookin, because
psychological theories do not provide a basis for predicting with
105. Id. at 241-42. For a discussion of the fairness issue, see infra note 238.
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which parent the child will have a better future and because society
lacks any consensus about what constitutes a better future. 106
[W]hat set of values should a judge use to determine a
child's best interest? Whenever someone is faced with a
decision based on the "best interest of the child"
standard, he must have some way of deciding what counts
as good and what counts as bad. In economists' terms
how is utility to be determined?...
Deciding what is best for a child often poses a
question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of
life itself. Should the decisionmaker be primarily
concerned with the child's happiness or with the child's
spiritual and religious training? Is the primary goal long-
term economic productivity when the child grows up? Or
are the most important values of life found in warm
relationships? In discipline and self-sacrifice? Are stability
and security for a child more desirable than intellectual
stimulation? These questions could be elaborated
endlessly. And yet, where is one to look for the set of
values that should guide decisions concerning what is best
for the child? Normally judges look to statutes, but
custody statutes do not themselves give content or relative
weight to the pertinent values. Moreover, if one looks to
our society at large, one finds neither a clear consensus as
to the best child-rearing strategies, nor an appropriate
hierarchy of ultimate values. The answer, in short, is
indeterminate.10 7
Because the best interest standard provides no substantive content
with respect to which competing values can be weighed, the
106. Mnookin, supra note 54, at 230.
107.R. MNOOKIN, IN THE. INTEREST OF CHILDREN 18 (1985). David Chambers explains the
further indeterminacy of perspective:
The concept of "children's best interests," unlike such concepts as distance or mass,
has no objective content. Whenever the word "best" is used, one must always ask
"according to whom?" The state, the parents, and the child might all be sources of
views, worthy of consideration, about the child's interests and how best to serve them.
The child's view might take either of two forms - the child's stated preference as to
custody or a view of what we would expect this child, or children in general, to choose
for themselves either now or from the hindsight of their own adulthood.
Chambers, supra note 10, at 488-89; see also Elster, supra note 7, at 12-14 (plausible outcomes of
custody options might be identified but their probabilities cannot be assessed; even if probabilities
could be determined, it is impossible to attach values to outcomes).
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personal values of the initial decisionmaker may become the crucial
factor. 1 08
The agnosticism of the Porter court was expressed in terms of
parental interests - to deprive the mother of custody because she
remained at home as primary caretaker would be no more unfair
than to deprive the father of custody because he developed his
career to support his family. By necessary implication it was also an
agnosticism like Mnookin's with respect to the substantive interest
of the children: the appellate court could not in reviewing a specific
application of the best interest standard suggest that continuity of
theircustodial relationship with their primary caretaker was more
important to the best interest of the children than custody with their
economically more secure father.
1. Statutory Factors
The 1979 North Dakota Legislature enacted statutory
guidelines for determining the best interest of children. Section 14-
09-06.2 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
For the purpose of custody, the best interests and welfare
of the child shall be determined by the court's
consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the
best interests and welfare of the child. These factors
include all of the following when applicable:
1. The love, affection, and other emotional ties
existing between the parents and child.
2. The capacity and disposition of the parents to give
the child love, affection, and guidance and to
continue the education of the child.
3. The disposition of the parents to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care, or other
remedial care recognized and permitted under the
laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other
material needs.
4. The length of time the child has lived in a stable,
satisfactory environment and the desirability of
maintaining continuity.
5. The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing
or proposed custodial home.
6. The moral fitness of the parents.
108. See infra notes 198 and 200 and accompanying text.
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7. The mental and physical health of the parents.
8. The home, school, and community record of the
child.
9. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence,
understanding, and experience to express a
preference.
10. Any other factors considered by the court to be
relevant to a particular child custody dispute. 109
North Dakota trial courts must consider these statutory factors
when they are relevant and must articulate a rationale for their
decisions, but they are not required to make findings as to specific
factors or to assign any particular importance or weight to
particular factors. 10
2. Application of Statutory Factors
The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that the
statutory guidelines are compilations of factors that it has always
treated as relevant to custody determinations."1 ' If the statutory
factors had been enacted at the time that Porter was decided, the
litigants could easily have expressed their arguments in terms of
and by reference to the statutory factors. The mother could have
argued that she was favored by the first statutory factor because as
primary caretaker she had demonstrated love and affection and that
she had established unique emotional ties with the children. She
could have reasoned that she was favored by the second statutory
factor because her past nuturing provided the more reliable
evidence of both capacity and disposition to give the children love,
affection, guidance, and education. She could have claimed she was
favored by the third statutory factor because her caregiving also
was the more reliable evidence of a disposition to provide for the
children's material needs, and she could have pointed out that the
North Dakota Legislature intended that the third factor refer to the
inclination rather than the personal capacity to provide for material
needs. 11 2 She could have urged that awarding her custody was
109. N.D.CENT. CODE 5 14-09-06.2 (1982).
110. Miller v. Miller, 305 N.W.2d 666, 673 (N.D. 1981); see also Voth v. Voth, 305 N.W.2d
656, 658 (N.D. 1981).
111. Voth, 305 N.W. 2d at 657; seealso Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W. 2d 121, 126 (N.D. 1980).
112: As originally proposed by House Bill 1585 in 1979, the third statutory guideline for
determining the best interests and welfare of the child was "[Tihe capacity and disposition of the
parents to provide the child with .... material needs." H.R. 1585, 46th Leg. Assembly of N.D.
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favored by the fourth statutory factor because it would ensure
stability and continuity of the children's primary psychological
relationships. The father, on the other hand, could have argued
that he satisfied the first and second statutory factors because he
also loved the children. Furthermore, he could have contended that
his established employment and steady income showed the
disposition to satisfy the children's material needs recognized by
the third statutory factor, enabled him to be available to provide for
the guidance recognized by the second statutory factor, and
ensured his ability to provide them with a stable and permanent
environment recognized by the fourth and fifth statutory factors.
If one parent can show both that he or she was the primary
caretaker during a marriage and that she or he will provide the
more secure and stable environment after the divorce, that parent
will almost always be awarded custody. 113 Porter, on the other
hand, dramatizes the difficult and recurrent problem when
statutory considerations compete with rather than reinforce each
other because one parent has been the primary nurturer in the past
and the other parent can promise better fiscal and environmental
stability in the future. Indeed, the determination of the Porter court
that it was in the best interest of the children to be in the custody of
their father because he was in a better position to provide for their
support and maintenance and to lend more stability and guidance
to nurture their development is consistent with the rationales in
several more recent North Dakota cases that apply the statutory
guidelines in such circumstances and award custody to
economically and environmentally more secure fathers rather than
to primary caretaking mothers.
In Landsberger v. Landsberger, 114 for example, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota determined it was in the best interest of
one- and four-year old daughters to be in the custody of their father
because he could provide a more stable, permanent, and satisfac-
tory environment for the children. 15 The father had been
employed steadily throughout the marriage; the mother had not
worked outside the home until shortly before the couple
separated. 116 The trial court found that:
(1979). The only amendment of the proposed statutory factors deleted the words "capacity and"
from that third guideline. Act approved March 18, 1979, ch. 194, §3, 1979 N.D. Laws 424 (codified
at N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2 (1981)).
113. J. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 219; e.g., In re Gardinetti, 342 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1983) (mother had been primary caretaker and would be able to provide more stable
environment).
114. 364 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1985).
115. Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918, 919 (N.D. 1985).
116. Id. at 918.
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Love, affection, and positive emotional ties exist between
each parent and the children. Each party has the capacity
and disposition to give the children love, affection, and,
guidance and to continue their education. They are both
disposed to provide the children with food, clothing,
medical care, and any other necessary remedial care,
together with other material needs. Neither parent is
morally unfit, and both are physically and mentally
healthy. The children have no home, school, or
community record and are not of sufficient intelligence,
understanding, and experience to express a preference.117
As the mother characterized the decision she appealed, the
Landsberger trial court "called it a draw on five factors, ruled that
two factors were not applicable, and left two factors upon which its
decision apparently turned . ,, 118 Like Captain Porter, Mr.
Landsberger because of his more stable and assured economic
position was better able to satisfy the fourth and fifth statutory
factors by providing a stable, satisfactory, and permanent home for
the children. 119 Similarly, custody of a two-year old child was
awarded to his father rather than to his primary caretaker mother
in Naumann v. Naumann 120 when the trial court found analysis of six
of the statutory factors inconclusive and based its decision on
finding that the father's situation "offers more stability and
permanence" for the child. 121
Such opinions do not find a significant difference between
primary caretakers as compared to secondary caretakers with
respect to evidence or depth of existing emotional ties or capacity
and disposition to give children love and affection. However, even
if Landsberger and Naumann had found that the first and second
117. Id. at 919.
118. Id.
119. Seeid. at 920.
120. 376 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 1985).
121. Naumann v. Naumann, 376 N.W.2d 802, 802 (N.D. 1985). The Naumann child had
lived with his parents on a farm during the first year and six months of his life. Brief of Appellee at 1.
He then lived with his mother pursuant to an interim court order for eight months between his
parents' separation and their divorce. See Naumann, 376 N.W.2d at 802. With respect to factor four,
the length of time the child has lived in a stable environment and the desirability of maintaining
continuity, the trial court found that "the Father will provide for the child in the family home, and
provide a stable environment." Naumann v. Naumann, No. 4483, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order for Judgment at 3 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. May, 1985). The trial court found the
future of the mother to be uncertain. Id. With respect to factor five, permanence of the existing or
proposed custodial home, the court found that the father's situation was more permanent. Id. Both
those factors, as the trial court applied them, were satisfied by the fact that the father intended to
continue living on the farm, where the father had lived since he was a child but the two-year old child
whose custody was at issue had lived only during the first half of his life. Brief of Appellee at 3. The
trial court ignored, in considering the desirability of maintaining continuity for the child, that his
mother had always been his primary caretaker and that for the last eight months she had been his sole
custodian.
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statutory factors favored the primary caretaking mother rather than
that the parents were even as to those factors, the courts could
nevertheless have determined the best interest of the children to be
served by awarding custody to the nonprimary caretaker fathers by
reference to the fourth and fifth statutory factors. If no particular
factor is generally'more important than any other factor, the
relative strengths of one parent as to the first and second factors can
be determined by a judge to be less important in a particular case
than the relative strengths of the other parent as to any other factor.
C. BEST INTERESTS OF CHILD - PRIMARY CARETAKER
PREFERENCE
There are alternatives to the indeterminacy of treating the
best interest of children as a matter of equally significant
considerations. There may be a presumption that a particular
consideration should determine the best interest of children unless
the parent favored by that consideration is unfit. If the presumption
can be rebutted only by showing that its beneficiary is unfit, it is
called a strong presumption. 122 As in the case of the strong
presumption that parents are entitled to custody as against
nonparents or the state, the fitness qualification introduces only a
narrow discretion for the decisionmaker: once it is determined that
a parent has the status or trait specified by the presumption, only
his or her fitness remains relevant.
Alternatively, if a particular factor is preferred by being given
added weight and treated as more important than other
considerations which are nevertheless treated as relevant, it is
described as a weak presumption. 123 If a weak presumption
applies, both parents are evaluated and compared but the
nonpreferred parent has the burden of showing what qualities or
circumstances override the special weight assigned to the
consideration that favors the beneficiary of the presumption. A
weak presumption introduces more discretion into the
decisionmaking process. However, both strong and weak
presumptions give substantive content to the best interest standard
by presupposing that emphasis on one factor is more likely than an
indeterminate standard to result in choice of a parent whose
custody will better protect and promote the child's best interest.
That substantive content therefore gives more guidance to initial
122. Chambers, supra note 10, at 562.
123. Id.
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decisionmakers and facilitates more effective review by appellate
courts than is permitted by a unweighed standard.
In interparent contests for sole custody, a presumption
favoring the primary caretaker as the custodian for young children
has developed as the current alternative to indeterminate,
unweighed determinations of the best interest of children. 124 Unlike
Mnookin-Porter agnostics, proponents of treating primary
caretaking as more significant than other considerations relevant to
contested custody do make a substantive judgment about the best
interest of children: they believe that caregiving creates strong
psychological bonding and that protection of the psychological
bond between children and those with whom they most closely
interact is more important than other relevant considerations in
identifying the parents in whose custody children "will.. .feel more
loved or secure, or, in the long term, be more competent and
effective as adults." 125 Proponents also argue instrumentally that
124. See generally, Annotation, supra note 83, at 1137-38 (discussing cases that have recognized a
legal presumption in favor of the primary caretaker parent in awarding custody of children of tender
years). Atkinson reports that in 1982 and 1983 appellate courts of at least 20 states favored
custody for primary caretakers. J. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 239. Presumptions favoring joint
custody, the other popular contemporary alternative to the indeterminate custody standard, are
beyond the scope of this Article.
Atkinson suggests that maintenance of primary caretaker relationships is most important for
children ten years old or younger. Id. at 238. Chambers endorses a primary caretaker preference for
children to the age of five, believing that after that age fewer of the caretaking tasks involvi intimate
interaction and emotional ties to secondary caretakers become stronger. Chambers, supra note 10, at
531. The strong primary caretaker presumptions adopted by Minnesota and West Virginia are
applicable to children who are too young to express a preference. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d
705, 712 (Minn. 1985); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W.Va. 1981). For a discussion of
Pikula, see infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Garska, see infra notes 126-
28 and accompanying text.
125. Chambers, supra note 10, at 503. Chambers identifies the importance of the psychological
bond in the best interest standard from the perspective of a child's experience:
What.. .are the essential qualities of a parent or a parent-child relationship that are,
necessary in order for a child to feel a sense of well-being during childhood and to
become an adult with a sense of well-being? ... [Children] need both dependable care
and, for a sense of well-being, a sense that they are loved, valued, and protected by
those who take care of them. As the child grows, the same qualities retain importance
(though in differing degrees) and are joined by other qualities also essential to a sense
of well-being. Most globally, the need is for a growing sense of competence -
competence within the world around the child, competence (in the child's own view) to
relate successfully to other people and competence (again, in the child's own view) to
function as a productive member of the society.
Id. at 497-98. Chambers further writes that:
Michael Wald has tried to identify such elemental qualities from the writings in child
psychology, child development, and child placement in divorce. The list includes the
following: the need to sustain a secure relationship with parent a figure, to feel valued
by the parent figure, to enjoy his childhood day by day, and to develop a range of
capacities to function as an adult, most particularly, to be able to love, to have a sense
of self-worth, and to have a sense of control over his life. The child of divorce who has
known both parents will also want the opportunity for regular contact with both
parents in a conflict-free setting. The writers upon whom he draws are not self-
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preferring primary caretakers discourages coercive misuse of the
custody issue in divorce proceedings and facilitates coherent
judicial and private decision-making.
West Virginia and Minnesota have adopted a strong
presumption that a primary caretaker parent, if fit, is entitled to
custody of his or her young children. Alternatively, opinions in
many states treat primary caretaking status as a particularly
important consideration in determining the best interest of children
and so prefer the primary caretaker but do not presume that fit
primary caretakers are conclusively entitled to custody.
In 1981, the West Virginia Supreme Court in Garska v.
McCoy 26 held that it was in the best interest of children too young to
express a preference that they be in the custody of their primary
caretaking parent, if that parent met the minimum objective
standard of fitness. 127 The court in an opinion authored by Justice
Richard Neely reversed a decision in which a trial court had
awarded custody of a two-year old to her nonprimary caretaking
father because he was better educated, more intelligent, and better
able to provide financial support and a good social and economic
environment. 128
Four years later, Minnesota in Pikula v. Pikula 129 became the
second state to impose a strong judicial presumption that the best
consciously building a theory of "primary goods," but the qualities listed are
remarkably consistent with the child's eye perspective argued for in this Article.
(Conversations with Wald, 1984-85.).
Id. at 498 n.60.
126. 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
127. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d. 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). Atkinson explains that "[i]n most
states, there is no magic age at which a child's preference is binding." J. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at
297. Chambers notes that "[r]esearch on the capacity of children to make various sorts of decisions
typically find chronological age a poor predictor: many ten-year olds make better decisions then
many twelve-year olds." Chambers, supra note 10, at 564 n.320. Most courts make individual
evaluations of each child's maturity and capacity. West Virginia, however, is one of two states that
treat the preference of a fourteen-year old to be in the custody of a fit parent as binding. S.H. v.
R.L.H., 289 S.E.2d 186, 189 (W. Va. 1982). The other state recognizing that absolute right is
Georgia. Parkinson v. Parkinson, 167 Ga. App. 265 .... 306 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1983). The West
Virginia Supreme Court included in the syllabus of Garska the following:
Where there is a child under fourteen years of age, but sufficiently mature that he can
intelligently express a voluntary preference for one parent, the trial judge is entitled to
give that preference such weight as circumstances warrant, and where such child
demonstrates a preference for the parent who is not the primary caretaker, the trial
judge is entitled to conclude that the presumption in favor of the primary caretaker is
rebutted.
Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 358 syl. pt. 7. The West Virginia Supreme Court subsequently upheld an
award of custody to a nonprimary caretaker when a six-year old child preferred that placement.
Graham v. Graham, 326 S.E.2d 189, 191 (W. Va. 1984) (per curiam). One justice dissented from
the per curiam decision, arguing that the record did not show that the six-year old child was
sufficiently mature to intelligently express a voluntary preference. Id. at 192 (Miller, J., dissenting).
128. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 359.
129. 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985).
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interest of children too young to express a preference requires
awarding custody to their primary caretaker if he or she is fit. 130
Justice Rosalie Wahl authored the opinion in which the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed an award of custody of two- and four-year
olds to their nonprimary caretaking father in a case in which the
trial court determined that. paternal custody would provide
continuity of a supportive environment as part of a strong, stable
extended family group. 131
The West Virginia and Minnesota opinions differ significantly
in emphasis. Justice Wahl stressed the importance of emotional and
psychological stability, while Justice Neely seemed most concerned
that the rule's instrumental impact prevent coercive misuse of
custody issues to extort unfair fiscal concessions. Opinions from
other states favoring a caretaker preference generally emphasize
psychological bonding of children to their primary caretakers and
find significant the commitment to child care already demonstrated
by the primary caretaker.
1. Continuity of Primary Psychological Relationship
Justice Wahl in Pikula grounded the Minnesota primary
caretaker presumption squarely on the importance of protecting
130. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 712 (Minn. 1985). The Pikula rule has been applied to
decide the custody of a child as old as twelve. Tanghe v. Tanghe, 400 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987). Minnesota courts, however, have also found younger children sufficiently old to express
a preference. E.g., Mowers v. Mowers, 406 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (child seven
years, ten months old); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 403 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (child
six years old). In Gillis v. Gillis, the court of appeals remanded for a finding whether a seven-year old
child was old enough to express a preference. Gillis v. Gillis, 400 N.W.2d 775, 776 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987). The court of appeals has also agreed with a trial court finding that the expressed preference of
eleven and ten-year old children need not be deferred to when the children had been manipulated
and coached. Schwamb v. Schwamb, 395 N.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Subsequent to the Pikula decision, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a rebuttable presumption
that ifjoint legal custody is requested it is in the best interests of children. MINN. STAT. S 518.17 (2)
(1986). Minnesota defines joint legal custody as meaning "that both parents have equal rights and
responsibilities, including the right to participate in major decisions determining the child's
upbringing, including education, health care and religious training." Id. 5 518.003 (3) (b). It defines
joint physical custody as meaning "that the routine daily care and control and residence of the child
is structured between the parties." Id. S 518.003 (3)(d). Preference for joint legal custody does not
affect the Pikula presumption as to physical custody. Minnesota cases have established that joint
physical custody is not a preferred disposition. Peterson v. Peterson, 393 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986); see also Brauer v. Brauer, 384 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Furthermore, joint custody is not to be used as a "legal baseball bat" to force parents to cooperate.
Ozenna v. Parmelee, 407 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Chapman v. Chapman,
352 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
131. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 709-10. The Minnesota Court of Appeals had reversed the trial
court on the grounds that it had erroneously applied Minnesota statutory factors in determining the
best interest of the children. Pikula v. Pikula, 349 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. Pikula,
374 N.W.2d at 710. The court, however, affirmed the intermediate court's award of custody on
other grounds. Id. at 714.
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psychological bonding. 132 Although she agreed with instrumental
arguments in support of the rule, Justice Wahl emphasized its
substantive content. The principal substantive argument in support
of either a strong or weak primary caretaker presumption is that the
intimate interaction of a primary caretaker with a young child
produces a unique bond between them. While theorists recognize
that children also form attachments to secondary caretakers, many
believe that the attachment to the primary caretaker is significantly
stronger and more important to the young child's sense of
security. 13 3
David Chambers, in an exceptionally careful study and
evaluation of empirical research and theory about children living in
other than two-parent homes, explains that "[o]ne of the central
tenets of modern psychoanalytic and social learning theory is that
the intimate interaction of a caretaker with an infant produces a
bond between them, generally referred to as an 'attachment."' 134
He describes observations that lead theorists to find that the
attachment of young children to primary caretaking mothers 135 is
more important than other relationships:
In the early months of a child's life, a primary-
caretaker mother typically touches, caresses, and holds
her child many times every day and feeds her several
132. The Pikula rule was anticipated by a 1980 decision in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that custody should be awarded to primary caretakers unless there were strong reasons for not
doing so. Berndt v. Berndt, 292 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 1980). AsJustice Wahl explained in Pikula:
The importance of emotional and psychological stability to the child's sense of
security, happiness, and adaptation that we deemed dispositive in Berndt is a postulate
embedded in the statutory factors and about which there is little disagreement within
the profession of child psychology. . . . For younger children in particular, that
stability is most often provided by and through the child's relationship to his or her
primary caretaker - the person who provides the child with daily nurturance, care
and support. As we further noted in Berndt, a court order separating a child from the
primary parent could thus rarely be deemed in the child's best interests.
Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 711. As Minnesota Court of Appeals Judge Crippen reiterated the Pikula
rationale in Brauer v. Brauer:
[P]lacing the child with the primary parent best serves the child's interests because of
the intimate relationship that exists between the child and the primary parent. It is in
the best interests of the child that there be a continuity of caregiving and that there be
stability in the child's life. That continuity and stability is best achieved by salvaging
the child's relationship with the primary parent.
Brauer, 384 N.W.2d at 597.
133. E.g., Leonard & Provence, The Development of Parent-Child Relationships and the Psychological
Parent, 53 CONN. B.J. 320, 324 (1979); Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94
YALE L.J. 757, 799 (1985).
134. Chambers, supra note 10, at 528.
135. Chambers notes that the concept of the primary caretaker is gender neutral but that all of
the research to date deals with primary caretaking mothers. Id.
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times a day. Within a few months, the child can typically
identify her, has positive feelings toward her, and can tell
her apart from others. By some point between around six
months and a year, the child begins to display what is
commonly called "attachment behavior": seeking to be
near her, becoming distressed on separation from her,
showing pleasure or relief on reunion with her, and
orienting herself to her even when not in physical contact
(listening for her voice, checking to make certain that she
is not too far away).
Before becoming fully verbal, children and their
primary caretakers develop elaborate and personal rituals
of communication that apply to feeding, diaper-changing,
responses to small injuries, and most of a child's other
repeated events. Through these rituals, a high level of
communication takes place in a "language" that no one
else knows fully how to "speak." The mother assumes a
place in her infant's psyche that others cannot replace by
performing fhe same services.
Many writers about child development believe that
the importance to the child of the psychological bond that
develops between the child and primary caretakers in this
early period stretches well beyond what might be inferred
from these visible small events and interactions. They
consider attachment to a primary caretaker the essential
cornerstone for a child's healthy emotional development.
At the earliest stage, it is critical to the child's learning to
place trust in others and to have confidence in her own
capacities. Later, it plays a central role in the child's cap-
acity to establish emotional bonds with other persons.
The sense of trust in others and in self that the attachment
provides may also affect the child's development of
intellectual and social skills. The growing child passes
through many developmental stages, each requiring her
to acquire critical skills and capacities . . . . The original
bond of the child with the primary caretaker is believed to
have an important continuing effect on the child's ability
to pass through each stage with success. 136
Justice Wahl in Pikula 13 7 and Justice Levine in her Gravning
136. Id. at 529-30. Chambers carefully notes that these observations present the strongest case
that can be made for preferring primary caretakers. Id. at 528.
137. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712.
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dissent 138 describe continuity of care with the primary caretaker as
perhaps the only predictor of a child's welfare about which there is
agreement. Chambers believes that proponents of primary
caretaking probably overstate attachment theory and undervalue
the significance of children's substantial emotional bonds with their
secondary caretakers. 139 Nevertheless, he finds that the claim that
the primary caretaker relationship is unique is widely accepted. 140
Furthermore, he adds:
I have shared earlier drafts of this Article with a
substantial number of persons with training in psychology
or psychiatry. Nearly all acknowledge the absence of a
firm empirical foundation for the conclusion that
preserving the bond of children to primary caretakers is
more critical than preserving the bond to secondary
caretakers and yet nearly all believe that there is
something special in that relationship worthy of weight in
making decisions about placement. 141
A number of cases in states that have not adopted a strong
presumption in favor of primary caretakers nevertheless give that
status extra weight and agree that the major significance of primary
caretaking is that it both creates and identifies primary
psychological bonding with children. For example, the Oregon
Court of Appeals explained in Derby v. Derby 142 that custody of a
five-year old and a nine-year old should be awarded to their mother
because as primary caretaker she had the closest emotional
relationship with the young children. 1 The court stated:
138. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 625 (N.D. 1986) (LevineJ., dissenting).
139. Chambers, supra note 10, at 533.
140. Id. at 537.
141. Id. Chambers concludes that current "hard" research cannot provide systematic empirical
studies to support a primary caretaker presumption, but he does find the presumption supported by
"softer" empirical data supplied by nonsystematic clinical observation. Id. at 560-61. He therefore
endorses a weak rather than a strong presumption. Id.
Lee Teitelhaum explains that:
Classical research through experimental testing of hypotheses about custodial
arrangements, marital dissolution, alimony, and most other questions of public
importance is simply impossible. Random assignment of children to one or another
parent, or the random granting and denial of divorce petitions, is neither
constitutionally nor socially acceptable. Second-choice methodologies, such as quasi-
experimental research, are only relatively less difficult.
Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 MicH. L. REv. 430, 437 (1985). Teitelbaum adds
that "unavailability of data to support empirical assumptions upon which rules are founded, is
hardly unique to family law." Id. at 439.
142. 31 Or. App. 803, 571 P.2d 562 (1977).
143. Derby v. Derby, 31 Or. App. 803, 806-07, 571 P.2d 562, 564 (1977), modified on other
grounds, 31 Or. App. 1333, 572 P.2d 1080 (1977).
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The undisputed evidence in this case was that the wife
was not merely the mother, but was also the primary
parent. During the marriage she was not working and
performed the traditional and honorable role of
homemaker. She cleaned the house, cared for the
children, fed the family, nursed them when sick and spent
those countless hours disciplining, counseling and
chatting with the children that every homemaker should.
For some families the husband may perform this role and
be the primary parent. In other families the parents
evenly divide the role and there is no primary parent. In
this family the husband played the traditional role of
breadwinner, working eight to ten hours a day. In his off-
hours he dedicated much time and attention to the
children, but the lion's share of the child raising was
performed by the wife. It is undisputed that the children
were happy and well-adjusted and that the relationship
between the wife and children was close, loving and
successful. Although the same relationship
unquestionably existed to a degree with the husband, the
close and successful emotional relationship between the
primary parent and the children coupled with the age of
the children dictate the continuance of that
relationship. 144
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit approve this Derby passage as a
recognition of the significance of identifying the primary caregiving
parent. 145
The California Supreme Court pointed out in 1986 that it had
frequently. stressed "the importance of stability and continuity in
the life of a child, and the harm that may result from disruption of
established patterns of care and emotional bonds." 146 The court
held that it was therefore an abuse of discretion for a trial court to
have awarded custody to a father on the grounds that he was better
equipped psychologically and economically to care for the child. 147
Those grounds were insignificant, the appellate court declared,
144. Id. at 806-07, 571 P. 2d at 564. For a 1985 annotation citing cases from sixteen states in
which primary caretaking was treated either expressly or by necessary implication as an important
factor, see Annotation, supra note 83, at 1139.
145. IN BEST INTERESTS, supra note 14, at 67.
146. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal.3d 531, 541, 724 P.2d 486, 492-93, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806-07
(1986).
147. Id.
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compared to the fact that the mother had been primary caretaker of
the happy and healthy two-year old since his birth. 148
While stopping short of characterizing other considerations as
insignificant, Pennsylvania courts in a series of decisions have
endorsed custody decisions in favor of the primary caretaker, the
parent who has "through daily, affection, guidance,
companionship, and discipline fulfill[ed] the child's psychological
and physical needs.... ,, 149 The doctrine, a Pennsylvania Superior
Court explained in 1985, posits the likelihood of a child's greater
attachment to the primary caretaker and recognizes that the
attachment may be of critical importance in deciding custody. 150
Although it may seem unlikely that anyone would deny the
importance of primary psychological bonding, in the absence of an
explicit preference that consideration receives surprisingly little
explicit recognition in case law. Chambers suggests that may be so
because "something subtle and invisible like a special emotional tie
between a primary caretaker and a child tends to be overlooked" in
a trial or because judges may want to avoid hurting the feelings of
the parent to whom the child is less strongly attached. 151 It is also
148. Id.
149. Beers v. Beers, 342 Pa. Super. 465, -. , 493 A.2d 116, 118 (1985) (quoting Common
Wealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. 421, -, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1982)). In Jordan the
court explained:
IT]he trial court must give positive consideration to the parent who has been the
primary caretaker. Not to do so ignores the benefits likely to flow to the child from
maintaining day to day contact with the parent on whom the child has depended for
satisfying his basic physical and psychological needs.
It is clear that the continued presence of a fit parent who through daily affection,
guidance, companionship, and discipline fulfills the child's psychological and physical
needs is crucial to the child's emotional well being. The countless transactions between
parent and child on a day to day basis build the foundation for the child's future
healthy development. The Pennsylvania courts have recognized this principle and
have held that the "continued residence of children with one parent is a factor which
may, in certain cases, be controlling."
Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. at -, 448 A.2d at 1115.Jordan was an "easy" case in which the five-year
old child had lived with his primary caretaking mother for his entire life and the father had lived
apart from the boy for almost four years. See id. at -, 448 A. 2d at 1115. The court, however,
formulated a generally applicable doctrine that "the rule of the primary caretaker, without regard to
the sex of the parent, is a substantial factor which the trial judge must weigh in adjudicating a
custody matter where the child is of tender years." Id. at -, 448 A. 2d at 1115.
150. Beers, 342 Pa. Super. at -, 493 A.2d at 119; see also Agudo v. Agudo, 411 So.2d 249,
250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (seventeen-month old awarded to primary caregiving mother based
on expert testimony that it is well-accepted that children between the age of six months and three
years establish an attachment to the primary caretaker which is essential to the emotional
development of the child and that to deprive a child of the primary caretaker during this period has a
negative effect on the child's intellectual, physical and psycho-social development).
151. Chambers, supra note 10, at 486 n. 29. Chambers notes the following:
Legislatures that list factors that judges are to consider in resolving custody disputes
commonly list first the quality of the child's emotional ties or relationship with each
parent but, at least in the judicial opinions I am able to find, few judges rest their
decisions on a finding that the child has in fact a closer relationship to one parent than
516
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possible that primary caretaking is disregarded because recognition
of its value is mistakenly thought to amount to a maternal
preference. 152
2. Past Caretaking as an Objective Basis for Predicting Future
Parenting
Associated with but distinguishable from the premise that
past primary caretaking identifies the child's strongest
psychological relationship is the view that the track records of
caregivers provide a reliable, realistic basis for predicting future
parenting. For example, a Pennsylvania court reasoned:
Insofar as a parent's past performance is likely to be
predictive, judicial inquiry to determine the identity of
the primary caretaker will yield evidence concerning the
future commitment of a parent. If in the past, the primary
caretaker has tended to the child's physical needs and has
exhibited love, affection, concern, tolerance, discipline
and a willingness to sacrifice, the trial judge may predict
that those qualities will continue. 153
Justice Neely similarly argued in Garska that intelligent conclusions
can be made for the future based upon past conduct showing love,
the other, or that one is a better parent. I am uncertain why this should be so, but
there are at least three possibilities.
The first is that somejudges may not believe that emotional ties are important. If
legislatures do believe them important, a generalized rule resting on evidence about
emotional ties might encourage or compel judges to bend to the legislature's will. The
second is that most judges care about emotional ties, but simply cannot discern in
most cases which parent has the closer tie with the child. If this is the case, a general
rule grounded in empirical evidence should produce better decisions. The final
explanation is that judges typically do have a hunch about the child's stronger ties to
one parent, but are reluctant to reveal their hunch because of the wound it could inflict
on the other parent. In such cases, judges may rest their stated conclusions on some
other ground that played less of a role or no role in their decisions, such as the
comparative financial positions of the parents. If this is the case, a general rule,
adequately grounded, should at least do no harm, though it may cause pain for the
judges who must reveal more about their grounds for decision in cases in which their
hunches run in the opposite direction of the preference.
Id. Crippen and Hatling suggest that the need for continuity may often be unrecognized because it is
not so important in adult lives. Crippen & Hatling, supra note 80, at 420. Perhaps its importance is
seldom articulated because it seems self-evident. In Gronneberg v. Gronneberg, for example, an award of
custody to a primary caretaker was upheld as not clearly erroneous but there was no explicit
recognition of the importance of primary caretaking. See Gronneberg v. Gronneberg, 412 N.W.2d
84, 94 (N.D. 1987).
152. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
153. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. at __, 448 A.2d at 1115; see also In re Muell, 408
N.W.2d 774, 777 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (particularly significant that mother had been responsible for
the primary care of the children throughout the marriage and that they had progressed well under
her supervision). Klaff argues that the best means by which a judge can determine a parent's
capacity or willingness to provide primary care is his or her own past performance as a caretaker.
Klaff, supra note 30, at 348.
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affection, concern, tolerance, and the willingness to sacrifice. 154 In
the same way that primary caretaking is significant, substantial
sharing of parenting responsibilities may provide reliable
prognostic evidence favoring both parents. By contrast, the
commitment and nurturing ability of a parent who has not been
actively involved in caregiving is necessarily speculative.
Often, parents who have not been active caretakers express
ambitious intentions, but those intentions are not informed or
verified by past experience. 155 Courts, however, often treat
relatively minor parental involvement as strong positive evidence of
future performance. In Landsberger, for example, the court
acknowledged that "during the first part of the marriage, the
children's needs were met primarily by [the mother]" but treated
that as offset by the fact that the father babysat while the mother
frequently went out evenings with women friends during the last
154. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 364; see also Novotny v. Novotny, 394 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (the primary caretaker law determines the fact of primary parenting from evidence of the
past). In Garska Justice Neely did not focus on emotional or psychological well being of children, nor
did he discuss the relationship ofcaregiving to psychological bonding. See Garska, 278 S.E. 2d at 360-
62. While he defined the primary caretaker by objective and functional criteria, he also suggests that
the "track record" of the primary caretaker demonstrates love and affection as well as a willingness
to sacrifice. See id. at 364.
Justice Neely seems to find distasteful some of the functions which identify the primary
caretaker; such a valuejudgment is nearer the surface in his earlier observation that the socialization
of women encourages them to develop "surpassing patience and a high tolerance for a close, grating,
aesthetically unpleasant, and frequently oppressive, yet nonetheless absolutely indispensable
physical relationship with children."J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248, 252 (W. Va. 1978).
155. E.g., Olin v. Olin, 393 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (father in past had been
uninvolved with childcare but had desire to provide quality parenting).
In Porter, Mrs. Porter argued the following regarding her former husband:
Captain Porter... speaks of how he "could" learn to cook and clean; of how a parent
"should" get up in the morning to fix breakfast for children and the good feelings this
would give them. Many parents have looled back with considerable amusement at
how they, prior to having children of their own, viewed the ways their friends
managed their children and how they were certain that they would do a host of things
different and better than what they saw. Unlike these well-intentioned people without
children, however, Captain Porter had ample opportunity prior to the divorce action
in which to demonstrate his care for his children. This he did not do ....
Appellant's Reply Brief at 11, Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235 (N.D. 1979) (No. 9470).
In Koller v. Koller a North Dakota trial judge found significance in the absence of past childcare
by a father whose motion for a change of custody it denied. See Koller v. Koller, 377 N.W.2d 130,
131 (N.D. 1985). The supreme court quoted the trial court's oral finding:
THE COURT: The situation was originally in this case that I was faced with a
decision as to which of two people should have custody within the context of the
divorce proceeding. ...
My view of the matter was, and still is, while [the father] seems a pleasant
enough man and rather articulate and, again, has the capability of being a parent, his
entire history is to the contrary. When given the opportunity to do that, he never has. I
have no reason to think that he would not continue in that manner.
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four months of the marriage. 156 The North Dakota Supreme Court
repeated the trial court's observation that the father "now focuses
more" on the children, but did not and could not on the basis of the
record suggest that his actual involvement in childcare substantially
matched the mother's. 157 It is possible that what seems for some
judges the relative novelty of a father's involvement in parenting
leads to overstatement of its significance. 158 Nancy Polikoff
suggests that some judges who have little direct experience of what
primary childcare involves may be overly impressed by "the
changing of a fraction of the number of diapers, preparing a
fraction of the number of meals, presiding over a fraction of the
number of baths, providing solace for a fraction of scraped knees
and hurt feelings." 159
156. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d at 919. The bar frequenting took place from July through
September of 1984. Record at 28-30, Landsberger v. Landsberger, No. 34361 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct.
N.D. May 31, 1984). The couple separated in November. Id. The mother testified that she no longer
frequented bars. Id. at 306-07.
157. Landsberger, 364 N.W. 2d at 919. While the "comparative focusing" language might seem
out of context to suggest that the father now focused more on the children than the mother did, it is
equally plausible to understand the trial court's opinion to mean that Mr. Landsberger now focused
more on the children than he had at the beginning of the marriage:
I think the parties' attitudes have changed somewhat since the beginning of the
marriage. Initially, Mr. Landsberger exhibited no unusual interest in the children but
now focuses more upon them. Mrs. Landsberger's life initially revolved mostly
around the children, but she has since become more interested in outside activity. I do
not mean by this to suggest that she does not love the children, as it is apparent that
both parents do and that the children love their parents.
Landsberger v. Landsberger, No. 34361, mem. at 4 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. June 26, 1984)
The father conceded that the mother had been primarily responsible for caring for the children
during the marriage. Record at 45-46, Landsberger (No. 34361). His claims of participation were
modest: he testified that he did some feeding and bathing of the then-one-year old child and took her
to a doctor a couple of times when he was laid off for three months in 1983; that he cooked breakfasts
sometimes and a full meal once; and that he got closer to the older child when she "was probably
about two years old, when she started going fishing." Id. at 44, 56, 573. Testimony differed as to the
extent of his interaction with the children during the three months before the separation, when he
babysat while the mother went to bars as often as three or four evenings a week. She testified that she
usually went out about 9:00 p.m. and that she fed and bathed both children and that the younger
child was usually in bed before she left. Id. at 234-35. He testified that she sometimes went out at
7:00 and usually at 8:00 or 7:00, and that he bathed the older child "a number of times" although he
knew "it wasn't a lot he bathed [the younger one]." Id. at 9, 29, 522-23. He denied that they were
always fed before the mother left. Id. at 30. He testified that he shared child care with his mother and
sisters when he had visitation during the six months that the children had been in custody of their
mother before the divorce. Id. at 523, 532-34. He further testified that he intended to take a cooking
class but that the County Social Services had not arranged that for him. Id. at 91-92.
158. The Landsberger trial judge, for example, characterized the father's involvement in child
care as "unusual" in noting that "[ijnitially Mr. Landsberger exhibited no unusual interest in the
children but now focuses more on them." Landsberger, mem. at 4. A 1986 New York study of gender
bias reports the comment of one respondent:
I think a key issue women face unfairly from time to time in custody disputes is that a
less than perfect mother is criticized for her imperfection while a father who simply
wants his kids is given credit for having that wonderful desire, even if he has done very
little child care.
Schafran, supra note 87, at 286.
159. Polikoff, supra note 71, at 195.
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Polikoff also points out that, while fathers are often credited
for doing relatively little, mothers are sometimes criticized because
their past conduct does not show exclusive preoccupation with
homemaking and childcare:
Case analysis reveals a tendency to overrate small
paternal contributions to parenting because they are still
so noticeable, and to concomitantly over-emphasize lack
of total maternal parenting. In other words, the emphasis
in evaluating mothers is on what they do not do, because
they are expected to do everything. By this standard, men
will always look good for doing more than nothing and
women will always look bad for doing less than
everything. 160
Although it is widely recognized that mothers usually remain
primarily responsible for childcare even when they are employed
outside the home, 161 courts sometimes imply that primary
caretaker status is less significant when, and perhaps because, a
woman has serious career interests. 162 Although courts are
160. Id. at 191. Polikoff has also written:
The flip side of penalizing mothers with limited financial resources due to sporadic or
part-time employment is penalizing mothers who work full-time for not being
sufficiently available to their children. Since men are traditionally expected to be full-
time workers, fathers do not face this disadvantage. In fact, a man with a full-time job
who provides any assistance in childrearing, however limited, looks like a dedicated
father, while a woman with a full-time job who still does primary, but not all,
caretaking, looks like "half" a mother, dissatisfied with the childrearing role.
Polikoff, Why are Mothers Losing. A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7
WOMEN'S L. REP. 235, 239 (1982).
Weitzman and Dixon report that some attorneys expressed concerns that emphasis on
psychological parenting seemed to equate a mother's fitness with her exclusive devotion to her
children as a fulltime, traditional housewife. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 75, at 513; see also
Polikoff, supra note 71, at 191.
161. See infra note 192.
162. Polikoff, supra note 160, at 239-41. In Landsberger, the trial court referred to Mrs.
Landsberger as "a career mother." Landsberger v. Landsberger, No. 34361, mem. at 2 (S. Cent.
Dist. Ct. N.D. June 26, 1984). The father argued on appeal that "[b]y the time of the trial, she had
already determined that she was going to be a working mother, forfeiting any claim that she might
have had to being the one with whom the children felt closest because she had always been the
primary caretaker." Brief of Appellee at 17, Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918 (N.D.
1985) (No. 10764). The North Dakota Supreme Court observed the following:
A 'career mother' is not disqualified for custody of her children any more than a
working father, but where each parent works outside of the home and where each has
the ability and desire to care for their children, the trial court must necessarily weigh
the circumstances on a fine and delicate scale.
Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d at 920.
It is perhaps misleading that the trial judge in Bashus v. Bashus joined two separate and
independent findings in a single paragraph providing: "The mother has, in the past, demonstrated
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uniformly enthusiastic about vocational rehabilitation for divorced
women, 163 the feeling seems to linger that serious outside interests
diminish a woman's nurturing ability but are acceptable for a
''normal working father." 164 Because its functional analysis avoids
such a gender-stereotyped double standard, the primary caretaker
presumption avoids overvaluing fathers who do more than nothing
and undervaluing mothers who do less than everything. Instead, it
carefully considers parenting with a neutral focus on past
performance.
3. Avoidance ofA busive Misuse of Custody Issue
Justice Neely's instrumental rationale for the West Virginia
rule focuses almost entirely on practical ways in which the
presumption improves the process of custody resolution by
avoiding abuses and inequities that-are in his view inevitable in
unweighed custody determinations. He argues that a primary
caretaker presumption is necessary in order to avoid inequitable
results in cases that are settled by negotiation rather than by
litigation. 165 Anxiety caused by the possibility of loss of custody
leads to what Justice Neely labels the Solomon Syndrome, the
phenomenon that "the parent who is most attached to the child will
be most willing to accept an inferior bargain." 166 Primary
caretakers are more risk adverse because they are more frightened
by the possibility of losing custody. The relatively more risk-ad-
verse party is comparatively disadvantaged in negotiating because
that person will accept concessions in order to avoid the gamble
that her first priority has been her career in music. The mother has had prolonged absence from the
home on several occasions that can only be described as near abandonment." Bashus v. Bashus, 393
N.W.2d 746, 749 (N.D. 1986). In fact it is clear from the record that the prolonged absence from
home was occasioned by an extramarital relationship that was not career-related. Record at 88, 93-
94, Bashus v. Bashus, No. 36493 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Dec. 19, 1985); see infra note 278. The
wording of the finding, however, seems to link the mother's career interest to the "near
abandonment."
163. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 326 N.W.2d 697, 700 (N.D. 1981) (court commended mother's
desire to further her education in order to achieve financial independence); Williams v. Williams,
302 N.W.2d 754, 758 (N.D. 1981) (spousal support justified by goal of educationally and financially
rehabilitating wife).
164. Simmons v. Simmons, 223 Kan. 639, -, 576 P.2d 589, 591. (1978) (oil company
president was able "to spend a normal working father's time with the children.").
165. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360-62 (W. Va. 1981).
166. Id. at 362. King Solomon showed us, Neely wrote in 1984, that "the better a mother is as a
parent, the less likely she is to allow a destructive fight over the children." Neely, The Primary
Caretaker Rule: Child Custody and the Politics of Greed, 3 YALE & PoL'v REV. 168, 178 (1984). Besides
standing for the general proposition that parents who are more closely bonded to their children may
be psychologically disadvantaged in custody disputes, the Solomon story shows that loving parents
may forego asserting their own interests in order to protect children from "the costs of divisiveness."
Minow, Consider the Consequences, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 900, 908 n. 25 (1984).
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inherent in litigation. 167 The primary caretaker, who is often in a
weaker financial position than his or her spouse, is therefore likely
to accept less spousal support, child support and property in
exchange for assurance of retaining custody. 168
Neely relied on experience to support his observation that
there is in fact pressure on the primary caretaker to exchange
lower support payments for custody of the child. 169 The
phenomena is widely recognized, although evidence of it is usually
anecdotal. 170 In a 1981 newspaper magazine feature defending the
tender years presumption as a means of encouraging negotiated
settlements, Justice Neely cited as evidence of unfair adversarial
pressure his own tactics as a practicing attorney:
[W]hen I worked as an attorney and represented men in
divorce cases I always had my client demand custody of
the children. When some clients told me they didn't want
the children, I told them to fight for them anyway, at least
in the initial pleadings. I knew we could trade the children
for reduced alimony and child support out of court (good
mothers are so terrified by custody fights that they will
trade just about everything to keep the children) and that
was what usually happened. 171
As a large majority of divorces are settled according to private
bargaining between the parties leading to stipulations that are only
perfunctorily evaluated by judges who accept them, 172 there is a
high risk of unfair fiscal agreements attributable to the vulnerability
of the primary caretaker. Reduction of that vulnerability would
directly further the best interests of children by encouraging
adequate support agreements. Since primary caretakers usually
167. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950, 979 (1979).
168. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 360.
169. Id.
170. E.g., Wishkin, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79, 101 (1986) (an
attorney who analyzed the 227 published decisions in divorces closed between October 1982 and
February 1983 in two rural and two urban Vermont judicial districts and interviewed parties in 21%
of those cases reported that a significant portion of the women interviewed stated that they had
bargained away property or support rights in exchange for child custody). For an unusual case in
which a psychiatrist testified that a father fought for custody only for bargaining leverage, see In re
Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 898 n.3 (Iowa 1982).
171. Family Weekly, October 11, 1981, at 10-11. Justice Neely recounts a particular example of
his zealous advocacy in detail in Neely, supra note 166, at 177- 78.
172. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 167, at 951; Sharp, Custody Decrees, 68 VA. L. REV.
1263, 1279 (1982). Negotiation of divorce-related issues is extremely important because
approximately 90% of divorce decrees are based on stipulations. Mnookin & Kornhauser,
supra note 167, at951 n. 3.
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retain custody after uncontested divorces, more adequate property
and spousal support stipulations would, indirectly, also protect
children. 173
4. Encouragement of Private Settlements
A primary caretaker presumption should encourage private
settlements and thereby avoid the impact on children of prolonged
custody litigation. The destabilizing impact of protracted custody
litigation and relitigation is widely recognized as harmful to
children.1 74 As an Oregon judge observed, "the chances of a child
developing emotional problems as they grow up increases
in direct proportion to the thickness of the file involved in a divorce
case." 175 Not only does the primary caretaker presumption
mitigate the disadvantage in private decisionmaking to the more
risk-adverse party, it also positively facilitates informed
negotiation by providing a clear and predictable framework in the
shadow of which the parties bargain. 176 Because custody disputes
173. See Chambers, supra note 10, at 563-64. Chambers modestly argues:
If we believe that the child (unlike a boat or cottage) is not an item that a parent ought
to have to make financial concessions to receive, if indeed we want to protect the
financial security of the child if the child ends up in the custody of the parent who
wanted her more, than creating a preference for primary caretakers may reduce at
least slightly the use by secondary caretakers of the threat of a custody fight for tactical
advantage.
Id. Another author notes:
An unfair financial settlement reduces the material standard of the child and the
mother, and it also affects their lives in other ways. Lower financial support often
requires the mother to work longer hours, and financial difficulties may subject her to
increased emotional strain. The child has less time with the mother, and the mother
has less emotional energy to devote to the child. The reduced standard of living, the
reduced time with the mother, and the reduced quality of the time with the mother
work to the substantial detriment of the child.
Cochran, Best Interests of the Child, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1985).
174. Elster notes that "[a] custody battle places a child in many difficult roles: mediator,
weapon, pawn, bargaining chip, trophy, go-between or even spy." Elster, supra note 7, at 24. Elster
ultimately argues that some sort of presumptive entitlement is more desirable than unweighed
comparisons of all parental traits because "intellectual honesty should force one to recognize that
there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the assessment of degrees of fitness, whereas the
damage done to children by litigation is hardly open to doubt." Id. at 25; see also Cochran, supra note
173, at 15-20.
175. King v. King, 10 Or. App. 324, 328, 500 P.2d 267, 268 (1972).
176. In a classic exploration of the impact of divorce doctrine, Mnookin and Kornhauser
explain that legal standards provide a framework within which divorcing couples negotiate and
bargain. Divorcing parents "bargain in the shadow of the law" in the sense that legal rules give each
parent bargaining chips based upon the predictable outcome of litigation in the event that no
agreement is reached. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 167, at 968. Thus, predictable judicial
decisions facilitate bargaining. See id. Mnookin and Kornhauser argue that the primary function of
divorce law should be to provide a clear framework within which divorcing couples can determine
their rights and responsibilities by private ordering. Id. at 950.
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in jurisdictions without a presumptive entitlement to one easily
identified parent are so unpredictable, the legal backdrop against
which parties negotiate is too clouded by uncertainty to cast a
useful shadow. Since results are uncertain and each parent can
argue that the child should be in his or her custody, parents may be
encouraged to litigate 177 and relitigate. 178 An explicit and
predictable preference for primary caretaker custodians would
serve the best interests of children by encouraging parental
agreement.
5. Judicially Manageable Standard
Primary caretaking can usually be identified easily and
therefore provides a workable judicial standard. Justice Neely
conceded that he would not favor a presumption if he believed that
unweighed comparisons of two fit parents would result in more
intelligent child placement. 179 Not unnaturally, enthusiasm for a
primary caretaker presumption varies in proportion to skepticism
about the availability of adequate information for unweighed
custody adjudications and the reliability of judicial evaluation of
that information.
Although proponents of a primary caretaker presumption do
not agree with agnostics that there is no meaningful consensus
supporting treatment of primary caretaking as substantially more
important than other considerations in determining custody, they
do agree with skeptics that ordinarily courts do not have adequate
information to make comparative predictions about two plausible
177. See Chambers, supra note 10, at 562 (clear signals to parents about the probable outcome of
going to court discourage litigation); Mnookin, supra note 54, at 262 (indeterminate best interest of
child standard makes outcome of litigation difficult to predict and may encourage litigation because
each parent can often make reasonable arguments that a child would be better off with him or her).
Indeterminate criteria may encourage nonprimary caretakers to litigate because reported decisions
may seem promising. Assuming that most primary caretakers are women, infra note 221, it may
seem encouraging to nonprimary caretakers that men often prevail in appellate custody litigation.
Atkinson analyzed all the custody decisions published in the West Publishing Company's Reporter
System for 1982 and 1983. J. ATKINSON, supra note 29. He determined that "[i]n cases that reached
the merits and gave custody to either the mother or the father, 51% of all appellate court cases gave
custody to the father and only 49% of cases gave custody to the mother." Id. at 226. He speculates
that mothers may still receive custody in a majority of contested cases at the trial level and suggests
that appellate decisions might not reflect that pattern because mothers may be discouraged by their
attorneys from appealing and because some appellate courts publish only decisions that are likely to
present new law or special facts, neither of which factors are as likely in decisions favoring mothers as
in those favoring fathers. Id. at 227. Estimates of trial results vary widely. Polikoff reports studies
showing men win custody in one-third to one-half contested trials. Polikoff, supra note 71, at 185.
McCant, however, claims that fathers win in less than 5% of contested cases. McCant, The Cultural
Contradiction of Fathers as Nonparents, 21 FAM. L.Q. 127, 133 (1987).
178. See generally. Wexler, supra note 133, at 757 (states traditionally permit modification of
custody if a parent can show a change in circumstances of the parties).
179. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981).
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custodial alternatives. Courts are able in "easy cases" to identify
an inadequate custodial choice, 180 even if that parent would not be
considered unfit if the question were whether state intervention
might be justified. Courts are not equipped, however, to deal with
fine distinctions in hard, close contests between two positive
custodial alternatives. 181 Developing and establishing information
is expensive, and most divorcing parents have limited resources. 182
There is widespread disbelief that privately selected and paid
experts are objective. 183 Court-employed or appointed neutral
investigators receive mixed reviews. 184
180. Mnookin explains that:
[Slome custody cases may still be comparatively easy to decide. While there is no
consensus about what is best for a child, there is much consensus about what is very
bad (e.g., physical abuse); some short-term predictions about human behavior can be
reliably made (e.g., chronic alcoholism or psychosis is difficult quickly to modify).
Asking which alternative is in the best interests of a child may have a rather clear-cut
answer in situations where one claimant exposes the child to substantial risks of
immediate harm and the other claimant already has a substantial personal relationship
with the child and poses no such risk. In a private dispute between two parents, for
example, if a judge could predict that one parent's conduct would seriously endanger
the child's health, it would not be difficult to conclude that the child's expected utility
would be higher if he went with the other parent, whose conduct did not, even without
the necessity of defining utility carefully. More generally, where one alternative
plainly risks irreversible effects on the child that are bad and the other does not, there
is no need to make longer-term predictions or more complicated psychological
evaluations of what is likely to happen to the child's personality.
But to be easy, a case must involve only one claimant who is well known to the
child and whose conduct does not endanger the child. If there are two such claimants
or none, difficult choices remain.
Mnookin, supra note 54, at 261.
181. Okupaku argues forcibly that in close cases "psychological theory concerning the needs of
children and the harms resulting from nonfulfillment of these needs is" general and elastic.
Okupaku, supra note 82, at 1137.
182. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn. 1985) (many primary caretakers may be
unable to afford the expense of litigation and this may weaken the primary caretaker's power).
Chambers observes:
Many of us have an image of custody litigation with high-paid counsel and batteries of
psychiatrists battling for weeks on end-in its extreme form, the fights of the Pulitzers
and the Vanderbilts. While there is little statistical information about those who fight,
what little there is and my own observations in Michigan suggest that most of the cases
involve middle-income couples who may be as angry as the rich, but whose hearings
last only a few hours.
Chambers, supra note 10, at 483 n. 17. Chambers gives as an example of the cost of information
psychiatrist and author Richard Gardner, who generally charges more than $2,000 for his custody
examinations. Id. at 482 n. 15.
183. Silberman and Schepard express concern that "[the taint of being a 'hired gun' dis-
courages many capable mental health professionals from becoming involved in custody evalua-
tions." Silberman & Schepard, Consultants' Comments on the New York State Law Revision Commission
Recommendation on the Child Custody Dispute Resolution Process, 19 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 399, 411
(1985). Okupaku suggests that "[w]ell-intentioned behavioral science practitioners convinced of the
accuracy of their unsystematic clinical observations can find in the overbroad descriptions of
childhood needs and harms support for virtually any opinion." Okupaku, supra note 82, at 1140.
184. Atkinson reports:
Many judges do not place much weight on testimony by mental health
experts-particularly if the expert was retained by one of the parties. Many judges
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In addition to problems in obtaining information, there are
seemingly intractable difficulties in evaluating what information is
available. Justice Neely suggests that judicial evaluation is
uncertain because the better custodian may not make the most
persuasive witness. 185 Furthermore, he argues, degrees of
comparative parenting skill cannot be judicially determined
because judges do not have adequate empirical tools to measure
degrees of parental fitness. 186 Justice Wahl agrees that general
indicia are "inherently resistant to evaluation and difficult to apply
in any particular case" to evaluate relative degrees of fitness. 187 An
important instrumental justification for both the Minnesota rule
and the West Virginia rule is that, unlike unweighed
assume that if an attorney or party look long enough, they can find an expert who will
say almost anything. Most of the judges interviewed for this book said expert
testimony was helpful only in a minority of cases (less than 10% or 20% of contested
cases), and in those cases, mental health was a genuine issue. One judge said: "A
fairly experienced judge is a good observer of human nature. . . . I don't need the
fancy labels-just common sense."
Nevertheless, some judges place a great deal of weight on the testimony of mental
health experts, regardless of whether there is a significant issue regarding the mental
health of the parties or the child. Those judges may prefer to rely on the
recommendations of the expert, even if testimony of other witnesses strongly suggests
a different result. Alternatively, some judges may use expert testimony as a tiebreaker
in a close case. One attorney, commenting on reports by social service investigators
and court-affiliated mental health experts, said: "They scare . . . me. The
[investigators] are overworked to begin with, [and] the judge may be just looking for
something to hang his hat on, and all the rest [of the evidence that the attorney has
developed] becomes irrelevant to thejudge."
J. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 672-73; cf. Branson v. Branson, 411 N.W.2d 395, 400 (N.D. 1987)
(award of custody to father rather than primary caretaker mother, relying in part on psychologist's
testimony of statistical probability that mother might develop parenting problems in the future
because she had been a victim of child abuse). Robert Levy analyzed court-ordered custody
investigations during one year in Minneapolis, Minnesota and suggests reasons why it may be
difficult for ajudge to evaluate the information. Levy concluded:
[Investigators working for the Hennepin County Department of Court Services]
emphasized conclusory psychodynamic interpretations which were not subject to easy
or convincing rebuttal, which occasionally reflected only current fashions or fads in the
therapy community, or which sometimes masked in the language of therapy and
family dynamics the investigator's personal and idiosyncratic values.
Levy, supra note 78, at 501 (footnotes omitted); see also Levy, Custody Investigations as Evidence in
Divorce Cases, 21 FAM. L. Q. 149, 160-66 (1987) (custody investigations unreliable because of fact
shaping and fact suppression, imposition of values and improper use of psychological criteria by
investigators).
185. J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248, 254 (W. Va. 1978).
186. Id. at 255.
187. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 712 (Minn. 1985). A frequently-quoted author argues
that "[e]mpirical findings directly or indirectly relevant to questions for which judges deciding
difficult [custody] cases need answers are virtually non-existent." Okupaku, supra note 82, at 1140,
quoted in Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712. Okupaku argues that there is a double obstacle to reliable
predictions, even when psychological examinations and testing of both parents and children are
obtainable: it is necessarily speculative to predict future adult behavior on the basis of personality
theories and it is necessarily speculative to predict the likely consequences of assumed future adult
behavior on children. Id. at 1143.
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determinations, a primary caretaker presumption is a judicially
workable standard that can be easily applied and evaluated by trial
courts.
Both the Garska and the Pikula presumptions are inapplicable
if the parents have equally shared caretaking. 188 It is a premise of
both opinions that unless there has been substantial coparenting, a
functional analysis of tangible, external, easily quantified and
compared facts will identify the primary caretaker. Justice Wahl in
Pikula adopted the indicia of primary caretaking set out by Justice
Neely in Garska:
In establishing which natural or adoptive parent is the
primary caretaker, the trial court shall determine which
parent has taken primary responsibility for, inter alia, the
performance of the following caring and nurturing duties
of a parent: (1) preparing and planning of meals; (2)
bathing, grooming, and dressing; (3) pur-
chasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical
care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5)
arranging for social interaction among peers after school,
i.e. transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl
or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e.
babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at
night, attending to child in the middle of the night,
waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e.
teaching general manners and toilet training; (9)
educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10)
teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing, and
arithmetic. 18 9
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in their last book approved the Garska
guidelines because they agreed that the factors explicitly identify
evidence to be "considered in terms of their function-assuring
188. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E. 2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981); Pikula, 374 N.W. 2d at 714. For a
discussion of Garska and Pikula, see supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
189. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363; Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713-14. For a discussion of Garska and
Pikula, see supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text. Since for David Chambers, as forJustice Wahl
and Justice Levine, the significance of caretaking is that it is the occasion of psychological bonding,
Chambers examines critically the Garska-Pikula list of functions for identifying caretaking status. He
points out that developmental theory "suggests that what is important is not simply tasks performed
for the child but interactions with the child - direct contact in feeding, bathing, talking, snuggling,
and so forth." Chambers, supra note 10, at 538. He therefore recommends most but not all the Garska
indicia. Id. Tasks such as preparing and planning meals and purchasing, cleaning, and care of
clothes "would not be of direct relevance unless they included close interaction with the child; on
the other hand, a factor not included in the Garska list, the actual feeding of a small child, might be
highly relevant ..... Id. at 538 n. 230; see also Elster, supra note 7, at 37-38.
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continuity of care for the child" and because they are relatively
objective, visible factors. 190
It is clear, as both Justices Neely and Wahl observe, that
ordinarily a traditional homemaker who is not employed outside
the home will be easily identifiable as the primary caretaker. 191 An
entitlement that could be determined only if one parent were a
fulltime homemaker would be of limited applicability, however, at
a time when an increasing number of mothers as well as fathers
work. In fact, there is considerable evidence that one parent usually
functions as primary caretaker even when both are employed
outside the home. 192 Both Justices Neely and Wahl explicitly claim
applicability of their rule to working parents,1 93 and cases applying
a primary caretaker presumption have often found it possible to
identify primary caretaking status as between working parents. 194
Caretaking is crucial because tangible nurturing ordinarily
leads to psychological bonding, not because caretaking has an
inherent value. 195 A primary caretaker presumption, in effect,
190. IN BEST INTERESTS, supra note 14, at 66-7.
191. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 360; Pikula,374 N.W.2d at 714; see, e.g., Speltz v. Speltz, 386
N.W.2d 264, 267-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing the trial court's award of custody to the
father because the trial court failed to consider that the traditional mother who bathed the children,
prepared the family meals and took care of the household, was the primary caretaker).
Although Pikula indicates that ordinarily the traditional homemaker will be able to establish
primary caretaker status, that status "does not establish a presumption dispensing with specific
evidence of parental duties." Rosen v. Rosen, 398 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In two
post-Pikula cases, the Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that employed fathers substantially
shared childcare with mothers who were not employed outside the home. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 403
N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding that
the father while working outside the home had unusual involvement in child care, including care in
the home, medical care and recreation); Regenshied v. Regenshied, 395 N.W.2d 375, 378-79
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (agreeing with the trial court's finding that the mother was primary in
providing physical care, and the father was primary in providing emotional and intellectual care,
and therefore the parties shared equally in the children's care and neither parent was primary).
192. See Polikoff, supra note 71, at 188. Polikoff points out that it is a misconception to assume
that child care is evenly divided when both parents work outside the home because "[i]n reality
employed mothers overwhelmingly continue to be primarily responsible for childrearing." Id.
Weitzman supports this position and cites one recent study that showed fathers are less likely to
spend time with children when their wives are employed because "fathers are more willing to
'relieve' a wife who has been at home with the children all day." L. WEITZMAN, supra note 34, at 240.
Chambers reports that "[an initial, uniform finding from interviews with parents is that, in general,
fathers spend far less time with infants than mothers, even when mothers work outside the home."
Chambers, supra note 10, at 534; see also M.A. GLENDON, THENEw FAMILY AND THE.NEw PROPERTY
132 (1981) (mother is usually the primary caretaker whether or not she participates in the workforce);
cf. Project, Law Firms and Lawyers with Children: An Empirical Analysis of Family/Work Conflict, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 1263 (1982) (Stanford study concluding that both law firms and law students expect that
women will be responsible for most childrearing responsibilities).
193. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 360; Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 714. In Pikula, Wahl stated that "[w]e
would expect that, as between any two parents, one will be the primary parent even if neither
conforms to the more traditional pattern of one parent working outside the home and one within it."
Id.
194. See infra notes 227-29.
195. As the North Dakota Supreme Court has explained, "persons who provide a child's daily
care and who, thereby, develop a close personal relationship with the child become the psychological
parents to whom the child turns for love, guidance, and security." Patzer v. Glaser, 396 N.W.2d
740, 743 (N.D. 1986).
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views caretaker status as prima facie evidence of primary
psychological parentage. However, while the ultimate purpose of a
primary caretaker presumption is to insure the continuation of
children's intimate relationships with their primary psychological
parents, the presumption must be formulated indirectly in terms of
caretaking rather than directly in terms of psychological parenting
because a judicially manageable standard requires objective, easily
applicable, functional criteria for identifying the parent most likely
to be the primary psychological parent. As Minnesota Court of
Appeals Judge Gary Crippen has pointed out, it would be
regrettable if contests to prove which parent is the primary parent
became a new avenue of hostile litigation. 196 The fact and the
length of the caretaking relationship provide generally reliable
indirect evidence of a psychological relationship, whereas a rule
that requires direct comparison of psychological parenting would
be as judicially unmanageable a standard as an unweighed
comparison of all relevant parental attributes. Like an unweighed
comparative evaluation, a direct comparison of psychological
parenting would trigger battles of experts, often unequally
financed, generating controversial testimony that permits different
and unpredictable judicial acceptance or rejection. 197 Because the
process would be expensive and uncertain, a primary psychological
parent presumption would not avoid coercive misuse of the custody
issue against the vulnerable primary caretaker.
The question whether a parent may have established a
primary psychological relationship with a child in spite of not being
primary tangible caretaker ought to be considered in those unusual
cases in which such a claim is plausible. Identification of one parent
as primary psychological parent should not be confused with the
196. Crippen & Hatling, supra note 80, at 418. It is important to remember, Crippen and
Hatling suggest, that a primary parent contest easily could result in finding neither parent primary,
so that the presumption would not arise. Id. Certainly the instrumental arguments for the
presumption lose their force when there is protracted litigation of the status issue. However, because
of the substantive premise that primary psychological bonding is more important than other
considerations, the presumption should not be avoided in cases in which there is substantial evidence
that one parent was the primary caregiver.
197. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have explained
one reason why it is difficult for courts directly to determine psychological parentage:
To arrive at a trustworthy opinion of a particular child's true mental state as to who
are his psychological parents is a matter which taxes the skills of even the most
experienced clinicians-skills not easily taught and usually beyond the training of
courts, social service personnel, and other mental health professionals.
BEFORE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 13, at 43. Fran Olsen has proposed a primary attachment
presumption but acknowledges that it would tend to make child custody decisions dependent upon
"experts" who determine primary attachment. Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 LAW &
INEQUALITY 1, 18-19 (1984).
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preliminary characterization of one parent as, the primary
caretaker, even though the primary caretaker preference rests
upon the premise that the caregiver will usually be the primary
psychological parent. However, the burden of establishing that
complex claim ought to be on the parent seeking to overcome the
rebuttable inference that a primary caretaker is the primary
psychological parent.
6. Effective Appellate Review
It is an important part of the Minnesota rationale that a
primary caretaker presumption makes possible meaningful
appellate review. Effective appellate review is essential, Justice
Wahl notes, because "ad hoc judgments on beliefs, lifestyles, and
perceived credibility of proposed custodians" can play an
inappropriate role in custody decisions 198 but are difficult if not
impossible to control by a standard of review that asks only that
trial judges consider all relevant factors and not abuse their
discretion. 1 99 Joan Wexler explains why subjective value judgments
are a particularly acute problem in custody litigation:
Custody litigation, unlike most other litigation, attempts
to predict the future rather than to understand the past.
In most other litigation, the result will depend upon the
court's determination that some event did or did not take
place at an earlier time. Aside from possibly bearing on
credibility, the litigants' personality, priorities, lifestyle,
financial resources, emotional stability, and other
personal attributes have no relevance to the outcome. In
custody litigation, however-at least under the best
interests and traditional modification standards- those
very factors will determine the result in large measure,
with the court making a judgment as to whether the child
is likely in the future to be "better off" with one parent
198. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn. 1985). Mnookin observes that use of an
indeterminate standard allows state officials to decide custody disputes on the basis of unarticulated
predictions and preferences that could be questioned if expressed. Mnookin, supra note 54, at 263.
Mnookin concludes that because of the large degree of discretion under such a standard, there is a
substantial risk that decisions will be made based on values not widely shared in our society, even
among judges. Id.
199. Atkinson reports that in custody appeals forty-one states and the District of Columbia
apply an abuse of discretion standard of review, four states use a de novo standard, three use a
combination and two are difficult to categorize. J. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 753. North Dakota,
since 1972, has treated a determination that the best interest of the child requires a particular
placement as a finding of fact, not reversible unless clearly erroneous. Odegard v. Odegard, 259
N.W.2d 484, 485 (N.D. 1977).
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than with the other. Not surprisingly, decisions made in
this framework are less a product of reasoned application
of precedent than of the personality, temperament,
background, interests, and biases of the trial judge or of
the community that elected him. 200
Lower court litigation in Pikula illustrates the subjectivity
problem. The trial judge in Pikula initially awarded custody to the
father on the bases of the following findings:
Finding 11. That there is a strong, stable, religious
family group relationship within the Pikula family that
has been developed, nurtured and cultivated over the
years. It has stood like a bedrock through the depression
years and post-war years of plenty and permissiveness.
This environment has inbred in the family a unity,
respect, loyalty and love that for the most part has been
destroyed and lost in most modern American families. It
is in the best interest of the child that they be kept in the
cultural family environment.
Finding 12. That the environment in which petitioner
finds herself is almost the exact opposite. It is
characterized by self-interest and excessive liberalism. 201
It seems fair to suggest that those findings reveal more about the
judge's political values and biases than they do about his
consideration of the best interests of the child. His amended
findings, however, deleted the reference to excessive liberalism and
200. Wexler, supra note 133, at 762. Uviller argues:
ITjhe "best interest of the child" formulation, while high-tone and well-intended, is
devoid of substance. A "child's best interest" comprises any and all of the deciding
judge's child rearing prejudices. These may range from the need for religious training
to the respective virtues and pitfalls of permissiveness and authority. A "child's best
interest" may involve a judicial preference for living in the country as opposed to the
city, as in Shaw v. Shaw, . . where the court noted disapprovingly that the mother
lives "in an apartment complex" whereas the father lives "in a rural community with
an environment of churches, family life, and wholesome farm life, and all of which
lends itself for better growth and development of the minor child concerned." In
addition, the sexual mores of the other traditionally have been a prime target under
the "best interest" test.
Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Ferninism: The Maternal Preference Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 124
(1978).
Atkinson agrees that cases with very similar facts are decided in divergent ways by courts within
the same state because "results often come from the hearts and emotions of judges rather than from
the facts of the case.".J. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 219.
201. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 708-09.
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added some conclusions about the impact of the father's family and
the mother's family on the child. 202
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
trial judge had abused his discretion because he disregarded
evidence reflecting negatively on the father and favoring the
mother, and because he emphasized the father's extended family
and the mother's family background. 203 The Minnesota Supreme
Court, however, found that the trial judge's findings as to the
closeknit and interdependent character of the father's family were
supported by the evidence. 204 The supreme court, although
"troubled" by the trial court findings, concluded that if all relevant
considerations were of equal weight in deciding the best interest of
the child, the trial court could not be said to have abused its
202. See id. at 709. The trial court's amended findings provided:
Amended Finding 11. That there is a strong, stable, religious family group
relationship within the Pikula family, including respondent and the children, that has been
developed, nurtured and cultivated over the years. It has stood like a bedrock through
the depression years and post-war years of plenty and permissiveness. This
environment has inbred in the family, including respondent, a unity, respect, loyalty and
love that for the most part has been destroyed and lost in most modern American
families. It is in the best interests and welfare of the children that [they be kept in the
cultural family environment.] their custody be awarded to respondent, who shares these
attributes and who will assure that these children will be raised in the present cultural, family,
religious and community environment of which they have been and are integral parts, which
environment affords them stability, appropriate socializing and family orientation. The children are
properly adjusted to their current home situation, broadly defined, and to the greater community
within which they have lived virtually their entire lives, the children behave well and have extensive
and qualitative contacts with significant persons within this environment, respondent's personal
environment continues to stabilize and improve and is presently satisfactory, as well as gives
indications of continuing stability, and it is desirable that the children's continuity with respondent
and significant other persons and institutions here be maintained, respondent offering a permanent,
well-established, concerned and involved, as well as supporting home for the children, the overall
health of those who likely will here affect the mental, physical, emotional, education, cultural and
religious growth of the children is good, and respondent is inclined to, has and likely will continue to
care for the children and raise them in their religion, creed and culture.
Amended Finding 12. That the environment is which petitioner finds herself is almost
the exact opposite [. It is characterized by self-interest and excessive liberalism.] of that
in which respondent lives and will raise the children, it would subject the children to considerable
uncertainty and instability in home, community, culture, persons and religion, should custody be
awarded to petitioner, and further, such an award would disrupt, curtail and likely end the
children's nurturing and constant contacts with the environment, persons and institutions now
significantly and poritively affecting their lives, petitioner's behavior and practices of child rearing as
well as her interest in her children are at least subject to serious question and doubt, and it would not
be in the children's best interest to award their custody to petitioner.
Id. (deletions in brackets; additional language italized).
203. Pikula v. Pikula, 349 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), modified, 374 N.W. 2d 705
(Minn. 1985).
204. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 710. The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that "these
findings appear reasonably supported by the evidence, although they do emphasize the desirability of
the environment that would be provided by the paternal grandparents and the extended family
rather than that of the proposed custodian, the father." Id. The father drove a truck for his father,
working a split shift which at the time of trial required him to leave home at 3:00 a.m. and to return
at 7:00 p.m. Id. at 708. The supreme court also noted a report that the father continued to have
problems with alcohol dependency. Id. at 707.
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discretion. 205 However, although it could not find an abuse of
discretion as to findings of fact, the supreme court concluded as a
matter of law that the trial court had misinterpreted the statute by
not recognizing that the mother was the primary caretaker and that
she was therefore entitled to custody unless she was unfit. 206
Because a weak or strong primary caretaker presumption has
substantive content, it makes possible meaningful appellate review.
Review of a trial court determination based upon all relevant
factors equally considered, by contrast, is necessarily restricted to
monitoring procedural regularity: did the trial judge report having
considered all the relevant factors, and is there some evidence in the
record to support her conclusion. Whatever its discomfort with the
award of custody of the young Porter children to their
noncaretaking father, the North Dakota Supreme Court in Porter
could not hold that there had been an abuse of discretion because
the trial court found that a relevant consideration favored the
father. 207 The difference between unweighed criteria and a weak or
strong primary caretaker presumption is illustrated by contrasting
.Porter to a post-Pikula Minnesota case in which the trial court
awarded custody of eleven-, six-, and four-year olds to their
economically secure father, a lawyer who retained the rural family
home, rather than to their mother who had not worked outside the
home since the birth of their second child. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals expressed concern about what appeared to it to be a
penalty against the mother for having been a traditional housewife
and mother. 208 Its ground for remand, however, was that the trial
court had failed to apply the primary parent doctrine set out in
Pikula. 209
D. A RECOMMENDATION THAT NORTH DAKOTA
RECOGNIZE A PRIMARY CARETAKER PREFERENCE
This Article proposes an explicit preference for primary
caretakers on the ground that it would serve the best interests of
205. See id. at 710. The supreme court found the negative findings about the mother
"troubling" because they were contradicted by the evidence of the three social workers who testified
that the mother was a good parent, but it acknowledged that a trial court is not bound to accept
expert testimony. Id.
206. Id. at 710-11.
207. See Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W. 2d 235, 242 (N.D. 1979).
208. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 376 N.W.2d 702, 707 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
209. Id. On remand, the trial court found neither parent was the primary caretaker of the three
older children. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 403 N.W.2d 892, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). The
intermediate appellate court sustained that finding and affirmed the award of physical custody to the
father. Id. at 893-94. Moreover, the appellate court found support for the trial court finding that two
of the children were old enough to express a preference, making the Pikula presumption inapplicable.
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young children better than unweighed considerations of all relevant
factors. An explicit preference would more effectively protect
children's primary psychological relationships, reduce the risk of
coercive misuse of custody issues in negotiation, and facilitate trial
and appellate decisionmaking. The recommendation is not,
however, an endorsement of the strong form of caretaker
presumption adopted in Minnesota and West Virginia. There is a
dramatic difference between a strong and a weak primary caretaker
presumption. If a parent is identified as primary caretaker in West
Virginia or Minnesota, the sole remaining question is whether
that parent is fit. That inquiry is too narrow because it examines
the conduct and promise of only one parent. Initial resistance by
Minnesota and West Virginia trial courts to exclusion of any
consideration of qualitatively better parenting by a nonprimary
caretaker has caused rather transparent efforts to avoid accepting
the Pikula strong presumption as controlling. 210 A more serious
problem, however, is that pressure to avoid the rigidity of the
presumption may stretch the concept of "unfitness" within the
meaning of the primary .aretaker doctrine, 21t thereby diluting the
strength of the presumption in substance but not in form and
risking erosion of the concept of unfitness in deprivation and
termination cases.
Id. at 898. The trial court found that the mother was primary caretaker of the youngest child. Id. at
894. The appellate court also modified the trial court's judgment to make placement of the youngest
child with the mother permanent. Id.
210. E.g., Ohm v. Ohm, 393 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (trial court identified
the mother as primary caretaker of four-year old but awarded physical custody to the father at nights
and mother during days; Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed as a matter of law); Gerardy v.
Gerardy, 391 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (trial judge, who refused to apply the Pikula
presumption in a case in which it was undisputed that the mother had been primary caretaker prior
to separation and that she was fit, observed that the father in traditional families "may never have
the opportunity to demonstrate that he can fulfill the criteria" for primary caregiving,) Heck v.
Heck, 301 S.E.2d 158, 158 (W. Va. 1983) (the court reversed and remanded because the trial court
did not follow Garska).
211. Justice Neely stated in Garska that "where the primary caretaker fails to provide:
emotional support; routine cleanliness; or nourishing food, the presumption shall not apply."
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 n.9 (W. Va. 1981). A mother was unfit when she consistent-
ly failed to adequately clean and organize her home and the court found that unsafe conditions
prevailed in the home. Collins v. Collins, 297 S.E.2d 901, 902 (W. Va. 1982). Adultery, however,
did not constitute unfitness unless it had a deleterious effect on the children. Stacy v. Stacy, 332
S.E.2d 260, 262 (W. Va. 1985). Moreover, prior substance abuse and criminal conduct did not
make a mother unfit at the time of the hearing when she had been sober and stable for nine months
before the hearing. Allen v. Allen, 320 S.E.2d 112, 115-18 (W. Va. 1984).
Justice Wahl in Pikula held that the primary caretaker presumption controls unless there is a
"strong showing of unfitness," a showing that "the child's physical or emotional health is likely to be
endangered or impaired by being placed in the primary parent's custody." Pikula v. Pikula, 374
N.W.2d 705, 714 (Minn. 1985). Minnesota courts found evidence of such endangerment in a
number of cases. See, e.g., Bettin v. Bettin, 404 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (child's
present environment endangers his health because of mother's relationship with Brown, who was
charged with child sexual abuse); Kerkhoff v. Kerkhoff, 400 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (mother was unfit because of her emotional abuse of the child, financial situation and unstable
personal life); Hemingsen v. Hemingsen, 393 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (mother's
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A 1986 Minnesota Court of Appeals decision shows an
unsatisfactory result of the pressure to allow at least one kind of
comparative evaluation of parenting in a case in which one parent
apparently met the Garska-Pikula objective test as primary provider
of tangible care. In Regenscheid v. Regenscheid 212 the court of appeals
upheld a lower court determination that neither parent was
primary caretaker because, although one had provided primary
physical care, the other had been primary in providing emotional
and intellectual care. 213 The court observed that the strong
emotional bonding between the latter parent and the children
overcame the presumption that the primary caretaker is the parent
who provides the most physical care. 214 The court may well have
been correct in concluding that the more emotionally supportive
parent would be the better custodian, but its redefinition of
primary caretaking in order to permit that conclusion distorts the
concept and sacrifices easy identification of the primary caretaker.
In a case like Regenscheid, the primary provider of tangible care
may not have been the primary psychological parent.
Unfortunately, a strong presumption favoring the primary
caretaker does not permit evidence that might override prima facie
evidence that the primary caregiver is the primary psychological
parent. That is a serious flaw because, although primary caretaking
is strong and easily available evidence of psychological bonding, it
does not guarantee primary bonding. 215 The most compelling
substantive justification for treating primary caretaker status as
especially important is that usually the primary caretaker is the
primary psychological parent. The presumption that a fit primary
abusive and emotional problems posed danger to the child); Jones v. Jones, 377 N.W.2d 38, 40-41
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (mother had history of mental illness). However, it did not constitute
unfitness within the meaning of Pikula when a primary caretaking mother was depressed, suffering
from stress, and had spanked her child with a wooden spoon, Uhl v. Uhl, 413 N.W.2d 213, 215, 216-
17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); when a primary caretaking mother lied about her upbringing and had a
poor relationship with a stepdaughter, Peterson v. Peterson, 408 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987); when there were three isolated incidents of improper discipline by a primary caretaking
mother who yelled at her young children and made inappropriate remarks to them about their
father's efforts to dissolve the marriage, Tanghe v. Tanghe, 400 N.W.2d 389, 392-93 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987); when a primary caretaking mother lived with a man with a criminal record, Surrett v.
Surrett, 396 N.W.2d 870, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); and when the primary caretaking mother was
judged on the basis of the Minhesota Multiphasic Personality Test to be hostile, close-minded, self-
centered and critical, Novotny v. Novotny, 394 N.W.2d 256, 257, 259 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
212. 395 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
213. Regenscheid v. Regenscheid, 395 N.W.2d 375, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
214. Id. at 379; see also Rosen v. Rosen, 398 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (not clear
whether one parent was primary caretaker, where the mother was a traditional homemaker and the
father did not claim to have performed many child care duties).
215. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text. Freud, Solnit, and Goldstein approve the
Garska primary caretaker guidelines as functional factors that are visible evidence for identifying who
is, has been, or is likely to be responsible for the child, but they believe that identification should be
open to challenge. IN BEST INTERESTS, supra note 14, at 66-67.
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caretaker necessarily receives custody is too strong for that
justification because the narrow fitness qualification does not
permit consideration of the possibility that a nonprimary caretaker
may in unusual cases be the primary psychological parent. Only a
standard that allows a comparative evaluation of both .parents can
treat the relative closeness of their psychological relationships to
their children as relevant. A weak primary caretaker presumption
permits that comparative evaluation.
Comparative evaluation of psychological relationships should
not, however, be permitted to undermine the instrumental
advantage of easy identification of the primary caregiver. Relative
psychological bonding should not be treated as an issue that the
primary caretaker must establish without the benefit of a
presumption because it is often elusive and difficult to establish by
positive evidence independent of the inference that arises from
caregiving. In those unusual cases in which a nonprimary caretaker
might establish that he or she is the primary psychological parent,
the evidentiary burden should be upon the nonprimary caretaker.
That burden is appropriately allocated by a weak primary caretaker
presumption.
There are other considerations that should be considered on
behalf of a nonprimary caretaker but which cannot be treated as
relevant if the only issue is the fitness of the primary caretaker.
While those considerations should not be treated as equal in
importance to primary caretaking or psychological parentage,
neither should they be disregarded; in fact, statutes like section 14-
09-06.2 of the North Dakota Century Code require that other
factors be considered. 216
Jurisdictions that make primary caretaking the most
important consideration in determining the best interest of children
but which do not go so far as conclusively presuming that primary
caretakers are awarded custody unless they are unfit seem to strike
a workable balance. For example, in In re Maddox, 217 a 1982
Oregon case, the trial court awarded custody of eight- and three-
216. N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2(1981). For the text of § 14-09-06.2, see text accompanying
note 109. A student note forcefully criticizes the strong Minnesota presumption as incompatible with
the Minnesota statute that specifies nine factors to be considered and evaluated in determining the
best interest of the child. Note, Minnesota Developments, A Step Backward: The Minnesota Supreme Court
Adopts a "Primary Caretaker" Presumption in Child Custody Cases: Pikula v. Pikula, 70 MINN. L. REv.
1344, 1371-73 (1986); see MINN STAT. 5 518.17 (Supp. 1987). Crippen and Hatling try to reconcile
that statute with a strong presumption by suggesting the parents' capacity for affection and
guidance, the child's culture, and the performance of the proposed custodial home are all relevant to
determining the fitness of the primary caretaker. Crippen & Hatling, supra note 80, at 421. Such an
expansion of the definition of fitness, however, would in effect reduce the strong presumption to a
weak presumption.
217.56 Or. App. 345, 641 P.2d 665 (1982).
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year old children to their father, although the mother had been a
full-time homemaker and primary parent during the marriage and
was primary parent of the younger child during the separation. 218
The court gave the primary caretaker factor considerable weight
but found that other factors made it in the best interest of the
children to be in the custody of their father. 219
Justice Levine's suggestion in Gravning that custody should go
to the primary caretaker when "equally fit" parents seek custody of
young children 220 is consistent with use of a weak presumption
because a finding of equal fitness presupposes a comparative
analysis. Although a comparative evaluation necessarily loses some
of the clarity and predictability of a strong presumptive entitlement
conditioned only on a finding that a primary caretaker is not unfit,
a weak presumption puts upon the nonprimary caretaker the
burden of showing that he or she would better serve the best
interest of the child. Trial courts awarding custody to a nonprimary
caretaker would have to clearly support whatever factors they
determined to outweigh the most important caregiving factor. An
appellate court would then be able to review whether the trial court
had given sufficient weight to the primary caretaking factor.
1. Gender Neutrality
In the absence of an explicit preference favoring primary
caretakers, there is a risk that courts may seriously undervalue
primary caretaking because they confuse attributing significance to
that status with gender bias. Ironically, increased awareness that it
is unfair to advantage or disadvantage men or women by stereo-
typic assumptions that certain qualities or functions are exclusively
male or female may cause some judges to discount a quality or fun-
ction because it has been stereotypically identified as an exclusively
female quality or function. Courts may mistakenly reject or
diminish the significance of the nurturing role because the person
218. In re Maddox, 56 Or. App. 345, 641 P.2d 665, 666 (1982).
219. Id. at __, 641 P.2d at 667. The children had strong emotional ties to the father, who had
demonstrated a stronger and more stable parental role, and could provide a more stable environment
for the children. Id. at __, 641 P.2d at 667. Evidence of sexual indiscretions by the mother in the
presence of the children might have permitted the Maddox court to characterize her as an unfit
parent. Id. at __, 641 P.2d at 667. That aspect of the case is useful because it shows the difference
between a strong presumption entitling a fit primary caretaker to custody and a weak presumption in
favor of a primary caretaker. The result might have been the same in Maddox under either doctrine,
but the father's qualities and capacities as a parent and the strength of his psychological bonds to the
children would have been irrelevant in a case governed by a strong presumption.
220. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d, 621, 624 (N.D. 1986) (Levine, J., dissenting).
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fulfilling that role is more often female than male. 221 Such con-
fusion is sometimes reflected in equations of a primary caretaker
preference with a maternal preference. 222 The gender bias of the
maternal preference was not in its valuing of primary nurturers,
however, but rather in its presumption that all mothers and no
fathers are primary nurturers. Since we no longer believe that
caregiving is an exclusively maternal capacity or function, it should
be clear that a primary caretaker preference is not equivalent to a
maternal preference.223
Unlike maternal status, primary caretaker status is open to
males as well as to females. In fact, as Justice Wahl suggested in
Pikula, a clearly-defined primary caretaker status might well
encourage more active participation by fathers in child rearing. 224
Preferences have been applied in cases in which a primary
caretaker mother was a full-time homemaker during the marriage,
225 in cases in which a primary caretaker father was a full-time
homemaker during the marriage, 226 in cases in which both parents
221. Atkinson reports that in 1982 and 1983 appellate cases in which courts favored primary
caretakers, mothers received custody approximately 80% of the time. J. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at
241-42.
222. See, e.g., In re Van Dyke, 48 Or. Ct. App. 965, -, 618 P.2d 465, 466 (1980). In Van Dyke
the trial court found that the evidence in a custody dispute was nearly equal, and awarded custody to
the father because "to rule otherwise would be to give a preference to the mother simply because she
is the mother and as such, had been the primary care-taker. This would be in violation of Oregon
statute." Id. at - , 618 P.2d at 466. The appellate court evaluated the evidence and awarded
custody of the two-year old to the mother because she was the primary caretaker, explaining. that the
mother could not be preferred solely because she is the mother but that did not preclude
consideration of primary caretaking. Id. at __ , 618 P.2d at 467.
Polikoff explains that "the only appropriate purpose of a sex-neutral standard is to require
evaluation of who is providing primary nurturance without automatically assuming it to be the
mother; its purpose should not be to eliminate the importance of nurturance from the custody
determination .... " Polikoff, supra note 71, at 188.
223. The authors of a recent casebook note: The primary caretaker presumption obviously is
designed to replace the maternal preference doctrine in a gender-neutral way. In that way, it is
analogous to current alimony statutes which provide for post-divorce support for needy spouses,
rather than merely for needy former wives. I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ, & A. STANTON, FAMILY LAW:
CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 485-86 (1986).
224. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 712 n.2. (Minn. 1985). Elster criticizes the maternal
presumption because it grants a preference without regard to function and therefore creates
disincentives for better caretaking because neither parent is likely to gain advantage. Elster, supra
note 7, at 33. Because of its functional focus, the primary caretaker presumption creates incentives
for both parents to spend time with their child. Crippen and Hatling note that, because the
preference favors the parent who has established the closest relationship with the child, "[ilt
behooves both parents, then, to play active roles in caring for their children." Crippen & Hatling,
supra note 80, at 418.
225. E.g., Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Minn. 1985) (mother was a homemaker);
Tanghe v. Tanghe, 400 N.W.2d 389, 400 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (same); Novotny v. Novotny, 394
N.W.2d 256, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (same); Ohm v. Ohm, 393 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (same); Speltz v. Speltz, 386 N.W.2d 264, 265 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (same).
226. E.g., Heim v. Heim, 394 N.W.2d 254, 255 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (mother had provided
primary care until father's business failed, at which time mother secured three part-time jobs and
father provided primary childcare); Wolter v. Wolter, 382 N.W.2d 896, 897 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(mother was engineer; father was fulltime homemaker until after separation).
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worked and the mother was primary caretaker, 227 in cases in which
both parents worked and the father was primary caretaker, 228 and
in at least one case in which a father who worked outside the home
was primary caretaker even though his wife was not employed. 229
Furthermore, courts have determined that parenting was
substantially shared so that there was no primary caretaker in cases
in which only one parent worked outside the home 230 as well as in
cases in which both parents were employed. 231
227. E.g., Digatono v. Digatono, 414 N.w.2d 498, 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (mother
remained primary caretaker when she worked outside home during year before separation during
which father was unemployed); Stenzel v. Stenzel, 401 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(mother was primary caretaker when both parents shared responsibility for meals, clothing, and
toilet training, but the mother assumed more of such caretaking responsibilities as dressing and
reading to the children, even when father was laid off prior to separation); Tasker v. Tasker, 395
N.W.2d 100, 102-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (mother was primary caretaker even though she had
three part-time jobs totaling over forty hours a week and father had history of unemployment);
Gerardy v. Gerardy, 391 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (mother performed all nurturing
duties for five-year old prior to separation); Gibson v. Gibson, 304 S.E.2d 336, 339 (W. Va. 1983)
(some shared childcare but "duties not shared in anything close to an equal way"); Heck v. Heck,
301 S.E.2d 158, 159 (W. Va. 1983) (mother "claimed to have general responsibility for cooking
meals, reading books to the girls, taking them to the doctor and supervising them at home in the
evenings"; father did not claim mother was not primary caretaker).
228. E.g., Ozenna v. Parmelee, 407 N.w.2d 428, 429-30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (father, who
managed rental properties, was primary caretaker of five-year old, two-year old, and infant when
mother worked outside home and then returned to school), modifying, 377 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985); Leach v. Leach, 660 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (both parents worked
tulltime; there was substantial evidence that the father had been primary caretaker of the three-year
old child since her birth); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 255 (S.D. 1984) (father who
operated art gallery was more involved than physician mother with day-to-day parenting duties).
229. Maureen F.G. v. George W.G., 445 A.2d 934, 936 (Del. 1982). In Maureen, the court
found credible the father's testimony that he was primary caretaker of four- and six-year old
children. Id. The court repeated the father's testimony that:
Prior to the separation, [the Father] was the breadwinner for the family and his
former wife, [the Mother], was a housewife. In spite of this arrangement [the Father]
stated that in the latter part of their marriage, he was the primary parent for caring for
the children. For example, he testified it was he who put the children to bed, got them
up in the morning, fixed their breakfast, and in general, took a much more active role
in their life than did their mother. [The Father] did relate that some of this may have
been due to his wife's illness during the latter stages in which they lived together.
Id.
230. E.g., Kennedy v. Kennedy, 403 N.W.2d 892, 893-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (trial court
found that childcare responsibilities for twelve-, six-, and four-year old children had been shared in
essentially equal way); Pekarek v. Pekarek, 384 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (mother
who lost herjob during the marriage, cooked meals and gave baths to twelve-, eleven-, and nine-year
old children; father cooked meals, washed dishes, did laundry, transported children to their activities
and claimed he "was the babysitter as much as [the mother]"); Graham v. Graham, 326 S.E.2d 189,
190 (W. Va. 1984) (substantially shared caretaking, even though father taught school during the day
and worked in his brother's business at night); T.C.B. v. H.A.B., 317 S.E.2d 174, 176 (W. Va.
1984) (mother took care of four-year old child during the day while father was at work; father cared
for child in the evenings while mother went out).
231. E.g., Sheeran v. Sheeran, 401 N.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (parents
shared equal responsibilities for providing meals, medical care, peer interacting, education,
grooming and dressing children and putting them to bed at night, purchasing and caring for
children, and disciplining the four- and six-year old children; father was primarily responsible for
bathing the children, arranging babysitting, attending children at night and waking them in the
morning, and disciplining the seven-year old child); Schwamb v. Schwamb, 395 N.W.2d 732, 735
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (no specific findings but record shows both parents served as caretakers);
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Although a primary caretaker preference is technically gender
neutral, suspicion of covert gender discrimination might hinder
acceptance of a primary caretaker presumption or preference. 232
Even though it is not intended as a disguised maternal preference,
the impact of a primary parent preference will certainly favor
mothers. Given the gender-based role division that continues to
dominate American society, the primary caregiving parent is more
often female than male, whether or not she is employed outside her
home. 233  However, the justifications for a primary caretaker
presumption are genuinely gender-neutral. The desire for a clear
rule to facilitate private bargaining masks no substantive bias of
any kind. The need to avoid coercive misuse of the custody issue
against the primary caretaker is meant to protect the spouse who
needs that protection because of function rather than gender. The
relationship between primary caregiving and psychological
bonding is not gender linked and by its functional focus avoids the
excessive sentimentality sometimes associated with the concept of
maternity as an inherent and unique attribute.
Because of the same societal patterns that cause more women
than men to be primary caretakers, the parent with a higher income
and more material resources will more often be male than female.
The impact of an entitlement favoring economic stability, or
exaggerating the significance of financial advantage by
undervaluing caretaking, will therefore favor fathers and may also
be suspected of masking gender discrimination. 234 It is obvious
Ryan v. Ryan, 393 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (parents shared equally in daily care of
three-year old); Jorschumb v. Jorschumb, 390 N.W.2d 806, 809-15 (Minn. Ci. App. 1986) (father
full-time farmer and mother part-time waitress; trial court concluded "unique co-parenting" but
one dissenting appellatejudge believed father was primary caretaker).
The North Dakota Supreme Court recently noted that, during a marriage in which the mother
worked outside the home and the father held two full-time jobs, the father had been a substantial
caretaker of two children. Volk v. Volk, 404 N.W.2d 495, 498-99 (N.D. 1987).
232. That suspicion may well be fueled by Justice Neely's cavalier equation of the Garska
primary caretaker rule to the maternal presumption he had imposed in a West Virginia case two
years earlier. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). Nevertheless, Neely conceded
that a father might be primary caretaker and he conscientiously referred to "he or she" throughout
his opinion. See id. at 360.
233. See infra note 192. Two clinical psychologists have observed:
ISItill in most families, it is the mother who knows the child best, who is best informed
about the child's daily life and needs, and who provides the major physical care and
psychological security for the child at least for the early years. This appears to be the
case even when the mother works outside the home and the parents share various
aspects of keeping the family going. . . ITihere are exceptions, perhaps more now
than 30 years ago, to the mother's uniquely important role in the child's life. But they
are, we believe, still exceptions.
Leonard & Provence, supra note 133, at 322.
234. Chambers points out:
In our peculiarly American tradition, the decisions are regarded not merely as
arbitrary but as discriminatory as well. The father, if he loses, will believe that the
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that preference for the parent in an established employment
situation, as compared to a parent returning to employment after
absence from the workforce or beginning work outside the home for
the first time, amounts to a presumption against the traditional
mother who has acted as a full-time homemaker during the
marriage. 235 Since women are disproportionately employed in
lower-paying jobs, 23 6  and because married women tend to
subordinate their career development to their families, 237
preference for the more financially stable parent will disadvantage
working as well as traditional mothers.
Porter suggests that it is no more unfair in custody disputes to
disadvantage primary caretaking mothers for their economic
instability than it would be to disadvantage financially stable
judge was prejudiced in the mother's favor just because she is a woman. The mother,
if she loses, will believe that the judge gave inappropriate weight to the father's better
financial circumstances.
Chambers,. supra note 10, at 481.
Porter v. Porter is a textbook example of the recurrent pattern in which the parent whose work
outside the home is not disrupted by divorce is approved as stable while the formerly full-time
homemaker is perceived as unstable: the father was established and advanced in his military career;
the mother tried to earn money through selling plans and working as a part-time waitress and
housecleaner. Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W. 2d 235, 239 (N.D. 1979). Similarly, in Dizayee v. Dizayee,
custody of a three-year old child was awarded to a father who continued to work as a security person
at the state penitentiary and who was described by the trial court as stable. See Dizayee v. Dizayee,
414 N.W.2d 606, 607 (N.D. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, No. 870091CA (N.D. Dec. 30, 1987);
Record at 25, Dizayee v. Dizayee, No. 37535 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Feb. 20, 1987). The trial
court concluded that "[oin the other hand, the mother's stability is questionable. Her recent move to
Grafton, changing of jobs and her conduct since that move illustrates . . . an instability "
Dizayee v. Dizayee, No. 37535, mem. at 1 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. March 12, 1987). The mother,
who had not worked outside her home since a few months after the child's birth, was awarded
interim custody. Dizayee v. Dizayee, No. 37535, Interim Order at 1 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. May
29, 1986); see Record at 102 Dizayee (No. 37535). With permission of the trial court, she moved with
the child from her parents' farm near Steele, North Dakota to Grafton, North Dakota in order to
accept ajob in a day care center. Dizayee v. Dizayee, No. 37535, Memorandum Opinion & Order at
1 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Sept. 23, 1986); Record at 78-79. That job was terminated six months
later. Id. at 79. Subsequently, the mother obtained permanent employment as a nurse's aide. Id. at
79-80. Other conduct described after the move to Grafton concerned ordinary activities with the
child and social activities with a church fellowship group. Id. at 138-42, 147-49.
235. SeeGould v. Gould, 342 N.W.2d 426, 431 n. 2 (Wis. 1984). Justice Shirley Abrahamson of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has suggested that:
Basing custody awards on the relative affluence of one of the parents would in effect
discriminate against women .... INlot only against women who work inside the home
full time fulfilling the iinportant, traditional role of homemaker but also against
women who work outside the home and generally have less earning power than men.
Id.
236. A study by the National Commission on Working Women indicates that in 1984, women
working year round, full time jobs had median annual earnings of $14,780, compared to median
annual earnings of $23,218 for men. NATIONAL COMM'N ON WORKING WOMEN, AN OVERVIEW OF
WOMEN IN THE.WORK FORCE (1986). Thus, women in 1984 earned approximately 5.64 for every
$1.00 earned by men. Id
237. Woods, Been, & Schulman, Sex and Economic Discrimination Child Custody Awards, 16
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1130, 1131-34 (1983); G. MASNICK & M. BANE, THE.NATION'S FAMILIES: 1960-
1990, 70-82 (1980).
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fathers for not having been primary caretakers. 238 Indeed it may
seem unfair to attach continuing consequences to marital roles
correlated to gender, although those roles result from shared de-
cisions by both spouses and, to the extent that they are choices to
which both spouses acquiesce, will be more fully informed choices if
legal doctrines clarify the likely consequences of marital roles.
Porter is misleading, however, in suggesting that different marital
roles are equally significant in determining the custodial best
interest of children. Continuity of the intimate relationship created
by primary caretaking can only be insured by awarding physical
custody to the primary caretaker, but financial support for children
is not inseparable from physical custody. 239 Financial stability
should not be treated as equal in significance to primary
caregiving because it is less crucial for children to remain in custody
of the more financially stable parent than it is to maintain their
closest psychological relationships.
2. Time Frame for Identification of Primary Caretaker
Cases differ regarding whether primary caretaker status
should be identified only by parental functioning during the
marriage or also by reference to conduct after separation. If the
most important purpose of the doctrine is instrumental, to provide
clarity and predictability in order to avoid abusive misuse of the
custody issue and to facilitate private agreement, arguably the
status should be identified by parental conduct during the marriage
because that conduct usually provides a clear pattern.
238. Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235, 241-42 (N.D. 1979). For a discussion of Porter, see
supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text. Some commentators argue that fairness to parents and
parental interests need not be treated as wholly irrelevant and separate from children's interests.
Elster, for example, argues that a parent who has devoted crucial years to childcare should have a
prima facie right to custody and that such a linkage of custody to care would serve children's interests
by providing an incentive for better child care during marriage. Elster, supra note 7, at 17.
Chambers argues that primary caretakers have an interest that is subordinate to children's
interests but nevertheless legitimate. He rejects the notion of custody as a reward, agreeing with the
Porter court that what each parent does is of equal value to the child, but he suggests that courts may
take into consideration that primary caretakers will be substantially more distressed by loss of
custody. Chambers, supra note 10, at 499-502.
Both Elster and Chambers speculate that those who disclaim the relevance of fairness to parents
may not succeed in wholly ignoring that consideration. See Chambers, supra note 10, at 537 n.229
(psychologists may be influenced by a concern for caretakers); Elster, supra note 7, at 30 (in the back
of the minds of judges who favor primary caretaking may hover a concern for the rights of
caretakers).
239. Polikoff points out that "[w~hile providing for the economic well-being of children of
divorce is a laudable goal, it is one best achieved by making appropriately proportionate child
support awards, and by focusing resources on child support enforcement, not by including financial
ability in custody criteria." Polikoff, supra note 160, at 239. While nonenforcement of child support
has been a national scandal, current efforts to make enforcement effective are encouraging. Freed &
Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 20 FAM. L.Q. 439, 560-62 (1987).
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Furthermore, conduct during the marriage may provide more
reliable evidence because parents behave uncharacteristically
during the trauma of separation and divorce. 240 Identification of
the primary caretaker by considering only conduct during the
marriage also avoids the problem of permanent advantage to one
contestant by virtue of court-ordered interim arrangements. 241
On the other hand, if the most important purpose of the rule is
to protect children's strongest psychological relationships, the
status should be determined by reference to all circumstances
relevant to psychological bonding, including often confusing and
complicating conduct during and after the failure of a marriage.
In spite of the focus of the Minnesota presumption on the
linkage between primary caretaking and psychological bonding,
Pikula held and subsequent Minnesota cases have taken seriously
that primary caretaker status is to be determined "at the time the
dissolution proceeding was commenced" in the sense of "the point
in time at which the family relationships were physically disrupted
by events leading to the dissolution of the marriage, e.g., at the
time of the parties' separation or the interruption of the functioning
full family unit." 242 Identification of the primary caretaker prior to
the time of the disruption of the marital pattern certainly adds to
the clarity and predictability of the rule. It is difficult to reconcile
with Justice Wahl's primary concern for continuity of primary
psychological relationships, however, since those relationships
might have significantly changed after the marital disruption.
It is equally illogical that West Virginia, in spite of the Garska
focus on clarity and predictability, does not limit identification of
the primary caretaker to marital parenting. Although Garska
identified the primary caretaker as the parent primarily responsible
for the care of the child "before the domestic strife giving rise to the
proceeding began," 243 the West Virginia Supreme Court in a later
per curiam opinion found the primary caretaker rule inapplicable
when the mother had been the primary caretaker during the first
240. Chambers, supra note 10, at 507-08.
241. A particularly difficult problem arises when one parent is given temporary custody
pursuant to an interim court order, and the order is subsequently determined erroneous. In Hust v.
Hust, for example, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided that it would be improper to consider
that the grandparents had had custody for the past seven months because that custody was result of a
.judicial order it had now set aside. Hust v. Hust, 295 N.W.2d 316, 323 (N.D. 1980).
242. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 714 n.3 (Minn. 1985); e.g., Ohm v. Ohm, 393 N.W.2d
411, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Pikula permits circumstances subsequent to separation to be
considered in determining the fitness of the primary caretaker. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 714 n.3.
Changes in circumstances subsequent to separation not related to fitness, however, are relevant only
in separate custody modification proceedings. Kangas v. Kangas, 406 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987).
243. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
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seven years of the child's life but the father had "participated
substantially" in caring for the child during a year preceding the
custody determination. 244 A dissenting justice argued that it
perverted the Garska principle to "permit a primary caretaker to
lose her favored role simply because her husband abandons her and
his child without any meaningful support, thereby forcing her to
give up physical custody of the child." 245 A Minnesota court, by
contrast, would have determined primary caretaker status at the
time the father physically disrupted family relationships by leaving
his wife and child. At that point, the mother was unquestionably
primary caretaker.
The problem is acute if the primary caretaker is entitled to
custody pursuant to a strong presumption unless he or she is unfit.
It is less crucial and less difficult, however, when primary
caretaking is given considerable weight but evidence of
comparative parenting is admissible. The primary caretaker can
then be identified by reference to marital conduct, assuring that
proper weight will be assigned to that role, but later conduct can
also be treated as relevant. That more flexible doctrine made it
possible in a 1985 Pennsylvania case, for example, for the court to
identify the primary caretaking parent during the marriage and to
recognize the continuing significance of that marital conduct, but
at the same time to treat post marital shared parenting by the
nonprimary caretaker as significant. 246
3. Consistency With North Dakota Statutory Guidelines
As the North Dakota Supreme Court observed in Gravning v.
Gravning, the concept of the primary caretaking factor "inheres in
the statutory factors" codified in section 14-09-06.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code as considerations relevant to the
determination of the best interest of the child. 247 Although the last
catchall provision of the statute 248 would allow consideration of a
244. Dempsey v. Dempsey, 306 S.E.2d 230, 231-32 (W.Va. 1983).
245. Id. at 232 (Miller, J., dissenting).
246. Beers v. Beers, 493 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. Super. 1985) (father had grown closer to the child
by sharing custody during year of separation preceding divorce but the strengthening of that bond
did not dilute the closeness and commitment evidenced by mother's role as primary caretaker during
the first three years of the child's life).
247. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D. 1986); see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-09-
06.2 (1982). For the text of 5 14-09-06.2, see supra text accompanying note 109.
248. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2 (10) (1982). Subsection 14-09-06.2 (10) provides: "Any
other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute." Id.
Furthermore, the introductory language directs consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting
the best interests of the children and specifies that these factors "include" the particular factors that
are codified. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court has interpreted the word "include" as a word of
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factor not implicit in the statutory guidelines, recognition of the
particular importance of primary caretaker status is not only
permitted but is strongly supported by the fact that it is inherent in
the first four of the nine specified considerations. 249
There is little available legislative history for section 14-09-
06.2. 250 It is apparent, however, that the North Dakota statutory
factors followed in large part almost identical factors enacted by
Michigan in 1970 251 and by Minnesota in 1974. 252 Since the
enlargement rather than limitation. Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 234 (N.D. 1980). The court
has treated the presence and involvement of extended family as a nonstatutory factor that is relevant
to determing custody. Bashus v. Bashus, 393 N.W.2d 748, 751-52 (N.D. 1986). It also treats
cooperation in visitation as a significant factor. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W. 2d 621, 622 (N.D.
1986); Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W. 2d 121, 131 (N.D. 1980); infra note 274.
249. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2 (1)-(4) (1982). The concept of primary caretaking is
inherent in the first codified factor ("the love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between
the parents and child"), the second codified factor ("the capacity and disposition of the parents to
give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education of the child"), the third
codified factor ("the disposition of the parents to provide . .. material needs"), and the fourth
codified factor ("the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the
desirability of maintaining continuity"). See id.
250. See Act approved Mar. 18, 1979, ch. 194, 53, 1979 N.D. Laws 423, 424 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2 (1981)). The Act also included provisions for custody investigations, and
for governing the residence of a child. Id. 55 4, 5, 1979 N.D. Laws at 425 (codified at N.D. CENT.
CODE S 14-09-06.3, -07 (1981)). The original bill, House Bill 1585, was sponsored by Representa-
tives Stenehjem and Swiontek, and by Senator Lashkowitz. H.R. 1585, 46th LEG. ASSEMBLY OF
N.D. (1979). The House Judiciary Committee briefly discussed House Bill 1585 on January 31,
1979, and appointed a subcommittee. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 46th LEG. ASSEMBLY OF N.D.,
Minutes on House Bill 1585 (Jan. 31, 1979). The subcommittee presented several amendments
which were accepted by the House Judiciary Committee on February 14, 1979. Id., Minutes on
House Bill 1585 (Feb. 14, 1979). The only amendment of the statutory factors used in child custody
determinations deleted the words "capacity and" from the third factor ("the [capacity and]
disposition of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, or other remedial
care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material
needs"). Id.; see Act approved Mar. 18, 1979, ch. 194, 5 3, 1979 N.D. Laws 423, 424 (codified at
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (3) (1981)). House Bill 1585 was also discussed by the Committee on
Social Welfare and Veterans Affairs on March 2, 1979. HousE SOCIAL WELFARE AND VETERANS
AFFAIES COMMITTEE, 46th LEG. ASSEMBLY OF N.D., Minutes on House Bill 1585 (Mar. 2, 1979); see
McRae v. Carbno, 404 N.W.2d 508, 512 (N.D. 1987) (Meschke, J., dissenting) (discussing minutes
with reference to section 14-09-07 of the North Dakota Century Code); Burich v. Burich, 314
N.W.2d 82, 85 (N.D. 1981) (same).
251. See Act approved July 20, 1970, ch. 91, S 3, 1970 Pub. Acts 266, 266-67 (codified as
amended at MICH. .COMP. LAWS ANN. S 722.23 (West Supp. 1987)). In 1970, section 722.23 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated provided:
"Best interests of the child" means the sum total of the following factors to be
considered, evaluated and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the competing
parties and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to give the child love,
affection and guidance and continuation of the education and raising of the child in its
religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under
the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home.
(f) The moral fitness of the competing parties.
(g) The mental and physical health of the competing parties.
(h) The home, school and community record of the child.
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Minnesota Supreme Court found that "[t]he importance of
emotional and psychological stability to the child's sense of
security, happiness, and adaptation. . . is a postulate embedded
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient age to express preference.
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
MiCH..CoMP. LAWS ANN. 5 722.23 (West 1970) (current version at MICH..CoMp. LAWS ANN.
722.23 (West Supp. 1987)). The Michigan Legislature in 1980 amended § 722.23 to provide that the
"willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing
oarent-child relationship between the child and the other parent" is a factor to be considered in child
custody determinations. SeeAct approved Jan. 14, 1981, ch. 434, S 1, 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts 1890,
1890-91 (codified at MICH. .COMP. LAWS ANN. S 722.23 (West Supp. 1987)). In addition, the
Michigan Legislature made stylistic changes in S 722.23. Id.
The Michigan Supreme Court describes the Child Custody Act of 1970 as an attempt to
standardize the criteria for resolving child custody cases and to escape the essential subjectivity of
prior law pursuant to which what constituted a child's best interest varied from case to case. Baker v.
Baker, 411 Mich. 567, 576, 576 n.4, 309 N.W.2d 532, 534, n.4 (1981). Trial courts must
explicitly evaluate, make definite findings of fact, and state conclusions as to each statutory
guideline. Currey v. Currey, 109 Mich. App. 111, -, 310 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981).
252. See Act approved Mar. 28, 1974, ch. 330, S 1, 1974 Minn. Laws 555, 555 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1) (Supp. 1987)). In 1974, S 518.17 (1) ofthe Minnesota Statutes
provided:
Subdivision 1. For the purposes of this section "the best interest of the children"
means the sum total of the following factors to be considered and evaluated by the
court:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the competing
parties and the child;
(b) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to give the child love,
affection and guidance and continuation of the educating and raising of the child in its
religion or creed, if any, or culture;
(c) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under
the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs;
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and
the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home;
(1) The cutural background of the child;
(g) The.mental and physical health of the competing parties;
(h) The home, school and community record of the child;
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient age to express preference;
6) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
MINN. STAT. S 518.17 (1)(1974) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1) (Supp. 1987)). The
Minnesota statute was modeled after the Michigan statute. Note, supra note 216, at 1362 n.87; see
MIcH..COMP. LAws ANN. S 722.23 (West 1970) (current version at MICH. .COMP. LAws ANN. S
722.23 (West Supp. 1987)). For the 1970 text of S 722.23 of the Michigan Compiled Laws Anno-
tated, see supra note 251. The Minnesota Legislature substantially amended S 518.17 of the
Minnesota Statutes in 1978 & 1979. See Act approved Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 772, 5 39, 1978 Minn. Laws
1062, 1076-78 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1) (Supp. 1987)); Act approved May
29, 1979, ch. 259, 5 17, 1979 Minn. Laws 557, 565-66 (codified as amended as MINN. STAT. § 518.17
(1) (Supp. 1987)). For a description of the amendments, see Note, supra note 216, at 1351 n.30. In
addition to the 1978 and 1979 amendments, the Minnesota Legislature in 1987 amended § 518.17 (1)
to provide that evidence of domestic abuse is a relevant factor in child custody determinations. See
Act approved May 13, 1987, ch. 105, § 1, 1987 Minn. Laws 97, 97-98 (codified as MINN. STAT. S
518.17 (1) (Supp. 1987)). The current statute provides:
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in the statutory factors," 253 it is worth noting that the substance of
the relevant considerations codified by North Dakota continues to
correspond closely to Minnesota statutory provisions. 254
Subdivision 1. The best interests of the child. "The best interests of the child"
means all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated by the court including:
(a) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
(b) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient age to express preference;
(c) the interaction and interrrelationship of the child with a parent or parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests;
(d) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(e) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and
the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(f) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home;
(g) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(h) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love, affection, and
guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child in the child's culture and
religion or creed, if any;
(i) the child's cultural background; and
(j) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if related to domestic abuse,
as defined in Section 518B.01, that has occurred between the parents.
The court shall not tonsider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect
the custodian's relationship to the child.
MINN. STAT. § 518.17(l)(Supp. 1987).
253. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn. 1985); see MINN. STAT. 5 518.17 (1)(Supp.
1987). The Minnesota court also concluded that a strong primary caretaker presumption was
"required" by the statutory factors. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713. That conclusion, however, is
unpersuasive in that the strong form of the presumption requires treating as irrelevant, when there is
a fit primary caretaker, considerations which the statute directs courts to consider relevant. See
MINN. STAT. S 518.17(1) (Supp. 1987) (listing factors to be considered and evaluated by the court).
For the text of § 518.17(1), see supra note 252.
254. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1981) (North Dakota best interests factors) with
MINN. STAT. 5 518.17(1) (Supp. 1987) (Minnesota best interests factors). For the text of § 14-09-06.2
of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra text accompanying note 109. For the text of S
518.17 of the Minnesota Statutes, see supra note 252. Two of the ten North Dakota statutory factors
are identical tO two of the nine current Minnesota factors adopted by Minnesota in 1974 both states
considered relevant "[tihe length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and
the desirability of maintaining continuity," and "[t]he permanence, as a family unit, of the existing
or proposed custodial home." See N.D. CENT. CoDE S 14-09-06.2(4)-(5) (1981); MINN. STAT. §
518.17(1) (e)-(f) (Supp. 1987). Four more factors are nearly the same as the present formulation in
Minnesota of factors it originally adopted in 1974: North Dakota specifies "[tlhe capacity and dis-
position of the parents to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education
of the child," while Minnesota specifies "the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child
love, affection, arid guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child in the child's culture
and religion or creed, if any." See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2(2)(1981); MINN. STAT. S
518.17(1)(h) (Supp. 1987). North Dakota specifies "[t]he home, school, and community record of
the child," while Minnesota specifies "the child's adjustment to home, school, and community." See
N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2(8)(1981); MINN. STAT. S 518.17(1)(d)(Supp. 1987). North Dakota
specifies "[tlhe mental and physical health of all individuals involved." See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
09-06.2(7)(1981); MINN. STAT. §518.17 (1)(g)(Supp. 1987). North Dakota specifies "[tlhe
reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence,
understanding, and experience to express a preference," while Minnesota specifies "the reasonable
preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preference." See
N.D. CENT. CODE $14-09-06.2(9)(1981); MINN. STAT. § 518.17(1)(b)(Supp. 1987).
The first North Dakota statutory factor, "[tihe love, affection, and other emotional ties existing
between the parents and child," is almost identical to the first statutory factor codified by Minnesota
in 1974, "[t]he love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the competing parties and
the child." See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2(1)(1981); MINN. STAT. § 518.17(1)(a)(1974)(repealed
1978). Minnesota repealed that provision in 1978, at which time it added "the interaction and
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Since the relevance of primary caretaking is substantively
compatible with the North Dakota statute, the only remaining
statutory issue is whether assigning particular weight to that factor
is consistent with the statutory design. Statutory specification of
factors to be considered in determining the best interest of children
was modeled after section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act. 255 Section 402, like section 14-09-06.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code, neither requires nor suggests unweighed
consideration of the factors it codifies. On the contrary, the
Commissioners' Note to section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act provides:
Although none of the familiar presumptions developed by
the case law are mentioned here, the language of the
interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interests." See Act approved Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 772, § 39, 1978
Minn. Laws 1076, 1077 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 518.17(1)(c)(Supp. 1987).
One North Dakota statutory factor, "[t]he disposition of the parents to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this
state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs," followed a 1974 Minnesota specification of
"[t]he capacity and disposition of competing parties to provide the child with food, clothing,
medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of
medical care, and other material needs," which was repealed in 1978. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-09-
06.2(3)(1981); MINN. STAT. S 518.17(l)(c) (1974) (repealed 1978). TheJudiciary Committee of the
North Dakota House of Representatives, however, deleted the words "capacity and" in the
proposed bill. See supra note 250.
North Dakota includes one other provision that Minnesota adopted in 1974 but repealed in
1978, "[a]ny other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody
dispute." See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2(10)(1981); MINN. STAT. S 518.17(1)(j)(1974)(repealed
1978). That specification seems implicit in the introductory language of both statues. See N.D. CENT.
COoE 14-09-06.2(1981); MINN. STAT. § 518.17(Supp. 1987). Neither describes the specified factors
as exclusive; both direct courts to consider all relevant factors, including those specified. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1981); MINN. STAT. 5 518.17 (Supp. 1987).
North Dakota specifies one factor that does not correspond to any past or present Minnesota
factor "[t~he moral fitness of the parties." See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2(6) (1981); MINN. STAT.
S 518.17(1) (Supp. 1987). That provision might at first glance seem contradictory to the Minnesota
statutory direction that "[t]he court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not
affect his relationship to the child." See MINN. STAT. 518.17(1)(Supp. 1987). North Dakota case
law, however, makes clear that parental conduct is only relevant to the extent that it affects the
parent-child relationship. Larson v. Larson, 294 N.W.2d 616, 619 (N.D. 1980).
255. Note, supra note 216, at 1352 (Minnesota statutory factors modeled after Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act 5 402); see UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 5 402, 9A U.L. A. 561
(1987).
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform Laws in 1970, provides:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child. The court
shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect
his relationship to the child.
Id. Thirty states and the District of Columbia now have some form of statutory custody guidelines.
Freed & Walker, supra note 239, at 535.
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section is consistent with preserving such rules of thumb.
The preference for the mother as custodian of young
children when all things are equal, for example, is simply
a shorthand method of expressing the best interest of
children - and this section enjoins judges to decide
custody cases according to that general standard. The
same analysis is appropriate to the other common
presumptions: a parent is usually preferred to a
nonparent; the existing custodian is usually preferred to
any new custodian because of the interest in assuring
continuity for the child; preference is usually given to the
custodian chosen by agreement of the parents. 256
The fact that the promulgators of the original model for codification
of factors relevant to the best interest of children thought those
specifications consistent with adoption of presumptions favoring
one factor or status supports the position that a weak presumption
is consistent with the statutory design of section 14-09-06.2.157
4. Consistency With North Dakota Parent Versus Nonparent
Cases
In a series of cases dating back to 1915, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has recognized that continuity of primary
caretaking may be more important than other considerations that
are relevant to the question of custody, even in cases in which that
priority permits nonparents to refuse to return young children to
256. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT S 402 Commissioners' Note, 9A U.L.A. 561
(1987). Robert Levy, the reporter for the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, favored a maternal
preference in order to avoid contested custody. See Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child
Custody Adjudication An Effort to Rely on Social Science Data in Formulating Legal Policies. 4 L. AND Soc'Y.
REV. 167, 209 (1969); Levy, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Legislation: A Preliminary Analysis
224 (1968) (unpublished manuscript)(available in University of North Dakota Law Library). He was
unable to persuade the Commissioners to include the presumption in the Act but he made clear in the
note that its retention was permitted. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 5 402
Commissioners' Note, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
257. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-06.2 (1981). For the text of S 14-09-06.2, see supra text
accompanying note 109. A student note criticizing Pikula v. Pikula acknowledges that the
promulgators of the model of the Minnesota statute believed that codifying a variety of specific
relevant factors was consistent with preserving familiar presumptions favoring a particular factor.
The author comments that "of course, the commissioners' note may or may not be persuasive in
individual states, depending on whether the state legislatures adopted or even considered the views of
the drafters of the Uniform Act." Note, supra note 216, at 1354 n. 35; see UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT S 402 Commissioners' Note, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987). Certainly the official note would
not evidence legislative intent to retain a particular presumption in place before adoption of the
statutory factors. However, the note does support the position that the adoption of statutory factors
does not preclude assigning presumptive weight to a particular consideration.
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the custody of their parents. 258 These are cases in which a primary
caregiving nonparent claims that his or her qualitative relationship
with a child should supersede a parental claim. The best interest of
the child standard first appeared in North Dakota cases in the
initial opinion of that series, in a case showing the court's early
sensitivity to the bonds created by caretaking and the trauma risked
by taking young children from their primary caretakers. 259
North Dakota cases have developed the doctrine that when a
nonparent has been the primary caretaker and is established as a
258. In nine of these parent versus nonparent cases, the court rejected efforts by parents to
regain custody of children who had been in nonparental custody for a substantial length of time. See
Daley v. Gunville, 348 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1984); Mansukhani v. Pailing, 318 N.W.2d 748, 756
(N.D. 1982); In re D.R.J., 317 N.W.2d 391, 393 (N.D. 1982); In re D.G., 246 N.W.2d 892, 896
(N.D. 1976); McKay v. Mitzel, 137 N.W.2d 792, 794 (N.D. 1965); In re Wagner, 84 N.W.2d 587,
592 (N.D. 1957); Borg v. Anderson, 73 N.D. 95, 99, 11 N.W.2d 121, 123 (1943); Larson v. Dutton,
43 N.D. 21, 28, 172 N.W. 869, 872 (1919); In re Sidle, 31 N.D. 405, 410, 154 N.W. 277, 281 (1915).
In four cases, parents regained custody. See Patzer v. Glaser, 396 N.W.2d 740, 744 (N.D. 1986); In re
Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d 203, 207 (N.D. 1982); Raymond v. Geving, 74 N.D. 142, 153, 20 N.W.2d
335, 340 (1945); Garrett v. Burbage, 55 N.D. 926, 930, 215 N.W. 479, 480 (1927).
259. See Sidle, 31 N.D. at 415, 154 N.W. at, 281. In Sidle the father insisted that his son be
cared for by nurses and foster parents in a series of homes in Missouri, Illinois, and Iowa because he
was afraid his parents would be angry due to the fact that the child was born only six months after he
was married. Id. at 407-08 154 N.W. at 277-78. The North Dakota court described the father as
without affection for the child, and characterized the conduct of the parents as "practical
abandonment." Id. at 411, 415, 154 N.W. at 279, 281. However, the court recognized that the
mother loved the child and had always wanted to have him in her home. Id. at 415, 154 N.W. at
281. While "aware of the dominating interests of natural parents" and acknowledging that "[n]o
court should lightly set aside the claims of natural parents," the appellate court decided that the now
eight-year-old child should remain with the nonparents who had been his custodians for the past
three years and who had become what are now labeled psychological parents:
After wandering about for six years, after being taken from place to place, and
after being constantly and purposely removed from those who had begun to become
attached to him as soon as that attachment became apparent, after being deprived of
that which is dearer to every child, and in fact to every human being, than food or
drink or raiment or wealth or power, and that is simple and genuine love, the little
wanderer had at last found a haven of rest. He had not merely found the physical
comforts and opportunities which wealth furnished, but he had found love. He had
found not merely a mother, but a father. God does intend to give "to every little folk a
papa and a mama," and it is the dread of the lack of the former if the custody of the
child is given to the petitioner that largely controls our decision in this case.
Id. at 414, 416, 154 N.W. at 280-81. In deciding to leave the child in the custody of the nonparents,
the court explained that "[i]ts controlling consideration must be the interests of the child" and that
his best interests were served by leaving him with the nonparents. Id. at 413, 416, 154 N.W. at 280-
81.
The early perception of the importance of primary caretaking in parent versus nonparent
contests is similarly demonstrated.by the fact that the best-interest formula first appeared in
American case law in Chapsky v. Wood, a prototype of cases in which nonparents claim to have
established parentlike relationships that should be preferred to biological parental relationships in
order to maintain continuity of primary bonds. See Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881). In
Chapsky the father of an infant child left the child with her aunt due to the delicate health of the
child's mother. Id. at 655. Five years later, he was in a position to provide an adequate home for his
child but the aunt refused to surrender custody. See id. Future United States Supreme Court Justice
David J. Brewer did not defer to the presumptive right of parents to the custody and control of their
children. See id. at 651-52, 658. Although there was no suggestion that the parent was unfit, the
Kansas court held that the best interest of the child required that she remain with her aunt. Id. at
658. For a discussion of cases prior to 1964 that recognize the importance of primary caretaking by
nonparents, see Foster & Freed, Child Custody: Part 1, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 423, 436 (1964).
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psychological parent to the child, the presumption that a fit parent
is entitled to custody as against any nonparent does not apply in its
usual strong form. Instead, even though the parent is not unfit, his
or her presumptive entitlement to custody may be overridden. 260
The North Dakota Supreme Court in 1980 reconsidered and
refined some of its earlier cases awarding custody to a nonparent as
against a fit parent, generalizing that those cases all involved
extraordinary circumstances in which the children had been in the
actual physical custody of the nonparent prior to the litigation. 261
Two years later, the court more precisely described as an
extraordinary circumstance "when the custody dispute pits the
psychological parent against the natural parent." 262 The court has
repeatedly linked the concept of extraordinary circumstances to the
Freud, Goldstein, Solnit position that psychological continuity is
essential for the best interest of children. 263
Finding extraordinary circumstances does not automatically
entitle the psychological parent-nonparent to custody. Attainment
of psychological parentage satisfies the first part of a two-part test
but does not itself compel a particular disposition:
The establishment of a psychological parent relationship
does not . . . end the trial court's inquiry. It merely
260. Cases in many jurisdictions refuse to return children to their parents from the custody of
nonparents who have been primary caretakers for several years. J. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 421-
422. In some states, however, the only issue in any parent-nonparent custody dispute is whether the
parent is fit. E.g., McNames v. Corum, 683 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1985); Ford v. Ford, 303 S.E.2d 253
(W.Va. 1983).
261. See Hust v. Hust, 295 N.W.2d 316, 321 (N.D. 1980). Finding no exceptional
circumstances in Hust, the court held that awarding temporary custody to the maternal grandparents
was erroneous. Id. at 319. The court has repeated in cases after Hust that awarding custody to a
nonparent as against a parent is clearly erroneous unless exceptional circumstances require that such
a custody determination be made in the best interest of the child. See Daley v. Gunville, 348 N.W.2d
441, 443 (N.D. 1984); In re Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d 203, 207 (N.D. 1982); Mansukhani v. Pailing,
318 N.W.2d 748, 751 (N.D. 1982).
262. In reD.R.J., 317 N.W.2d 391, 394 (N.D. 1982). A finding of extraordinary circumstances
does not necessarily mean that there is no bonding between the child and his or her parent. In at least
two cases, the parent had maintained a relationship with the child and might be characterized as a
secondary rather than a primary psychological parent. See Patzer v. Glaser, 396 N.W.2d 740, 744
(N.D. 1985); Daley v. Gunville, 348 N.W.2d 441, 445 (N.D. 1984).
263. See, e.g., Dalev, 348 N.W.2d at 446 (awarding child to grandparents who were the only
source of stability and continuity in the child's life); Mansukhani, 318 N.W.2d at 753 (strong
psychological parent relationship between children and their grandparents constituted exceptional
circumstances requiring that children remain with grandparents); D.R.J., 317 N.W.2d at 394
(relying on Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in finding that a dispute between a psychological parent and
a mother must shift the issue to the best interest standard); D.G., 246 N.W.2d at 895 (stressing the
importance of preserving continuity in the child's life by maintaining custody with the child's
grandparents who had raised the six-year old from birth); see also IN BEST INTERESTS, supra note 14, at
66-67 (endorsing a preference in child custody disputes in favor of primary caregiver of child);
BEFORE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing the importance of the child's psychological
parent in determining the child's best interests); BEYOND BEST INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 98
(asserting that it is crucial for children to maintain a relationship with a psychological parent). For a
discussion of the psychological bond theory advocated by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, see supra
notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
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furnishes a justification for the award of custody to a
party other than the natural parent. It remains to be
determined if such an award would be in the child's best
interests. 264
In 1986, the North Dakota Supreme Court for the first time
found that there were exceptional circumstances but that those
circumstances did not require retention of custody by the
nonparents who had become psychological parents. 265 In every
264. Daley, 348 N.W.2d at 445. The court in Daley also made clear a third analytic step,
consideration of possible countervailing factors. Id. at 446 n.3. It defined "countervailing factors" as
"public policy issues which might require a custody placement adverse to the child's best interest."
Id. Possible countervailing factors were first discussed in Mansukhani. See Mansukhani, 318 N.W.2d at
754. The Mansukhani trial court had found that the grandparents were able to establish themselves as
psychological parents because they wrongfully acted to prevent the mother from developing a close
relationship with her children. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed that such a finding
would be a countervailing factor that could justify not placing the children with the grandparents,
because the court must balance its responsibility of making a custody placement in the best interest of
the child against its responsibility to further the public policy of not rewarding conduct directed at
hindering a parent's relationship with his or her child. Id. at 754-55. It concluded, however, that the
mother's failure to establish a close parental bond with the children had not in that case been caused
by the grandparents. Id. at 755. Therefore, awarding custody to them in the best interest of the
children could not violate public policy by rewarding psychological parents who achieved that status
by wrongful conduct. Id.
The public policy of discouraging interference with the maintenance or revival of bonding
between children and their parents is not the only countervailing factor that might justify custody not
in the child's best interest. Justice Levine has suggested a compelling social policy to permit a
parent "to seek reasonable help for her child from family members without risk of losing custody
to those proffering assistance" could be such a countervailing factor. Patzer v. Glaser, 368
N.W.2d 561, 566 (N.D. 1985) (Levine, J., dissenting). The concern that parents not be discouraged
from seeking help raises the difficult and more general issue of whether the reason parents did not act
as primary caretakers during the period when nonparents became psychological parents should be
relevant to deciding custody. The cause of parental separation does not affect the quality of a young
child's present relationship with any of the subsequent disputants, although it may be at least
indirectly relevant to evaluations of parental capacities and predictions about future parental
relationships. It does not affect the dominant consideration in these cases, the present impact on the
child of removal from the custody of persons who are the psychological parents at the time of the
litigation, but neither does the countervailing interest recognized in Mansukhani. See Mansukhani, 318
N.W.2d at 754.
265. Patzer v. Glaser, 396 N.W.2d 740, 744 (N.D. 1986). In earlier litigation, the supreme
court remanded for a determination of whether exceptional circumstances existed. Patzer, 368
N.W.2d at 564-65. Rather than give the child up for adoption, his unwed sixteen-year old mother
had agreed to place him with his parental grandparents while she completed the last two years of her
high school education. Id. at 562-63. She then moved to Wyoming to secure employment. Id. at 563.
Two years later, having returned to North Dakota ten times to visit her son, she asked for custody.
Id. The supreme court remanded for additional evidence of whether the grandparents had become
psychological parents. Id. at 564-65. On remand, the trial court concluded that the grandparents
were not psychological parents, but the supreme court then held that finding clearly erroneous.
Patzer, 396 N.W.2d at 743. Nevertheless, the supreme court affirmed the trial court judgment
placing the child in the custody of his mother, because it found no testimony that placement would
cause the child serious detriment. Id. at 744. Rather than applying the best-interest standard once
extraordinary circumstances had been established, the second Patzer case seems to impose upon the
nonparent-psychological parent a more difficult burden of showing that parental custody would
impose a serious detriment on the child. Id. at 743. Some earlier cases spoke of custody by
nonparents as necessary in the best interest of the child in order to prevent serious detriment. See
In re Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d 203, 206 (N.D. 1982); Mansukhani v. Pailing, 318 N.W.2d 748, 750
(N.D. 1982); Hust v. Hust, 295 N.W.2d 316, 318-19 (N.D. 1980). In those cases the court did not
appear to require a showing of serious detriment. It is now unclear whether the child's best-interest
standard might require retention of custody by nonparents for a reason other than predicted
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other contemporary North Dakota case in which nonparents were
identified as psychological parents, however, the supreme court
found it in the best interest of the children to remain in the custody
of those nonparents. 266
The North Dakota extraordinary circumstances cases are not
technically inconsistent with refusal to recognize special weight for
primary caretakers in interparent custody disputes. 267 That the
cases may be inconsistent in spirit, however, is suggested by the
fact that primary caretakers in interparent disputes turn to parent
versus nonparent cases for the most explicit language recognizing
the special value and importance of primary caretaking. 268
separation trauma. It is also unclear whether the three-part analysis formulated and applied in cases
after Hust has now been superceded by the statement in Patzer that a parent's paramount right
prevails unless it is necessary in the best interests of the child to award custody to the nonparent-
psychological parent to prevent serious detriment to the child. See Patzer, 396 N.W.2d at 743.
266. See. e.g., Daley v. Gunville, 348 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1984) (best intersts of child served
by maintaining custody of the grandparents). There were no extraordinary circumstances in
Buchholz, because, although the child had not been in his natural parent's custody for several years,
the nonparents seeking custody were not his psychological parents. Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d at 207.
The natural mother and adoptive father of the child had agreed at the time of their divorce that the
eight-year old boy would be in the custody of his adoptive father, an Air Force serviceman. Id. at
205. For a year and a half while the father was stationed in Okinawa, the parents agreed that the
child would be cared for in North Dakota by paternal grandparents. Id. The child then lived with his
father. Id. When the father died in 1982 while stationed in the Phillipines, the Air Force transported
the boy from the Phillipines to the home of his paternal grandparents, where he lived for six months
before the trial court's decision to award custody to the mother. Id. The grandparents refused to give
the child to his mother, preferring that he be in the custody of one of the father's brothers and his
wife. Id. It is possible that, had the grandparents sought custody for themselves, a court might have
found extraordinary circumstances. Since there were no extraordinary circumstances, the best
interest of the child test was not triggered and the trial court ought to have determined only that the
parent was fit.
267. By triggering the best interest of the child test, a finding of extraordinary circumstances
permits a court to treat a parent versus nonparent dispute as if it were an interparent dispute. In
effect, it treats a psychological parent as a functional parent. To the extent that Patzer may impose a
more difficult burden on the nonparent, that greater burden is due to the parents' paramount right
against any nonparent, an element not relevant in interparent disputes. See Patzer, 396 N.W.2d at
743.
268. In In re D. G. and in Mansukhani v. Pailing, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated:
Continuity in a child's life, especially a young child, is one of the most important
factors in determining that child's best interests. This point is well explained in Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child by Freud, Goldstein, and Solnit .... The authors point out
that the greatest influence on a child comes from that person or persons the child is
used to, fond of, and connected with by experiences, memories, and identification.
That person becomes the child's psychological parent in whose care the child feels
valued and wanted. With every change in this parent figure, the child's development
may regress.
In this case, continuity in the child's life can be preserved by maintaining
custody with the grandparents. The advantages to the child by avoiding uprooting
him outweigh the somewhat minor problems the lower court found with the
grandparents.
Mansukhani v. Pailing, 318 N.W.2d 748, 753 (N.D. 1982); In re D.G., 246 N.W.2d 892, 895 (N.D.
1976). The court cited this language in Daley v. Gunville as showing that "[tlhis court has repeatedly
stressed the importance of continuity and stability in a child's life, especially in the life of a young
child, as factors in determining the child's best interests." Daley, 348 N.W.2d at 446. Elster points
out that a presumption in favor of the status quo underlies both the primary caretaker presumption
and cases preferring custodial nonparents to parents. Elster, supra note 7, at 11.
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Certainly the North Dakota extraordinary circumstances cases
dramatically illustrate the linkage between primary caretaking and
primary psychological parenthood. The linkage may be taken for
granted in interparent cases, but cases like Porter in which primary
caretakers lose custody to financially more stable noncaregivers
leave doubts about that recognition, because it seems incongruous
to treat the primary psychological relationship created by primary
caretaking as important enough to override the presumptive
common law and constitutional entitlement of a fit parent as
against a nonparent but not as more significant than relative
financial stability in interparent disputes.
VI. WOULD A WEAK PRIMARY CARETAKER
PREFERENCE MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE?
Given the complexity of marital roles and parental
relationships, one can question whether any judicial standard can
meaningfully affect the outcome of custody contests between two
parents when each shows promise of functioning well as a single
parent, or between two parents who both seem marginally
adequate but are not unfit in the stricter sense that justifies removal
of children from parental custody. Proponents of a weak primary
caretaker presumption modestly claim that such a standard would
at least function instrumentally to deter litigation and coercive
misuse of litigation threats 269 and that substantively it would
control dispositions in cases in which a judge "concludes at the end
of all the evidence that she has no strong basis for believing that the
children will do better in one setting than the other." 270
269. Chambers, supra note 10, at 563; Cochran, supra note 173, at 61. While it is clear that a
weak presumption puts the burden on the nonprimary caretaker to show that as custodian he or she
would better serve the best interest of the child, it is not clear whether that burden must be satisfied
by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of evidence. Chambers recommends the
clear-and-convincing test because there is evidence that the weaker standard does not effectively
deter litigation. Chambers, supra note 10, at 563. Cochran agrees that:
[Al child custody preference should have an intermediate weight, requiring the parent
opposing the preference to establish by clear and convincing evidence that some
alternative to the preferred custody arrangement would be better for the child. Such a
standard strikes the best balance between avoiding litigation and conflict and allowing
courts to reach individualized decisions. In those cases in which courts can not clearly
determine that a custody arrangement other than the preferred one would be better for
the child, litigation is unlikely. A parent who does not have evidence that an
alternative custodial arrangement is justified will be discouraged from litigation, and
he or she will not be able to mount an effecitve threat of litigation in custody
negotiations.
Cochran, supra note 173, at 61.
270. Chambers, supra note 10, at 563.
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The extent to which a weak presumption might have changed
results in past North Dakota cases is necessarily speculative because
of course the disputes and opinions might have developed very
differently if the presumption had been in place. The impact on
articulated rationales in those cases is less speculative. It would no
longer be possible to deny custody to a primary caretaker on the
ground that a different consideration was as important as primary
caretaking in determining the best interest of a child. Certainly, in
Porter, the rationale for putting the Porter children in the custody of
their father would have been impossible if primary caretaking had
been treated as more important, rather than as neither more nor
less significant, than employment and fiscal stability. 271 Neither
would the greater stability of the nonprimary caretakers in
Landsberger 272 and Naumann 273 have provided a sufficient rationale.
It would not be possible to weigh closely balanced evidence and
conclude without further analysis that the best interest of a child
would be served by an award of custody to a nonprimary caretaker
in a position to offer a more stable environment. In cases in which
one parent was identified as primary caretaker, litigants would
have to show and trial courts would have to find either that prima
facie evidence of primary psychological parentage had been
rebutted or that other considerations were so significant that they
outweighed the primary caretaker preference. 274
271. See supra pages 500-03, 505-06.
272. See supra pages 506-07.
273. See supra pages 507-08.
274. For example, the rationale in Gravning would not be sufficient to override a presumption.
See Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1986). In Gravning the trial court found each
parent competent, capable, and equal in the eyes of the law. Id. at 623. The trial court awarded
custody of the two- and one-half-year old child to his father and left the one- and one-half-year old in
custody of the mother. Id. at 622. Expressly declining to follow the Pikula strong presumption in favor
of primary caretakers, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 622, 624. The supreme
court, characterizing the findings as "not elaborate," noted with apparent approval that the lower
court was concerned about the mother's lack of cooperation in visitation while she had sole custody
during the year of separation. Id. at 622. The supreme court noted that it had warned in a prior case
that lack of cooperation in visitation could be very significant in determining custody. Id.; see Lapp v.
Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 131 (N.D. 1980).
Several doctrinal developments have converged to make visitation an extremely important
entitlement. Since both parents have a fundamental liberty interest in their parental relationships,
visitation for a noncustodial parent is a constitutional entitlement. See supra notes 48-58 and
accompanying text. Influential contemporary research supports the premise that maintaining a
relationship with both parents is very important to the best interest of children. E.g., J. WALLERSTEIN
&J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE.BREAK Up 218 (1980) (even when children had good relationships with
custodial parents, children did not perform well if they felt rejected by noncustodial parents). North
Dakota, by case law, and by subsequent statutory enactment, provides that noncustodial parents are
entitled to visitation unless visitation is likely to endanger the child's physical or mental health.
Gardebring v. Rizzo, 269 N.W.2d 104, 109 (N.D. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-05-22 (2) (1981).
Proof to deny or severely restrict visitation must be higher than probable cause. Healy v. Healy, 397
N.W.2d 71, 73 (N.D. 1986).
While noncooperation in visitation might be important enough to override a presumption in a
particular case, recognition of the importance of maintaining continuity of primary caretaking would
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It is possible in North Dakota cases in which primary
caretakers lost custody for reasons which would not outweigh a
presumption that different rationales might have supported the
same results. The opinions and briefs in such cases refer to factors
which might upon analysis have been important enough to override
or rebut a weak primary caretaker presumption.
Porter, Landsberger, and Naumann all include criticism of the
primary caretaker's parenting. 275 Trial judges in those cases might
have been more significantly influenced by allegations of bad
require that other means of protecting visitation be considered before disrupting that primary
relationship. A range of protections are available. Visitation can be increased to compensate for
visitation wrongfully withheld and to deter further interference. E.g., Lavarnway v. Pawlewicz, 98
A.D.2d 897 __, 471 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (1983); Exparte Karr, 663 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. 1983); In
re King, 44 Wash. App. 189, 194, 721 P.2d 557, 559 (1986); IOWA CoDE ANN. S 598.23 (2) (Supp.
1987); MINN. STAT. S 518.175 (6) (1986). Furthermore, courts can punish interference with custody
by contempt, although they cannot impose future, self executing contempt penalties. Vande Hoven
v. Vande Hoven, 399 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 1987). Tort damages may be awarded for interference
with visitation. E.g., Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706, 713 (W.D. Mo. 1984). But see
Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 200-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to grant tort relief to non-
custodial parent).
Award of custody of three-year old in Dizayee v. Dizayee as based in part on the trial court's
conclusion that the primary cartaker mother had "an attitude of foreclosing contact between the
son and father" while she had interim custody and particularly after she moved from Steele, North
Dakota to Grafton, North Dakota and the father remained in Bismarck, North Dakota. Dizayee v.
Dizayee, No. 37535, mem. at I (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. March 12, 1987), aff'd, 414 N.W. 2d 606
(N.D. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, No. 870091CA (N.D. Dec. 30, 1987). It was undisputed that the
mother strictly complied with all court-ordered visitation, but she was not cooperative when the
father requested additional time. Record at 36-37, 97, 125, 149-50, Dizayee (No. 37535).
Furthermore, on one occasion when she was in Bismarck for a convention she did not let the father
know his child was there. Id. at 120-22. The court apparently did not consider the alternative of
ordering more liberal visitation, nor did it recognize that the mother's tense and literal attitude about
court orders might have been related to the fact that she had been physically abused throughout the
marriage. Id. at 88, 91-94, 176-78.
275. Naumann v. Naumann, 376 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 1985); Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364
N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1985); Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235 (N.D. 1979). The Porter trial court
found:
[Plursuant to the defendant's exhibits, A, B, C, C, K & L which are polaroid pictures
of Brian Porter there is an indication that some scratching or other bruising of Brian
Porter had taken place prior to the picture being taken, during which time Brian
Porter was in the primary care and custody of Audrey Porter.
Porter v. Porter, No. 29446, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment at 5
(N.E. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Nov. 1, 1977). The seriousness of the two-year old child's scratches was
much disputed and their cause was not established. Record at 145- 147, 332-334, 404-407, 411-413.
The trial court also found that:
[The mother] allowed one Mr. McDonald to take the parties' oldest son, David,
to the dumping grounds at the Grand Forks Air Force Base during the evening hours,
at which time said child was improperly clothed and not in the care of custody of either
parent.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment at 5-6. While in itself that episode
seems insignificant, its inclusion as a formal finding may suggest that the court was concerned about
negative parenting by the mother that it did not more clearly identify.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in Landsberger noted that the mother was occasionally
unnecessarily harsh with the children and that she was worse than the father about arguing and using
foul language in the presence of the children. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d at 920. The Landsberger trial
court observed that:
[VOL. 63:481
1987] PRIMARY CARETAKERS 557
parenting by primary caretakers than their opinions acknowledge.
Both the trial courts and the North Dakota Supreme Court perhaps
do not dwell on nor explore such negative qualities because they are
reluctant to hurt parents' feelings or to strain continuing
relationships of children with noncustodial parents. However, fact-
finding and analysis is clearer and therefore more reliable as to
grounds on which decisions explicitly rest. Doubts that are not fully
articulated or investigated because a decision purports to be based
on different grounds might not survive more serious scrutiny. 2 76
Impressions of immoral or at least inappropriate conduct by
the primary caretaking motherswere detailed by the trial courts in
Porter, Landsberger, and Naumann. 2 77 Immoral conduct also seems to
have been a significant factor in Bashus v. Bashus, a 1986 North
[The mother] would overreact at times in connection with disciplining the
children. She attributes this also [as well as having talked of need for psychiatric help]
to underlying marital tension. The inappropriate discipline did not amount to child
abuse but could be characterized as occasionally unnecessarily harsh.
Landsberger v. Landsberger, No. 34361, mem. at 2 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. June 26, 1984).
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in Naumann did not indicate negative qualities about the
mother's parenting except by noting that the trial court concluded the child's health problems could
be better handled in the home environment the father could provide, apparently a reference to the
fact that the child had congestion difficulties and the mother smoked. Naumann, 376 N.W.2d at 802-
03. The trial court, however, considered "two, serious accidents, and related injuries suffered by the
child while with the Mother, which were out of the ordinary." Naumann v. Naumann, No. 4483,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order forJudgment at 3 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. May,
1985). In one of those accidents the child had broken his leg falling down stairs. Brief of Appellant at
9, Naumann v. Naumann, 376 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 1985). The other accident caused two black eyes
and required stitches for the child's nose. Brief of Appellee at 5.
276. Anecdotal evidence of harsh discipline by primary caretakers is fairly common. It is
difficult to evaluate the significance of such testimony. Furthermore, no comparative evaluation is
possible if the nonprimary caretaker has been relatively uninvolved in past childcare. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals in Tanghe awarded custody of five young children to their mother despite two
incidents near the time the divorce was initiated when the mother's discipline included scratching
and biting, an incident five years earlier when she spanked one of the children with a wooden spoon,
and the testimony of several witnesses that the mother yelled and screamed at the children and that
the father was calmer in providing discipline. Tanghe v. Tanghe, 400 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987). A psychologist who had counseled the mother testified that "for a full-time homemaker
raising five young children, yelling as a means of discipline is not unusual." Id. at 391. The appellate
court agreed that a parent who has the full-time responsibility to care for and discipline five young
children, and yells occasionally in doing so, "may not be engaging in the most constructive or
appropriate disciplinary practices, but, as recognized by the psychologist at trial, is not engaging in
unusual behavior." Id. at 392.
277. See Naumann v. Naumann, 376 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 1985); Landsberger v. Landsberger,
364 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1985); Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235 (N.D. 1979). The Porter trial court
made a formal finding that:
[D]uring the course of these proceedings while Audrey Porter had the primary care
and custody of the parties minor children she allowed one Mr. McDonald in her home
while she resided at the parties home on the Grand Forks Air Force Base and later
while she resided in her apartment in the City of Grand Forks at which time the parties
minor children were residing with Audrey Porter and that McDonald did in fact spend
several evenings in the home.
Porter, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order forJudgment at 6.
The Naumann trial court made a formal finding that: "The mother admitted a male friend spent
the night at her home while the child was present, and that she and the child spent the night at the
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Dakota case in which the supreme court awarded custody of four-,
six-, seven-, and eight-year old children to their father on the
ground that he and his extended family offered them a more
permanent environment.2 78  Moral conduct is a relevant
consideration in determining custody, but its relevance is limited to
its immediate or long term impact on children. 279 Findings in
Porter, Landsberger, Naumann, and Bashus suggest moral
disapprobation rather than a detrimental impact on the children
caused by parental immorality, but of course the courts did not rely
on that rationale in awarding custody to the nonprimary caretaker.
male friend's home, for an inference of immoral conduct." Naumann, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order forJudgment at 3.
The trial court in Landsberger discussed the fact that the mother frequented bars during the last
four months of the marriage. The trial court determined that:
One of her reactions to the stresses occasioned by the marital problems was to
begin frequenting nightclubs with various women friends. During these excursions she
would converse and dance with men. It is obvious that she enjoyed the attention.
There is some indication that at least one individual was attempting to develop an
intimate relationship with her, but there is no persuasive evidence that she was
actually unfaithful. Mrs. Landsberger says she now considers going to bars as being
inappropriate and does not do this any more.
Landsberger, mem. at 2-3.
278. See Bashus v. Bashus, 393 N.W. 2d 748, 751-52 (N.D. 1986); Record at 15, 22-23, 31-32,
86-88, 91-94, Bashus v. Bashus, No. 36493 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Dec. 19, 1986). The parents
separated in June, 1984, after which the father moved with the children from Montana to North
Dakota. Bashus, 393 N.W.2d at 749. The mother brought the children back to Montana in August
pursuant to an ex parte Montana order. Id. The father was awarded temporary custody after a
Montana hearing in September and returned with the children to North Dakota. Id. The mother
remained in Montana and later went with her boyfriend to Texas. Id. In December she moved to
North Dakota and unsuccessfully attempted a reconciliation with the father. Id. The trial court said
that it would be "a travesty" to ignore that the mother's "prolonged absence from home on several
occasions can only be described as near abandonment." Bashus v. Bashus, No. 36493, mem. at 1 (S.
Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Jan. 8, 1986). The supreme court described this finding as harsh but found it
supported by evidence that when the mother was separated from the children from September to
December 1984 her only contact with them was by telephone every couple of weeks. Bashus, 393
N.W.2d at 751. The mother testified that:
Jeff is correct in stating that I only called about once every two weeks, because it was
extremely hard for me to talk to my children. It took me days after I talked to them on
the phone, because I missed them so terribly bad, and it wasjust hard for me to talk to
them. It was emotional to listen to their little voices over the telephone, and it took a
lot out of me. It was hard for me to call.
Record at 94, Bashus (No. 36493).
279. See Larson v. Larson, 294 N.W.2d 616, 619 (N.D. 1980) (trial court was not clearly
erroneous in concluding before tangible manifestations of injury that morality and lifestyle could
injure children's moral well being and development). When a custodial father lived with a woman to
whom he was not married, the court observed that such circumstances do not mandate transfer of
custody. Lapp v. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d 350, 353 (N.D. 1983). Longterm cohabitation with a man to
whom she was not married by a custodial grandmother who was a psychological parent raised
concerns and was not condoned but did not prevent awarding custody to her. Daley v. Gunville, 348
N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1984). The trial court did not treat as relevant that the stable father in
Dizayee v. Dizayee was living with a woman to whom he was not married and who testified in his
behalf. See Record at 24, 62, 71-72, Dizayee v. Dizayee, No. 37535, Mem. (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D.
March 12, 1987), aff'd, 414 N.W. 2d 606 (N.D. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, No. 870091CA (N.D.
Dec. 30, 1987).
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As with respect to negative qualities in the parenting of primary
caretakers, determination of immoral conduct and analysis of its
impact on the children would necessarily be clearer and more
reliable if the decision explicitedly rested on a finding that the
impact of the conduct was so significant that it outweighed the
presumptively more important consideration of primary
caretaking. 280
Several North Dakota cases in which custody was awarded to
a nonprimary caretaker suggest circumstances in which prima facie
evidence- that the primary caretaking parent was the primary
psychological parent might have been rebutted. In Willi v. Willi,
custody of four- and two-year old daughters was initially awarded
to their primary caretaking mother but the father won custody of
the four-year old on appeal. 281 The Supreme Court of North
Dakota concluded that the trial court had not made appropriate
findings of fact as to the relationship between the mother and that
child. 282 It did not, however, agree with the father that the mother
was abusive or that she was incapable of or not disposed to give the
child love and affection. 283 Since neither the trial court nor the
supreme court made a positive evaluation of the father-child
relationship, it is not clear why the supreme court held it clearly
erroneous for the trial court to award custody to the mother. 284
Testimony in the record, however, suggests that this might have
been an appropriate case for finding a primary caretaker
presumption rebutted by a determination that the nonprimary
caretaker was the primary psychological parent. There was,
interspersed with arguable inconclusive testimony intended to show
the mother rejecting and abusive, evidence of the child's strong
psychological bonding to her father. 285 If it was indeed the father
rather than the primary caretaking mother to whom the child
turned for nurture and security, then Willi is an unusual case in
which the primary psychological relationship did not grow out of
the caretaking by the mother and in which the father should have
been able to overcome the presumption that it had. Similarly, if the
280. Evidence of strong bias in the past against sexual misconduct by custodial mothers
suggests a need for careful scrutiny of the basis for finding children harmed by immoral conduct of
primary caretakers. See Levy, supra note 78, at 500-01.
281. 335 N.W.2d 790 (N.D. 1983).
282. Willi v. Willi, 335 N.W.2d 790, 794 (N.D. 1983).
283. Id.
284. See id. The supreme court in Gravning characterized Willi as a case where the record
revealed seriously uneven treatment of one of two children by the initial custodial parent. Gravning
v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 623 (N.D. 1986).
285. Record at 17-20, 21, 49, 57, 117-119, 144, 146, Willi v. Willi, No. 48178 (N.W. Dist. Ct.
N.D. March 23, 1982), modified, 335 N.W.2d 790 (N.D. 1983).
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mother in Bashus was primary caretaker, 8 6 the father might have
been able to rebut prima facie evidence that the mother was the
primary psychological parent. 287
VII. CONCLUSION
If nonprimary caretakers and trial courts are on notice that
they must overcome the presumption that it is in the best interest of
children to be in the custody of their primary caretaker parent, they
might be able to do so. The results in Porter, Landsberger, Naumann,
Willi, and Bashus might have been unchanged if a primary
caretaker preference had been in place, but the fact finding and
analysis on which those results were based would have been better
developed. Alternatively, upon closer analysis, other
considerations might have been determined insufficient to override
or rebut the presumption favoring custody for the primary
caretaker. In either event, the substantive content of the primary
caretaker presumption would reduce the risk of underevaluation of
the importance of children's primary psychological relationships.
While the impact of a primary caretaker presumption might
be more likely to change rationales of opinions than to change their
results, that impact would not be insignificant. Reported
opinions-and the shadow that reported opinions cast both for
further doctrinal development and for private ordering by
negotiation and mediation-would be significantly different. The
Porter-Landsberger shadow invites coercive misuse of the custody
issue against economically insecure primary caretakers who have
not developed working skills during the course of a marriage. The
different and sharper rationales necessary to rebut or override a
primary caretaker presumption would cast a shadow more likely to
protect the relationship of children to the parents to whom they are
more closely bonded.
286. One parent is not identified as primary caretaker if there has been substantial coparenting.
See cases cited supra notes 230-31. In Bashus the father did not claim to have been closely involved with
the children during the marriage. See Record at 155-56, Bashus v. Bashus, No. 36493 (S. Cent. Dist.
Ct. N.D. Dec. 19, 1986), aff'd, 393 N.W. 2d 748 (N.D. 1986). The father testified that:
Earlier than '84 you've got to also look at the kid's ages. I went to work. I spent time
with my kids, played with ry kids, but again they were still at a younger age, too,
that-you know, I babysat and the time that I could spend with them, I did. Again, I
don't, you know, feel that I was off running around or doing one thing or another or
avoiding ever being with them.
Id. However, the mother agreed that he had become more involved in parenting after their
separation in 1984. Id. at 87. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the father remained in
daily contact with the children even when the mother had sole custody during six months preceding
the divorce. Bashus, 393 N.W. 2d at 751.
287. The record included many references to the father's relationship with the children. Record
at 26-27, 33, 41-44, 71, 75, 77, 81, 87-89, Bashus (No. 36493).
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